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Abstract: It is widely assumed that human learning and the structure of human languages are intimately related. This relationship is
frequently suggested to derive from a language-specific biological endowment, which encodes universal, but communicatively arbitrary,
principles of language structure (a Universal Grammar or UG). How might such a UG have evolved? We argue that UG could not have
arisen either by biological adaptation or non-adaptationist genetic processes, resulting in a logical problem of language evolution.
Specifically, as the processes of language change are much more rapid than processes of genetic change, language constitutes a
“moving target” both over time and across different human populations, and, hence, cannot provide a stable environment to which
language genes could have adapted. We conclude that a biologically determined UG is not evolutionarily viable. Instead, the
original motivation for UG – the mesh between learners and languages – arises because language has been shaped to fit the human
brain, rather than vice versa. Following Darwin, we view language itself as a complex and interdependent “organism,” which
evolves under selectional pressures from human learning and processing mechanisms. That is, languages themselves are shaped by
severe selectional pressure from each generation of language users and learners. This suggests that apparently arbitrary aspects of
linguistic structure may result from general learning and processing biases deriving from the structure of thought processes,
perceptuo-motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatics.
Keywords: biological adaptation; cultural evolution; grammaticalization; language acquisition; language evolution; linguistic change;
natural selection; Universal Grammar
1. Introduction
Natural language constitutes one of the most complex
aspects of human cognition, yet children already have a
good grasp of their native language before they can tie
their shoes or ride a bicycle. The relative ease of acqui-
sition suggests that when a child makes a “guess” about
the structure of language on the basis of apparently
limited evidence, the child has an uncanny tendency to
guess right. This strongly suggests that there must be a
close relationship between the mechanisms by which the
child acquires and processes language and the structure
of language itself.
What is the origin of this presumed close relationship
between the mechanisms children use in acquisition and
the structure of language? One view is that specialized
brain mechanisms specific to language acquisition have
evolved over long periods of natural selection (e.g., Pinker
& Bloom 1990). A second view rejects the idea that these
specialized brain mechanisms have arisen through adap-
tation, and assumes that they have emerged through some
non-adaptationist route, just as it has been argued that
many biological structures are not the product of adaptation
(e.g., Bickerton 1995; Gould 1993; Jenkins 2000; Lightfoot
2000). Both these viewpoints put the explanatory emphasis
on brain mechanisms specialized for language – and ask
how they have evolved.
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In this target article, we develop and argue for a third
view, which takes the opposite starting point: Our question
is not, “Why is the brain so well suited to learning
language?” Instead, we ask “Why is language so well
suited to being learned by the brain?” We propose that
language has adapted through gradual processes of cultural
evolution to be easy to learn to produce and understand.
Thus, the structure of human language must inevitably be
shaped around human learning and processing biases deriv-
ing from the structure of our thought processes, perceptuo-
motor factors, cognitive limitations, and pragmatic con-
straints. Language is easy for us to learn and use, not
because our brains embody knowledge of language, but
because language has adapted to our brains. Following
Darwin (1874), we argue that it is useful metaphorically
to view languages as “organisms” – that is, highly complex
systems of interconnected constraints – that have evolved
in a symbiotic relationship with humans. According to this
view, whatever domain-general learning and processing
biases people happen to have will tend to become
embedded in the structure of language – because it will
be easier to learn to understand and produce languages,
or specific linguistic forms, that fit these biases.
We start by introducing “The Logical Problem of
Language Evolution” (sect. 2), which faces theories
proposing that humans have evolved specialized brain
mechanisms for language. The following two sections,
“Evolution of Universal Grammar by Biological Adap-
tation” (sect. 3) and “Evolution of Universal Grammar
by Non-adaptationist Means” (sect. 4), evaluate adapta-
tionist and non-adaptationist explanations of language
evolution, concluding that both face insurmountable
theoretical obstacles. Instead, we present an alternative
perspective, “Language as Shaped by the Brain”
(sect. 5), in which language is treated as an evolutionary
system in its own right, adapting to the human brain.
The next two sections, “Constraints on Language Struc-
ture” (sect. 6) and “How Constraints Shape Language
over Time” (sect. 7), discuss what biases have shaped
language evolution and how these can be observed in
language change mediated by cultural transmission.
Finally, in section 8, the “Scope of the Argument,” we con-
sider the wider implications of our theory of language
evolution, including a radical recasting of the problem of
language acquisition.
2. The logical problem of language evolution
For a period spanning three decades, Chomsky (1965;
1972; 1980; 1986; 1988; 1993) has argued that a substan-
tial innate endowment of language-specific knowledge
is necessary for language acquisition. These constraints
form a Universal Grammar (UG); that is, a collection of
grammatical principles that hold across all human
languages. In this framework, a child’s language ability
gradually unfolds according to a genetic blueprint in
much the same way as a chicken grows a wing (Chomsky
1988). The staunchest proponents of this view even go as
far as to claim that “doubting that there are language-
specific, innate computational capacities today is a bit
like being still dubious about the very existence of mol-
ecules, in spite of the awesome progress of molecular
biology” (Piattelli-Palmarini 1994, p. 335).
There is considerable variation in current conceptions
of the exact nature of UG, ranging from being close to
the Principle and Parameter Theory (PPT; Chomsky
1981) of pre-minimalist generative grammar (e.g., Crain &
Pietroski 2006; Crain et al. 2006), to the Simpler Syntax
(SS) version of generative grammar proposed by Jackend-
off (2002) and colleagues (Culicover & Jackendoff 2005;
Pinker & Jackendoff 2005), to the Minimalist Program
(MP) in which language acquisition is confined to learning
a lexicon from which cross-linguistic variation is proposed
to arise (Boeckx 2006; Chomsky 1995). From the view-
point of PPT, UG consists of a set of genetically specified
universal linguistic principles combined with a set of par-
ameters to account for variations among languages (Crain
et al. 2006). Information from the language environment is
used during acquisition to determine the parameter set-
tings relevant for individual languages. The SS approach
combines elements from construction grammar (e.g.,
Goldberg 2006) with more traditional structural principles
from generative grammar, including principles relating to
phrase structure (X-bar theory), agreement, and case-
marking. Along with constraints arising from the syntax-
semantic interface, these basic structural principles form
part of a universal “toolkit” of language-specific mechan-
isms, encoded in a genetically specified UG (Culicover
& Jackendoff 2005). By contrast, proponents of MP con-
strue language as a perfect system for mapping between
sound and meaning (Chomsky 1995). In departure from
earlier generative approaches, only recursion (in the
form of Merge) is considered to be unique to the human
language ability (Hauser et al. 2002). Variation among
languages is now explained in terms of lexical parameteri-
zation (Borer 1984); that is, differences between languages
are no longer explained in terms of parameters associated
with grammars (as in PPT), but primarily in terms of
parameters associated with particular lexical items
(though some non-lexical parameters currently remain;
Baker 2001; Boeckx 2006).
Common to these three current approaches to genera-
tive grammar is the central assumption that the constraints
of UG (whatever their form) are fundamentally arbitrary –
that is, not determined by functional considerations. That
is, these principles cannot be explained in terms of learn-
ing, cognitive constraints, or communicative effectiveness.
For example, consider the principles of binding, which
have come to play a key role in generative linguistics
(Chomsky 1981). The principles of binding capture pat-
terns of, among other things, reflexive pronouns (e.g.,
himself, themselves) and accusative pronouns (him,
them, etc.), which appear, at first sight, to defy functional
explanation. Consider Examples (1) to (4), where the
subscripts indicate co-reference, and asterisks indicate
ungrammaticality.
1. Johni sees himselfi.
2. Johni sees himi.
3. Johni said hei/j won.
4. Hei said Johni won.
In (1) the pronoun himself must refer to John; in (2) it
cannot. In (3) the pronoun he may refer to John or to
another person; in (4) it cannot refer to John. These and
many other cases indicate that an extremely rich set of pat-
terns govern the behavior of pronouns, and these patterns
appear arbitrary – it appears that numerous alternative
patterns would, from a functional standpoint, serve
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equally well. These patterns are instantiated in PPT by the
principles of binding theory (Chomsky 1981), in SS by
constraints arising from structural and/or syntax-seman-
tics interface principles (Culicover & Jackendoff 2005),
and in MP by limitations on movement (internal merge;
Hornstein 2001). Independent of their specific formu-
lations, the constraints on binding, while apparently uni-
versal across natural languages, are assumed to be
arbitrary and, hence, may be presumed to be part of the
genetically encoded UG.
Putative arbitrary universals, such as the restrictions on
binding, contrast with functional constraints on language.
Whereas the former are hypothesized to derive from the
internal workings of a UG-based language system, the
latter originate from cognitive and pragmatic constraints
related to language acquisition and use. Consider the ten-
dency in English to place long phrases after short ones; for
example, as evidenced by so-called “heavy-NP shifts.” In
Example (5) shown below, the long (or “heavy”) direct-
object noun phrase (NP), the book he had not been able
to locate for over two months, appears at the end of the
sentence, separated from its canonical postverbal position
by the prepositional phrase (PP) under his bed. Both
corpus analyses (Hawkins 1994) and psycholinguistic
sentence-production experiments (Stallings et al. 1998)
suggest that Example (5) is much more acceptable than
the standard (or “non-shifted”) version in Example (6),
in which the direct-object NP is placed immediately fol-
lowing the verb.
5. John found PP[under his bed] NP[the book he had not
been able to locate for over two months].
6. John found NP[the book he had not been able to
locate for over two months] PP[under his bed].
Whereas individuals speaking head-initial languages,
such as English, tend to prefer short phrases before long
ones, speakers of head-final languages, such as Japanese,
have been shown to have the opposite long-before-short
preference (Yamashita & Chang 2001). In both cases, the
preferential ordering of long versus short phrases can be
explained in terms of minimization of memory load and
maximization of processing efficiency (Hawkins 2004). As
such, the patterns of length-induced phrasal reordering
are generally considered within generative grammar to be
a performance issue related to functional constraints
outside the purview of UG (although some functionally
oriented linguists have suggested that these kinds of
performance constraints may shape grammar itself; e.g.,
Hawkins 1994; 2004). In contrast, the constraints inherent
in UG are arbitrary and non-functional in the sense that
they do not relate to communicative or pragmatic consider-
ations, nor do they derive from limitations on the mechan-
isms involved in using or acquiring language. Indeed, some
generative linguists have argued that aspects of UG hinder
communication (e.g., Chomsky 2005b; Lightfoot 2000).
If we suppose that such arbitrary principles of UG are
genetically specified, then this raises the question of the
evolutionary origin of this genetic endowment. Two views
have been proposed. Adaptationists emphasize a gradual
evolution of the human language faculty through natural
selection (e.g., Briscoe 2003; Corballis 1992; 2003; Dunbar
2003; Greenfield 1991; Hurford 1991; Jackendoff 2002;
Nowak et al. 2001; Pinker 1994; 2003; Pinker & Bloom
1990; Pinker & Jackendoff 2005). Linguistic ability confers
added reproductive fitness, leading to a selective pressure
for language genes1; richer language genes encode increas-
ingly elaborate grammars. In contrast, non-adaptationists
(e.g., Bickerton 1995 – but see Bickerton 2003; Chomsky
1988; Jenkins 2000; Lightfoot 2000; Piattelli-Palmarini
1989) suggest that natural selection played only a minor
role in the emergence of language in humans, focusing
instead on a variety of alternative possible evolutionary
mechanisms by which UG could have emerged de novo
(e.g., as a result of as few as two or three key mutation
“events”; Lanyon 2006).
In the next two sections, 3 and 4, we argue that both of
these views, as currently formulated, face profound theor-
etical difficulties resulting in a logical problem of language
evolution.2 This is because, on analysis, it is mysterious
how proto-language – which must have been, at least
initially, a cultural product likely to be highly variable
over both time and geographical locations – could have
become genetically fixed as a highly elaborate biological
structure. Hence, there is no currently viable account of
how a genetically encoded UG could have evolved. In sub-
sequent sections (5 to 7), we argue that the brain does not
encode principles of UG – and therefore neither adapta-
tionist nor non-adaptationist solutions are required.
Instead, language has been shaped by the brain: Language
reflects pre-existing, and hence non-language-specific,
human learning and processing mechanisms.
3. Evolution of Universal Grammar by
biological adaptation
The adaptationist position is probably the most widely
held view of the origin of UG. We first describe adapta-
tionism in biology and its proposed application to UG
before outlining three conceptual difficulties for adapta-
tionist explanations of language evolution.
3.1. Adaptation: The very idea
Adaptation is a candidate explanation for the origin of any
innate biological structure. In general, the idea is that
natural selection has favored genes that code for biological
structures that increase fitness (in terms of expected
numbers of viable offspring).3 Typically, a biological struc-
ture contributes to fitness by fulfilling some purpose – the
heart is assumed to pump blood, the legs to provide loco-
motion, or UG to support language acquisition. If so,
natural selection will generally favor biological structures
that fulfill their purpose well, so that, over the generations,
hearts will become well adapted to pumping blood, legs
well adapted to locomotion, and any presumed biological
endowment for language acquisition will become well
adapted to acquiring language.
Perhaps the most influential statement of the adapta-
tionist viewpoint is by Pinker and Bloom (1990). They
argue that “natural selection is the only scientific expla-
nation of adaptive complexity. ‘Adaptive complexity’
describes any system composed of many interacting
parts where the details of the parts’ structure and arrange-
ment suggest design to fulfill some function” (p. 709; their
emphasis). As another example of adaptive complexity,
they refer to the exquisite optical and computational
sophistication of the vertebrate visual system. Pinker and
Bloom note that such a complex and intricate mechanism
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has an extremely low probability of occurring by chance.
Whatever the influence of non-adaptational factors (see
sect. 4 of our article), they argue that there must addition-
ally have been substantial adaptation to fine-tune a system
as complex as the visual system. Given that language
appears as complex as vision, Pinker and Bloom conclude
that it is also highly improbable that language is entirely
the product of non-adaptationist processes (see also
Pinker 2003).
The scope and validity of the adaptationist viewpoint in
biology is controversial (e.g., Dawkins 1986; Gould 2002;
Gould & Lewontin 1979; Hecht Orzak & Sober 2001);
and some theorists have used this controversy to question
adaptationist views of the origin of UG (e.g., Bickerton
1995; Lewontin 1998). Here, we take a different tack.
We argue that, whatever the merits of adaptationist expla-
nation in general, and as applied to vision in particular, the
adaptationist account cannot extend to a putative UG.
3.2. Why Universal Grammar could not be an
adaptation to language
Let us suppose that a genetic encoding of universal prop-
erties of language did, as the adaptationist view holds, arise
as an adaptation to the environment, here to the linguistic
environment. This point of view seems to work most natu-
rally for aspects of language that have a transparent func-
tional value. For example, the compositional character of
language (i.e., the ability to express in an infinite number
of messages using a finite number of lexical items) seems
to have great functional advantages. A biological endow-
ment that allows, or perhaps requires, that language has
this form appears likely to lead to enhanced communi-
cation; and hence, to be positively selected. Thus, over
time, functional aspects of language might be expected
to become genetically encoded across the entire popu-
lation. But UG, according to Chomsky (e.g., 1980; 1988),
consists precisely of linguistic principles that appear
highly abstract and arbitrary – that is, they have no func-
tional significance. To what extent can an adaptationist
account of the evolution of a biological basis for language
explain how a genetic basis could arise for such abstract
and arbitrary properties of language?
Pinker and Bloom (1990) provide an elegant approach to
this question. They suggest that the constraints imposed by
UG, such as the binding constraints (mentioned in sect. 2
above), can be construed as communication protocols for
transmitting information over a serial channel. Although
the general features of such protocols (e.g., concerning
compositionality, or the use of a small set of discrete
symbols) may be functionally important, many of the
specific aspects of the protocol do not matter, as long as
everyone (within a given speech community) adopts the
same protocol. For example, when using a modem to com-
municate between computers, a particular protocol might
have features such as odd parity, handshake on, 7 bit, and
so forth. However, there are many other settings that
would be just as effective. What is important is that the
computers that are to interact adopt the same set of
settings – otherwise communication will not be possible.
Adopting the same settings is therefore of fundamental
functional importance to communication between compu-
ters, but the particular choice of settings is not. Similarly,
when it comes to the specific features of UG, Pinker and
Bloom suggest that “in the evolution of the language
faculty, many ‘arbitrary’ constraints may have been selected
simply because they defined parts of a standardized com-
municative code in the brains of some critical mass of
speakers” (1990, p. 718).4 Thus, such arbitrary constraints
on language can come to have crucial adaptive value to
the language user; genes that favor such constraints will
be positively selected. Over many generations, the arbitrary
constraints may then become innately specified.
We will argue that this viewpoint faces three fundamen-
tal difficulties, concerning the dispersion of human popu-
lations, language change, and the question of what is
genetically encoded. We consider these in turn.
3.2.1. Problem 1: The dispersion of human popula-
tions. Pinker and Bloom’s (1990) analogy with communi-
cations protocols, while apt, is, however, something of a
double-edged sword. Communications protocols and
other technical standards typically diverge rapidly unless
there is concerted oversight and enforcement to maintain
common standards. Maintaining and developing common
standards is an integral part of software and hardware
development. In the absence of such pressures for stan-
dardization, protocols would rapidly diverge. Given that
language presumably evolved without top-down pressures
for standardization, divergence between languages seems
inevitable. To assume that “universal” arbitrary features
of language would emerge from adaptation by separate
groups of language users, would be analogous to assuming
that the same set of specific features for computer com-
munication protocols might emerge from separate teams
of scientists, working in separate laboratories (e.g., that
different modem designers independently alight on odd
parity, handshake on, 7-bit error correction, and so on).
Note that this point would apply equally well, even if the
teams of scientists emerged from a single group. Once
cut off from each other, groups would develop in indepen-
dent ways.
Indeed, in biological adaptation, genes appear to rapidly
evolve to deal with a specific local environment. Thus,
Darwin observed rich patterns of variations in fauna
(e.g., finches) across the Galapagos Islands, and inter-
preted these variations as adaptation to local island con-
ditions. Hence, if language genes have adapted to local
linguistic environments, we should expect a range of
different biologically encoded UGs, each specifically
adapted to its local linguistic context. Indeed, one might
expect, if anything, that language-genes would diverge
especially rapidly – because the linguistic environment
in each population is assumed to be itself shaped by the
different language-genes in each subpopulation, thus
amplifying the differences in the linguistic environment.
If so, then people should have, at minimum, some specific
predisposition to learn and process languages associated
with their genetic lineage. This does not appear to be
the case, and it is a key assumption of the generative lin-
guistics perspective that the human language endowment
does not vary in this way but is universal across the species
(Chomsky 1980; Pinker 1994).
There is an interesting contrast here with the human
immune system, which has evolved to a very rapidly chan-
ging microbial environment. Crucially, the immune
system can build new antibody proteins (and the genetic
mechanisms from which antibody proteins are constructed)
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without having to eliminate old antibody proteins (Goldsby
et al. 2003). Therefore, natural selection will operate to
enrich the coverage of the immune system (though such
progress will not always be cumulative, of course); there is
no penalty for the immune system following a fast-moving
“target” (defined by the microbial environment). But the
case of acquiring genes coding for regularities in language
is very different – because, at any one time, there is just
one language (or at most two or three) that must be acquir-
ed – and, hence, a bias that helps learn a language with
property P will thereby inhibit learning languages with
not-P. The fact that language change is so fast (so that
whether the current linguistic environment has property
P or not will vary rapidly, in the time-scale of biological
evolution) means that such biases will, on balance, be
counterproductive.
Given that the immune system does co-evolve with the
microbial environment, different co-evolutionary paths
have been followedwhenhumanpopulations have diverged.
Therefore, populations that have co-evolved to their local
microbial environment are often poorly adapted to other
microbial environments. For example, when Europeans
began to explore the New World, they succumbed in large
numbers to the diseases they encountered, while conversely,
European diseases caused catastrophic collapse in indigen-
ous populations (e.g., Diamond 1997). If an innate UG had
co-evolved with the linguistic environment, similar radically
divergent co-evolutionary paths might be expected. Yet, as
we have noted, the contrary appears to be the case.
The problem of divergent populations arises across a
range of different scenarios concerning the relationship
between language evolution and the dispersion of human
populations. One scenario is that language evolution is
recent and occurred during the dispersion of modern
humans (Homo sapiens sapiens). In this case, whether
language was discovered once, and then spread through-
out human populations, or was discovered in various
locations independently, there remains the problem that
adaptations to language would not be coordinated across
geographically dispersed groups. It is tempting to
suggest that all of these sublanguages will, nonetheless,
obey universal grammatical principles, thus providing
some constancy in the linguistic environment. But this
appeal would, of course, be circular, as we are attempting
to explain the origin of such principles. We shall repeat-
edly have to steer around this circularity trap below.
An alternative scenario is that language evolution pre-
dates the dispersion of modern humans. If so, then it is
conceivable that prior dispersions of hominid populations,
perhaps within Africa, did lead to the emergence of
diverse languages and diverse UGs, adapted to learning
and processing such languages, and therefore that, sub-
sequently, one local population proved to be adaptively
most successful and came to displace other hominid popu-
lations. Thus, on this account, our current UG might con-
ceivably be the only survivor of a larger family of such UGs
as a result of a population “bottleneck” – the universality of
UG would arise, then, because it was genetically encoded in
the sub-population fromwhichmodernhumansdescended.5
This viewpoint is not without difficulties. Some
interpretations of the genetic and archaeological evidence
suggest that the last bottleneck in human evolution
occurred at between 500,000 and 2,000,000 years ago
(e.g., Hawks et al. 2000); few researchers in language
evolution believe that language, in anything like its
modern form, is this old. Moreover, even if we assume a
more recent bottleneck, any such bottleneck must at
least predate the 100,000 years or so since the geographi-
cal dispersion of human populations, and 100,000 years
still seems to provide sufficient time for substantial linguis-
tic divergence to occur. Given that the processes of genetic
adaptation to language most likely would continue to
operate,6 different genetic bases for language would be
expected to evolve across geographically separated popu-
lations. That is, the evolution of UG by adaptation would
appear to require rapid adaptations for language prior to
the dispersion of human populations, followed by an
abrupt cessation of such adaptation, for a long period
after dispersion. The contrast between the evolution of
the putative “language organ” and that of biological pro-
cesses, such as digestion, is striking. The digestive system
is evolutionarily very old, and many orders of magnitude
older than the recent divergence of human populations.
Nonetheless, digestion appears to have adapted in import-
ant ways to recent changes in the dietary environment; for
example, with apparent co-evolution of lactose tolerance
and the domestication of milk-producing animals (Beja-
Pereira et al. 2003).
3.2.2. Problem 2: Language change.Whatever the timing
of the origin of language and hominid dispersion, the thesis
that a genetically encoded UG arose through adaptation
faces a second problem: that, even within a single popu-
lation, linguistic conventions change rapidly. Hence, the
linguistic environment over which selectional pressures
operate presents a “moving target” for natural selection. If
linguistic conventions change more rapidly than genes
change via natural selection, then genes that encode
biases for particular conventions will be eliminated –
because, as the language changes, thebiaseswill be incorrect,
and, hence, decrease fitness. More generally, in a fast-
changing environment, phenotypic flexibility to deal with
various environments will typically be favored over genes
that bias the phenotype narrowly toward a particular envi-
ronment. Again, there is a tempting counterargument – that
the linguistic principles of UG will not change, and hence
these aspects of language will provide a stable linguistic
environment over which adaptation can operate. But, of
course, this argument falls into the circularity trap, because
the genetic endowment of UG is proposed to explain
language universals; so it cannot be assumed that the
language universals pre-date the emergence of the genetic
basis for UG.
Christiansen et al. (2006) illustrate the problems raised
by language change in a series of computer simulations.
They assume the simplest possible set-up: that (binary) lin-
guistic principles and language “genes” stand in a one-to-
one correspondence. Each gene has three alleles – two,
each of which is biased in favor of a version of the corre-
sponding principle, and one neutral allele.7 Agents learn
the language by trial-and-error, where their guesses are
biased according to which alleles they have. The fittest
agents are allowed to reproduce, and a new generation
of agents is produced by sexual recombination and
mutation. When the language is fixed, there is a selection
pressure in favor of the “correctly” biased genes, and these
rapidly come to dominate the population, as illustrated
by Figure 1. This is an instance of the Baldwin effect
Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
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(Baldwin 1896; for discussion, see Weber & Depew 2003)
in which information that is initially learned becomes
encoded in the genome.
A frequently cited example of the Baldwin effect is the
development of calluses on the keels and sterna of ostriches
(Waddington 1942). The proposal is that calluses are initially
developed in response to abrasion where the keel and sterna
touch the ground during sitting. Natural selection then
favored individuals that could develop calluses more
rapidly, until callus development became triggered within
the embryo and could occur without environmental stimu-
lation. Pinker and Bloom (1990) suggest that the Baldwin
effect in a similar way could be the driving force behind
the adaptation of UG. Natural selection will favor learners
who are genetically disposed rapidly to acquire the language
to which they are exposed. Hence, over many generations
this process will lead to a genetically specified UG.
However, when language is allowed to change (e.g.,
because of exogenous forces such as language contact), the
effect reverses – biased genes are severely selected against
when they are inconsistent with the linguistic environment,
and neutral genes come to dominate the population. The
selection in favor of neutral genes occurs even for low
levels of language change (i.e., the effect occurs, to some
degree, even if language change equals the rate of genetic
mutation). But, of course, linguistic change (prior to any
genetic encoding) is likely to have been much faster than
genetic change. After all, in the modern era, language
change has been astonishingly rapid, leading, for example,
to the wide phonological and syntactic diversity of the
Indo-European language group, from a common ancestor
about 10,000 years ago (Gray & Atkinson 2003). Language
in hunter-gatherer societies changes at least as rapidly.
Papua, New Guinea, settled within the last 50,000 years,
has an estimated one-quarter of the world’s languages.
These are enormously linguistically diverse, and most orig-
inate in hunter-gatherer communities (Diamond 1992).8
Thus, from the point of view of natural selection, it
appears that language, like other cultural adaptations,
changes far too rapidly to provide a stable target over
which natural selection can operate. Human language
learning, therefore, may be analogous to typical biological
responses to high levels of environmental change – that is,
to develop general-purpose strategies which apply across
rapidly changing environments, rather than specializing
to any particular environment. This strategy appears to
have been used, in biology, by “generalists” such as cock-
roaches and rats, in contrast, for example, to pandas and
koalas, which are adapted to extremely narrow environ-
mental niches.
A potential limitation of our argument so far is that we
have assumed that changes in the linguistic environment
are “exogenous.” But many aspects of language change
may be “endogenous,” that is, may arise because the
language is adapting as a result of selection pressures
from learners, and, hence, their genes. Thus, one might
imagine the following argument: Suppose there is a
slight, random, genetic preference for languages with
feature A rather than B. Then this may influence the
language spoken by the population to have feature A,
and this may in turn select for genes that favor the
feature A.9 Such feedback might, in principle, serve to
amplify small random differences into, ultimately, rigid
arbitrary language universals. However, as Figure 2 illus-
trates, when linguistic change is genetically influenced,
rather than random, it turns out that, while this amplifica-
tion effect can occur, and lead to a Baldwin effect, it does
not emerge from small random fluctuations. Instead, it
only occurs when language is initially strongly influenced
by genes. But if arbitrary features of language would
have to be predetermined strongly by the genes from
the very beginning, then this leaves little scope for sub-
sequent operation of the Baldwin effect as envisioned by
Pinker and Bloom (1990).
3.2.3. Problem 3: What is genetically encoded? Even if
the first two difficulties for adaptationist accounts of UG
could be solved, the view still faces a further puzzle:
Figure 1. The effect of linguistic change on the genetic encoding
of arbitrary linguistic principles. Results are shown from a
simulation with a population size of 100 agents, a genome size of
20, survival of the top 50% of the population, and starting with
50% neutral alleles. When there is no linguistic change, alleles
encoding specific aspects of language emerge quickly – that is, a
Baldwin effect occurs – but when language is allowed to change,
neutral alleles become more advantageous. Similar results were
obtained across a wide range of different simulation parameters.
(Adapted from Christiansen, Reali & Chater 2006)
Figure 2. TheBaldwin effect, where genes influence language: the
role of population influence (i.e., genetic “feedback”) on the
emergence of the Baldwin effect for language-relevant alleles
when language is allowed to change 10 times faster than biological
change. Only when the pressure from the learners’ genetic biases
is very high ( 50%) can the Baldwin effect overcome linguistic
change. (Adapted from Christiansen, Reali & Chater 2006)
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Why is it that genetic adaptation occurred only to very
abstract properties of language, rather than also occurring
to its superficial properties? Given the spectacular variety
of surface forms of the world’s languages, in both syntax
(including every combination of basic orderings of subject,
verb and object, and a wide variety of less constrained
word orders) and phonology (including tone and click
languages, for example), why did language genes not adapt
to these surface features?10 Why should genes become
adapted to capture the extremely rich andabstract set of pos-
sibilities countenanced by the principles of UG, rather than
merely encoding the actual linguistic possibilities in the
specific language that was being spoken (i.e., the phonologi-
cal inventory and particular morphosyntactic regularities of
the early click-language, fromwhich the Khoisan family ori-
ginated and which might be the first human language; e.g.,
Pennisi 2004)? The unrelenting abstractness of the universal
principles makes them difficult to reconcile with an adapta-
tionist account.
One of the general features of biological adaptation is
that it is driven by the constraints of the immediate
environment. It can have no regard for distant or future
environments that might one day be encountered. For
example, the visual system is highly adapted to the laws
of optics as they hold in normal environments. Thus, the
length of a stick in water is misestimated by human
vision, because it does not correct for the refraction of
light through water (this being not commonly encountered
in the human visual world). By contrast, the visual system
of the archerfish, which must strike airborne flies with a
water jet from below the water surface, does make this cor-
rection (Rossel et al. 2002). Biological adaptation produces
systems designed to fit the environment to which adap-
tation occurs; there is, of course, no selectional pressure
to fit environments that have not occurred or those that
might occur at some point in the future. Hence, if a UG
did adapt to a past linguistic environment, it would seem
inevitable that it would adapt to that language environ-
ment as a whole: thus adapting to its specific word order,
phonotactic rules, inventory of phonemic distinctions,
and so on. In particular, it seems very implausible that
an emerging UG would be selected primarily for extre-
mely abstract features, which apply equally to all possible
human languages, not just the language evident in the
linguistic environment in which selection operates. This
would be analogous to an animal living in a desert environ-
ment somehow developing adaptations that are not
specific to desert conditions, but that are equally adaptive
in all terrestrial environments.
The remarkable abilities of the young indigo bunting to use
stars for navigational purposes – even in the absence of older
birds to lead theway – might at first seem to counter this line
of reasoning (e.g., Hauser 2001; Marcus 2004). Every
autumn this migratory bird uses the location of Polaris in
the night sky to fly from its summer quarters in theNortheast
United States to its winter residence in the Bahamas. As
demonstrated by Emlen (1970), the indigo bunting uses
celestial rotation as a reference axis to discover which stars
point to true north. Thus, when Emlen raised young fledg-
lings in a planetarium that was modified to rotate the night
sky around Betelgeuse, the birds oriented themselves as if
north was in the direction of this bright star. Crucially,
what has become genetically encoded is not a star map –
because star constellations change over evolutionary time
and thus form moving targets – but instead that which is
stable: that stationary stars indicate the axis of earth’s rotation,
and hence true north.
Similarly, it is tempting to claim that the principles of
UG are just those that are invariant across languages,
whereas contingent aspects of word order or phonology
will vary across languages. Thus, one might suggest that
only the highly abstract, language-universal, principles of
UG will provide a stable basis upon which natural selec-
tion can operate. But this argument is again, of course, a
further instance of the circularity trap. We are trying to
explain how a putative UG might become genetically
fixed, and hence we cannot assume UG is already in
place. Thus, this counterargument is blocked.
We are not, of course, arguing that abstract structures
cannot arise by adaptation. Indeed, abstract patterns, such
as the body plan of mammals or birds, are conserved
across species and constitute a complex and highly inte-
grated system. Notice, though, that such abstract structures
are still tailored to the specific environment of each species.
Thus, while bats, whales, and cows have a common abstract
body plan, these species embody dramatically different
instantiations of this pattern, adapted to their ecological
niches in the air, in water, or on land. Substantial modifi-
cations of this kind can occur quite rapidly, as a result of
changes in a small numbers of genes and/or their pattern
of expression. For example, the differing beak shape in
Darwin’s finches, adapted to different habitats in the Gala-
pagos Islands, may be largely determined by as few as two
genes: BMP4, the expression of which is associated with the
width, as well as depth, of beaks (Abzhanov et al. 2004), and
CaM, the expression of which is correlated with beak length
(Abzhanov et al. 2006). Again, these adaptations are all
related closely to the local environment in which an organ-
ism exists. In contrast, adaptations for UG are hypothesized
to be for abstract principles holding across all linguistic
environments, with no adaptation to the local environment
of specific languages and language users.
In summary, Pinker and Bloom (1990), as we have seen,
drawaparallel between theadaptationist accountof thedevel-
opment of the visual system and an adaptationist account of a
putative language faculty. But the above arguments indicate
that the two cases are profoundly different. The principles
of optics and the structure of the visual world have many
invariant features across environments (e.g., Simoncelli &
Olshausen 2001), but the linguistic environment is vastly
different from one population to another. Moreover, the
linguistic environment, unlike the visual environment, will
itself be altered in line with any genetic changes in the pro-
pensity to learn and use languages, thus further amplifying
differences between linguistic environments. We conclude,
then, that linguistically driven biological adaptation cannot
underlie the evolution of language.
It remains possible, though, that the development of
language did have a substantial impact on biological evol-
ution. The arguments given here merely preclude the
possibility that linguistic conventions that would originally
differ across different linguistic environments could
somehow become universal across all linguistic commu-
nities, by virtue of biological adaptation to the linguistic
environment. This is because, in the relevant respects,
the linguistic environment for the different populations
is highly variable, and hence any biological adaptations
could only serve to entrench such differences further.
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But theremight be features that are universal across linguis-
tic environments that might lead to biological adaptation,
such as the means of producing speech (Lieberman
1984), or the need for enhanced memory capacity, or
complex pragmatic inferences (Givo´n & Malle 2002).
However, these language features are likely to be functio-
nal – that is, they facilitate language use – and therefore
would typically not be considered part of UG.
It is consistent with our arguments that the emergence
of language influenced biological evolution in a more
indirect way. The possession of language might have fun-
damentally changed the patterns of collective problem
solving and other social behavior in early humans, with a
consequent shift in the selectional pressures on humans
engaged in these new patterns of behavior. But universal,
arbitrary constraints on the structure of language cannot
emerge from biological adaptation to a varied pattern of
linguistic environments. Thus, the adaptationist account
of the biological origins of UG cannot succeed.
4. Evolution of Universal Grammar by
non-adaptationist means
Some theorists advocating a genetically based UG might
concur with our arguments against adaptationist accounts
of language evolution. For instance, Chomsky (1972; 1988;
1993) has for more than two decades expressed strong
doubts about neo-Darwinian explanations of language
evolution, hinting that UG may be a by-product of
increased brain size or yet unknown physical or biological
evolutionary constraints. Further arguments for a radically
non-adaptationist perspective have been advanced by
Jenkins (2000), Lanyon (2006), Lightfoot (2000), and
Piattelli-Palmarini (1989; 1994).
Non-adaptationists typically argue that UG is both
highly complex and radically different from other biologi-
cal machinery (though see Hauser et al. 2002). They
suggest, moreover, that UG appears to be so unique in
terms of structure and properties, that it is unlikely to be
a product of natural selection amongst random mutations.
However, we argue that non-adaptationist attempts to
explain a putative language-specific genetic endowment
also fail.
To what extent can any non-adaptationist mechanism
account for the development of a genetically encoded
UG, as traditionally conceived? In particular, can such
mechanisms account for the appearance of genetically
specified properties that are presumed to be (a) idiosyn-
cratic to language, and (b) of substantial complexity?
We argue that the probability that non-adaptationist
factors played a substantial role in the evolution of UG is
vanishingly small.
The argument involves a straightforward application of
information theory. Suppose that the constraints embodied
in UG are indeed language-specific and hence do not
emerge as side-effects of existing processing mechanisms.
This means that UG would have to be generated
at random by non-adaptationist processes. Suppose
further that the information required to specify a language
acquisition device, so that language can be acquired and
produced, over and above the pre-linguistic biological
endowment can be represented as a binary string of
N bits (this particular coding assumption is purely for
convenience). Then the probability of generating this
sequence ofN bits by chance is 22N. If the language-specific
information could be specified using a binary string that
would fit on one page of normal text (which would presum-
ably be a considerable underestimate, from the perspective
of most linguistic theory), then N would be over 2,500.
Hence, the probability of generating the grammar by a
random process would be less than 222,500. So, to generate
this machinery by chance (i.e., without the influence of
the forces of adaptation) would be expected to require of
the order of 22,500 individuals. But the total population of
humans over the last two million or so years, including the
present, is measured in billions and is much smaller than
235.Hence, the probability of non-adaptationistmechanisms
“chancing” upon a specification of a language organ or
language instinct through purely non-adaptationist means
is astronomically unlikely.11
It is sometimes suggested, apparently in the face of this type
of argument, that the recent evolutionary–developmental
biology literature has revealed how local genetic changes,
for example, on homeobox genes, can influence the expression
of other genes, and through a cascade of developmental influ-
ences, result in extensive phenotypic consequences (e.g.,
Gerhart & Kirschner 1997; Laubichler & Maienschein
2007). Yet, suppose that UG arises from a small “tweak” to
pre-linguistic cognitive machinery; then general cognitive
machinery will provide the vast bulk of the explanation of
language structure. Without this machinery, the impact of
the tweak would be impossible to understand. Thus, the
vision of Universal Grammar as a language-specific innate
faculty or language organ would have to be retracted. But
the idea that a simple tweak might lead to a complex, highly
interdependent, and intricately organized system, such as
the putative UG, is highly implausible. Small genetic
changes lead to modifications of existing complex systems,
and these modifications can be quite far-reaching; however,
they do not lead to the construction of new complexity. A
mutation might lead to an insect having an extra pair of legs,
and a complex set of genetic modifications (almost certainly
over strong and continuous selectional pressure) may
modify a leg into a flipper, but no single gene creates an
entirely new means of locomotion, from scratch. The whole
burden of the classic arguments for UG is that UG is both
highly organized and complex, and utterly distinct from
general cognitive principles. Thus, the emergence of a puta-
tive UG requires the construction of a new complex system,
and the argument sketched above notes that the probability
of even modest new complexity arising by chance is astro-
nomically low.
The implication of this argument is that it is extremely
unlikely that substantial quantities of linguistically idiosyn-
cratic information have been specified by non-adaptationist
means. Indeed, the point applies more generally to the gen-
eration of any complex, functional biological structures.
Thus, it is not clear how any non-adaptationist account
can explain the emergence of something as intricately
complex as UG.
Some authors who express skepticism concerning the
role of adaptation implicitly recognize this kind of theoreti-
cal difficulty. Instead, many apparently complex and arbi-
trary aspects of cognition and language are suggested to
have emerged out of the constraints on building any
complex information processing system, given perhaps
currently unknown physical and biological constraints
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(e.g., Chomsky 1993; see Kauffman [1995] for a related
viewpoint on evolutionary processes). A related perspec-
tive is proposed by Gould (1993), who views language
as a spandrel – that is, as emerging as a by-product of
other cognitive processes. Another option would be to
appeal to exaptation (Gould & Vrba 1982), whereby a bio-
logical structure that was originally adapted to serve one
function is put to use to serve a novel function. Yet the
non-adaptationist attracted by these or other non-adapta-
tionist mechanisms is faced with a dilemma. If language
can emerge from general physical, biological, or cognitive
factors, then the complexity and idiosyncrasy of UG is illu-
sory; language emerges from general non-linguistic
factors, a conclusion entirely consistent with the view we
advocate here. If, by contrast, UG is maintained to be
sui generis and not readily derivable from general pro-
cesses, the complexity argument bites: the probability of
a new and highly complex adaptive system emerging by
chance is astronomically low.
The dilemma is equally stark for the non-adaptationist
who attempts to reach for other non-adaptationist mech-
anisms of evolutionary change. There are numerous mech-
anisms that amount to random perturbations (from the
point of view of the construction of a highly complex adap-
tive system) (Schlosser & Wagner 2004). These include
genetic drift (Suzuki et al. 1989), the random fluctuations
in gene frequencies in a population; genetic hitch-hiking
(Maynard-Smith 1978), a mechanism by which non-
selected genes “catch a ride” with another gene (nearby
on the chromosome) that was subject to selection; epigen-
esis (Jablonka & Lamb 1989), which causes heritable cell
changes as a result of environmental influences but
without corresponding changes to the basic DNA
sequences of that cell; horizontal genetic transfer
(Syvanen 1985) by which genetic material shifts from
one species to another; and transposons (McClintock
1950), mobile genetic elements that can move around in
different positions within the genome of a cell and thus
alter its phenotype. Each of these mechanisms provides
a richer picture of the mechanisms of evolutionary
change, but none provides an answer to the question of
how novel and highly complex adaptive systems, such as
the putative UG, might emerge de novo. However, if
language is viewed as embodying novel complexity, then
the emergence of this complexity by non-adaptationist
(and hence, from an adaptive point of view, random)
mechanisms is astronomically unlikely.
We may seem to be faced with a paradox. It seems clear
that the mechanisms involved in acquiring and processing
language are enormously intricate and moreover inti-
mately connected to the structure of natural languages.
The complexity of these mechanisms rules out, as we
have seen in this section, a non-adaptationist account of
their origin. However, if these mechanisms arose
through adaptation, this adaptation cannot, as we argued
in section 3, have been adaptation to language. But if the
mechanisms that currently underpin language acquisition
and processing were originally adapted to carry out other
functions, then how is their apparently intimate relation-
ship with the structure of natural language to be
explained? How, for example, are we to explain that the
language acquisition mechanisms seem particularly well
adapted to learning natural languages, but not to any of
a vast range of conceivable non-natural languages (e.g.,
Chomsky 1980)? As we now argue, the paradox can be
resolved if we assume that the “fit” between the mechan-
isms of language acquisition and processing, on the one
hand, and natural language, on the other, has arisen
because natural languages themselves have “evolved” to
be as easy to learn and process as possible: Language
has been shaped by the brain, rather than vice versa.
5. Language as shaped by the brain
We propose, then, to invert the perspective on language
evolution, shifting the focus from the evolution of language
users to the evolution of languages. Figure 3 provides a
conceptual illustration of these two perspectives (see also
Andersen 1973; Hurford 1990; Kirby & Hurford 1997).
The UG adaptationists (a) suggest that selective pressure
toward better language abilities gradually led to the selec-
tion of more sophisticated UGs. In contrast, (b) we
propose to view language as an evolutionary system in its
own right (see also e.g., Christiansen 1994; Deacon 1997;
Keller 1994; Kirby 1999; Ritt 2004), subject to adaptive
pressures from the human brain. As a result, linguistic
adaptation allows for the evolution of increasingly expres-
sive languages that can nonetheless still be learned and
processed by domain-general mechanisms. From this per-
spective, we argue that the mystery of the fit between
human language acquisition and processing mechanisms
and natural language may be unraveled; and we might,
furthermore, understand how language has attained its
apparently “idiosyncratic” structure.
Figure 3. Illustration of two different views on the direction of
causation in language evolution: (a) biological adaptations of the
brain to language (double arrows), resulting in gradually more
intricate UGs (curved arrows) to provide the basis for increasingly
complex language production and comprehension (single arrows);
(b) cultural adaptation of language to the brain (double arrows),
resulting in increasingly expressive languages (curved arrows) that
are well suited to being acquired and processed by domain-
general mechanisms (single arrows).
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Instead of puzzling that humans can only learn a small
subset of the infinity of mathematically possible languages,
we take a different starting point: the observation that
natural languages exist only because humans can
produce, learn, and process them. In order for languages
to be passed on from generation to generation, they
must adapt to the properties of the human learning and
processing mechanisms; the structures in each language
form a highly interdependent system, rather than a collec-
tion of independent traits. The key to understanding the fit
between language and the brain is to understand how
language has been shaped by the brain, not the reverse.
The process by which language has been shaped by the
brain is, in important ways, akin to Darwinian selection.
Hence, we suggest that it is a productive metaphor to
view languages as analogous to biological species,
adapted through natural selection to fit a particular eco-
logical niche: the human brain.
This viewpoint does not rule out the possibility that
language may have played a role in the biological evolution
of hominids. Good language skills may indeed enhance
reproductive success. But the pressures working on
language to adapt to humans are significantly stronger
than the selection pressures on humans to use language.
In case of the former, a language can only survive if it is
learnable and processable by humans. On the other
hand, adaptation towards language use is merely one of
many selective pressures working on hominid evolution
(including, for example, avoiding predators and finding
food). Whereas humans can survive without language,
the opposite is not the case. Thus, prima facie language
is more likely to have been shaped to fit the human
brain rather than the other way round. Languages that
are hard for humans to learn and process cannot come
into existence at all.
5.1. Historical parallels between linguistic and
biological change
The idea of language as an adaptive, evolutionary system has
a prominent historical pedigree dating back to Darwin and
beyond. One of the earliest proponents of the idea that
languages evolve diachronically was the eighteenth-century
language scholar, Sir William Jones, the first Western
scholar to study Sanskrit and note its affinity with Greek
and Latin (Cannon 1991). Later, nineteenth-century lin-
guistics was dominated by an organistic view of language
(McMahon 1994). Franz Bopp, one of the founders of
comparative linguistics, regarded language as an organism
that could be dissected and classified (Davies 1987).
Wilhelm von Humboldt, the father of generative grammar
(Chomsky 1965; Pinker 1994), argued that “language, in
direct conjunction with mental power, is a fully-fashioned
organism” (von Humboldt 1836/1999, p. 90; original empha-
sis). More generally, languages were viewed as having life-
cycles that included birth, progressive growth, procreation,
and eventually decay and death. However, the notion of evol-
ution underlying this organistic view of language was largely
pre-Darwinian. This is perhaps reflected most clearly in the
writings of another influential linguist, August Schleicher.
Although he explicitly emphasized the relationship between
linguistics and Darwinian theory (Schleicher 1863, quoted
in Percival 1987), Darwin’s principles of mutation, variation,
and natural selection did not enter into the theorizing about
language evolution (Nerlich 1989). Instead, the evolution of
language was seen in pre-Darwinian terms as the progres-
sive growth towards attainment of perfection, followed by
decay.
Darwin (1874), too, recognized the similarities between
linguistic and biological change12:
The formation of different languages and of distinct species,
and the proofs that both have been developed through a
gradual process, are curiously parallel . . . We find in distinct
languages striking homologies due to community of descent,
and analogies due to a similar process of formation. The
manner in which certain letters or sounds change when
others change is very like correlated growth . . . Languages,
like organic beings, can be classed in groups under groups;
and they can be classed either naturally, according to
descent, or artificially by other characters. Dominant
languages and dialects spread widely, and lead to the gradual
extinction of other tongues. A language, like a species, when
once extinct, never . . . reappears . . . A struggle for life is con-
stantly going on among the words and grammatical forms in
each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are
constantly gaining the upper hand . . . The survival and preser-
vation of certain favored words in the struggle for existence is
natural selection. (p. 106)
In this sense, natural language can be construed meta-
phorically as akin to an organism whose evolution has
been constrained by the properties of human learning
and processing mechanisms. A similar perspective on
language evolution was revived, within a modern evol-
utionary framework, by Stevick (1963) and later by
Nerlich (1989). Sereno (1991) has listed a number of par-
allels between biological organisms and language (with the
biological comparisons in parentheses):
An intercommunicating group of people defines a language
(cf. gene flow in relation to a species); language abilities
develop in each speaker (cf. embryonic development); language
must be transmitted to offspring (cf. heritability); there is a low
level process of sound and meaning change that continuously
generates variation (cf. mutation); languages gradually diverge,
especially when spatially separated (cf. allopatric speciation);
geographical distributions of dialects (cf. subspecies, clines)
gradually give rise to wholesale rearrangements of phonology
and syntax (cf. macroevolution); sociolinguistic isolation can
lead to language divergence without spatial discontinuity
(cf. sympatric speciation). (Sereno 1991, p. 472)
Christiansen (1994) pushed the analogy a little further,
suggesting that language may be viewed as a “beneficial
parasite” engaged in a symbiotic relationship with its
human hosts, without whom it cannot survive (see also
Deacon 1997). Symbiotic parasites and their hosts tend
to become increasingly co-adapted (e.g., Dawkins 1976).
But note that this co-adaptation will be very lopsided,
because the rate of linguistic change is far greater than
the rate of biological change. Whereas Danish and Hindi
needed less than 7,000 years to evolve from a common
hypothesized proto-Indo-European ancestor into very
different languages (Gray & Atkinson 2003), it took our
remote ancestors approximately 100,000–200,000 years
to evolve from the archaic form of Homo sapiens into
the anatomically modern form, sometimes termed Homo
sapiens sapiens. Indeed, as we argued in section 3, the
rapidity of language change – and the geographical dis-
persal of humanity – suggests that biological adaptation
to language is negligible. This suggestion is further corro-
borated by work in evolutionary game theory, showing that
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when two species with markedly different rates of adap-
tation enter a symbiotic relationship, the rapidly evolving
species adapts to the slowly evolving one, but not the
reverse (Frean & Abraham 2004).
5.2. Language as a system
But in what sense should language be viewed as akin to an
integrated organism, rather than as a collection of separate
traits, evolving relatively independently? The reason is that
language is highly systematic – so much so, indeed, that
much of linguistic theory is concerned with tracking the
systematic relationships among different aspects of linguis-
tic structure. Although language is an integrated system, it
can, nonetheless, be viewed as comprising a complex set of
“features” or “traits” which may or may not be passed on
from one generation to the next (concerning lexical
items, idioms, aspects of phonology, syntax, and so on).
To a first approximation, traits that are easy for learners
to acquire and use will become more prevalent; traits
that are more difficult to acquire and use will disappear.
Thus, selectional pressure from language learners and
users will shape the way in which language evolves. Cru-
cially, the systematic character of linguistic traits means
that, to some degree at least, the fates of different traits
in a language are intertwined. That is, the degree to
which any particular trait is easy to learn or process will,
to some extent, depend on the other features of the
language – because language users will tend to learn and
process each aspect of the language in light of their experi-
ence with the rest. This picture is familiar in biology – the
selectional impact of any gene depends crucially on the
rest of the genome; the selectional forces on each gene,
for good or ill, are tied to the development and functioning
of the entire organism.
Construing language as an evolutionary system has impli-
cations for explanations ofwhat is being selected in language
evolution. From the viewpoint of generative grammar, the
unit of selection would seem to be either specific UG prin-
ciples (in PPT; Newmeyer 1991), particular parts of the UG
toolkit (in SS; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005), or recursion in
the form of Merge (in MP; Hauser et al. 2002). In all cases,
selection would seem to take place at a high level of abstrac-
tion that cuts across a multitude of specific linguistic
constructions. Our approach suggests a different perspec-
tive inspired by the “lexical turn” in linguistics (e.g., Combi-
natory Categorical Grammar, Steedman 2000; Head-driven
Phrase Structure Grammar, Sag & Pollard 1987; Lexical-
Functionalist Grammar, Bresnan 1982), focusing on specific
lexical items with their associated syntactic and semantic
information. Specifically, we adopt a Construction Grammar
view of language (e.g., Croft 2000; 2001; Goldberg 2006;
O’Grady 2005), proposing that individual constructions con-
sisting of words or combinations thereof are among the basic
units of selection.
To spell out the parallel, the idiolect of an individual
speaker is analogous to an individual organism; a language
(e.g., Mandarin, French) is akin to a species. A linguistic
“genotype” corresponds to the neural representation
of an idiolect, instantiated by a collection of mental
“constructions,” which are here analogous to genes, and
gives rise to linguistic behavior – the language “phenoty-
pe” – characterized by a collection of utterances and
interpretations. Just as the fitness of an individual gene
depends on its interaction with other genes, so the
fitness of an individual construction is intertwined with
those of other constructions; that is, constructions are
part of a (linguistic) system. A species in biology is
defined by the ability to interbreed; a “language species”
is defined by mutual intelligibility. Hence, interbreeding
and mutually intelligible linguistic interactions can be
viewed as analogous processes by which genetic material
and constructions can propagate.
The long-term survival of any given construction is
affected both by its individual properties (e.g., frequency
of usage) and how well it fits into the overall linguistic
system (e.g., syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic overlap
with other constructions). In a series of linguistic and
corpus-based analyses, Bybee (2007) has shown how fre-
quency of occurrence plays an important role in shaping
language from phonology to morphology to morphosyntax,
due to the effects of repeated processing experiences with
specific examples (either types or tokens). Additionally,
groups of constructions overlapping in terms of syntactic,
semantic, and/or pragmatic properties emerge and form
the basis for usage-based generalizations (e.g., Goldberg
2006; Tomasello 2003). Crucially, however, these group-
ings lead to a distributed system of local generalizations
across partially overlapping constructions, rather than
the abstract, mostly global generalizations of current gen-
erative grammar.
In psycholinguistics, the effects of frequency and pattern
overlap have been observed in so-called Frequency 
Regularity interactions. As an example, consider the acqui-
sition of the English past tense. Frequently occurring map-
pings, such as go ! went, are learned more easily than
more infrequent mappings, such as lie ! lay. However,
low-frequency patterns may be more easily learned if they
overlap in part with other patterns. Thus, the partial overlap
in the mappings from stem to past tense in sleep ! slept,
weep ! wept, keep ! kept (i.e., -eep ! -ept) make
the learning of the these mappings relatively easy even
though none of the words individually have a particularly
high frequency. Importantly, the two factors – frequency
and regularity (i.e., degree of partial overlap) – interact
with each other. High-frequency patterns are easily learned
independent of whether they are regular or not, whereas
the learning of low-frequency patterns suffers if they are
not regular (i.e., if they do not have partial overlap with
other patterns). Results from psycholinguistic experimen-
tation and computational modeling have observed such
Frequency  Regularity interactions across many aspects of
language, including auditory word recognition (Lively et al.
1994), visual word recognition (Seidenberg 1985), English
past tense acquisition (Hare & Elman 1995), and sentence
processing (Juliano & Tanenhaus 1994; MacDonald &
Christiansen 2002; Pearlmutter & MacDonald 1995).
In our case, we suggest that similar interactions between
frequency and pattern overlap are likely to play an import-
ant role in language evolution. Individual constructions may
survive through frequent usage or because they participate
in usage-based generalizations through syntactic, semantic,
or pragmatic overlap with other similar constructions.
Additional support for this suggestion comes from artificial
language learning studies with human subjects, demonstrat-
ing that certain combinations of artificial-language struc-
tures are more easily learned than others given sequential
learning biases (e.g., Christiansen 2000; Reeder 2004;
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Saffran 2001; and see sect. 6.3 of this target article). For
example, Ellefson and Christiansen (2000) compared human
learning across two artificial languages that only differed
in the order of words in two out of six sentence types.
They found that not only was the more “natural” language
learned better overall, but also that the four sentence types
common to both languages were learned better as well.
This suggests that the artificial languages were learned as
integrated systems, rather than as collections of indepen-
dent items.
Further corroboration comes from a study by Kaschak
and Glenberg (2004) who had adult participants learn
the needs construction (e.g., “The meal needs cooked”),
a feature of the American English dialect spoken in the
northern midlands region from western Pennsylvania
across Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois to Iowa. The training
on the needs construction facilitated the processing of
related modifier constructions (e.g., “The meal needs
cooked vegetables”), again suggesting that constructions
form an integrated system that can be affected by the
learning of new constructions. Thus, although construc-
tions are selected independently, they also provide an
environment for each other within which selection
takes place, just as the selection of individual genes are
tied to the survival of the other genes that make up an
organism.
5.3. The nature of language universals
We have argued that language is best viewed as a linguis-
tic system adapted to the human brain. But if evolution is
unlikely to have bestowed us with an innate UG, then
how can we account for the various aspects of language
that UG constraints are supposed to explain? That is,
how can we explain the existence of apparent language
universals, in the form of regularities in language struc-
ture and use? Notice, however, that is it by no means
clear exactly what counts as a language universal.
Rather, the notion of language universals differs con-
siderably across language researchers (e.g., the variety
in perspectives among contributions in Christiansen
et al., in press). Many linguists working within the gen-
erative grammar framework see universals as primarily,
and sometimes exclusively, deriving from UG (e.g.,
Hornstein & Boeckx, in press; Pinker & Jackendoff, in
press). Functional linguists, on the other hand, view uni-
versals as arising from patterns of language usage due to
pragmatic, processing, and other constraints, and ampli-
fied in diachronic language change (e.g., Bybee, in
press). However, even within the same theoretical lin-
guistic framework, there is often little agreement about
what the exact universals are. For example, when survey-
ing specific universals proposed by different proponents
of UG, Tomasello (2004) found little overlap among
proposed universals.
Although there may be little agreement about specific
universals, some consensus can nonetheless be found
with respect to their general nature. Thus, within main-
stream generative grammar approaches, including MP
and PPT, language universals are seen as arising from
the inner workings of UG. Hornstein and Boeckx
(in press) refer to such UG-based universals as internalist
or I-Universals. They note that:
on this conception I-Universals are likely to be (and have been
found to be) quite abstract. They need not be observable.
Thus, even were one to survey thousands of languages
looking for commonalities, they could easily escape detection.
In this they contrast with Greenbergian Universals, which we
would call E(xternalist)-Universals. In fact, on this conception,
the mere fact that every language displayed some property P
does not imply that P is a universal in the I-sense. Put more
paradoxically, the fact that P holds universally does not imply
that P is a universal. Conversely, some property can be an
I-Universal even if only manifested in a single natural
language. The only thing that makes something an I-Universal
on this view is that it is a property of our innate ability to grow a
language (p. 4).
Thus, from the perspective of MP and PPT, language
universals are by definition properties of UG; that is,
they are formal universals (Chomsky 1965). A similar
view of universals also figures within the SS framework
(Culicover & Jackendoff 2005), defined in terms of the
universal toolkit encoded in UG. Because different
languages are hypothesized to use different subsets of
tools, the SS approach – like MP and PPT – suggests
that some universals may not show up in all languages
(Pinker & Jackendoff, in press). However, both notions
of universals face the logical problem of language evol-
ution discussed above (in sects. 2–4): How could the
full set of UG constraints have evolved if any single lin-
guistic environment only ever supported a subset of
them?
The solution to this problem, we suggest, is to adopt
a non-formal conception of universals in which they
emerge from processes of repeated language acquisition
and use. We see universals as products of the interaction
among constraints deriving from the way our thought pro-
cesses work, from perceptuo-motor factors, from cognitive
limitations on learning and processing, and from prag-
matic sources (see sect. 6 below). This view implies that
most universals are unlikely to be found across all
languages; rather, “universals” are more akin to statistical
trends tied to patterns of language use. Consequently,
specific universals fall on a continuum ranging from
being attested to only in some languages to being found
across most languages. An example of the former is the
class of implicational universals, such as that verb-final
languages tend to have postpositions (Dryer 1992),
whereas the presence of nouns and verbs in most, if not
all, languages (minimally as typological prototypes; Croft
2001) is an example of the latter. Thus, language univer-
sals, we suggest, are best construed as statistical ten-
dencies with varying degrees of universality across the
world’s languages.
We have argued that language is too variable, both in
time and space, to provide a selectional pressure that
might shape the gradual adaptation of an innate UG
encoding arbitrary, but universal linguistic constraints.
Moreover, a putative innate UG would be too complex
and specialized to have credibly arisen through non-adapta-
tionist mechanisms. Instead, we have proposed that the fit
between language and the brain arises because language
has evolved to be readily learned and processed by the
brain. We now consider what kinds of non-linguistic con-
straints are likely to have shaped language to the brain,
and given rise to statistical tendencies in language structure
and use.
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6. Constraints on language structure
We have proposed that language has adapted to the non-
linguistic constraints deriving from language learners and
users, giving rise to observable linguistic universals. But
how far can these constraints be identified? To what
extent can linguistic structure previously ascribed to an
innate UG be identified as having a non-linguistic basis?
Clearly, establishing a complete answer to this question
would require a vast program of research. In this section,
we illustrate how research from different areas of the
language sciences can be brought together to explain
aspects of language previously thought to require the exist-
ence of UG for their explanation. For the purpose of expo-
sition, we divide the constraints into four groups relating
to thought, perceptuo-motor factors, cognition, and prag-
matics. These constraints derive from the limitations and
idiosyncratic properties of the human brain and other
parts of our body involved in language (e.g., the vocal
tract). However, as we note further on in section 6.5, any
given linguistic phenomenon is likely to arise from a combi-
nation of multiple constraints that cut across these group-
ings, and, thus, across different kinds of brain mechanisms.
6.1. Constraints from thought
The relationship between language and thought is poten-
tially abundantly rich, but also extremely controversial.
Thus, the analytic tradition in philosophy can be viewed
as attempting to understand thought through a careful
analysis of language (e.g., Blackburn 1984). It has been
widely assumed that the structure of sentences (or utter-
ances, and perhaps the contexts in which they stand),
and the inferential relations over them, provide an analysis
of thought. A standard assumption is that thought is largely
prior to, and independent of, linguistic communication.
Accordingly, fundamental properties of language, such as
compositionality, function-argument structure, quantifi-
cation, aspect, and modality, may arise from the structure
of the thoughts language is required to express (e.g.,
Schoenemann 1999).
Presumably, language also provides a reasonably effi-
cient mapping of the mental representation of thoughts,
with these properties, into phonology. This viewpoint
can be instantiated in a variety of ways. For example,
Steedman’s emphasis on incremental interpretation (e.g.,
that successive partial semantic representations are con-
structed as the sentence unfolds – i.e., the thought that a
sentence expresses is built up piecemeal) is one motivation
for categorical grammar (e.g., Steedman 2000). From a
very different stance, the aim of finding a “perfect”
relationship between thought and phonology is closely
related to the goals of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky
1995).13 Indeed, Chomsky has recently suggested (e.g.,
Chomsky 2005b) that language may have originated as a
vehicle for thought and only later became exapted to
serve as a system of communication. This viewpoint
would not, of course, explain the content of a putative
UG, which concerns principles for mapping mental rep-
resentations of thought into phonology; and this mapping
surely is specific to communication: inferences are, after
all, presumably defined over mental representations of
thoughts, rather than phonological representations, or,
for that matter, syntactic trees.
The lexicon is presumably also strongly constrained by
processes of perception and categorization – the mean-
ings of words must be both learnable and cognitively
useful (e.g., Murphy 2002). Indeed, the philosophical
literature on lexical meaning, from a range of theoretical
perspectives, sees cognitive constraints as fundamental to
understanding word meaning, whether these constraints
are given by innate systems of internal representation
(Fodor 1975) or primitive mechanisms of generalization
(Quine 1960). Cognitive linguists (e.g., Croft & Cruise
2004) have argued for a far more intimate relation
between thought and language:. For example, basic con-
ceptual machinery (e.g., concerning spatial structure)
and the mapping of such structure into more abstract
domains (e.g., via metaphor) are, according to some
accounts, evident in languages (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson
1980). And from a related perspective (e.g., Croft 2001),
some linguists have argued that semantic categories of
thought (e.g., of objects and relations) may be shared
between languages, whereas syntactic categories and con-
structions are defined by language-internal properties,
such as distributional relations, so that the attempt to
find cross-linguistic syntactic universals is doomed to
failure.
6.2. Perceptuo-motor constraints
The motor and perceptual machinery underpinning lan-
guage seems inevitably to have some influence on language
structure. The seriality of vocal output, most obviously,
forces a sequential construction of messages. A perceptual
and memory system that is typically a “greedy” processor,
and has a very limited capacity for storing “raw” sensory
input of any kind (e.g., Haber 1983), may, moreover,
force a code which can be interpreted incrementally
(rather than the many practical codes in communication
engineering, in which information is stored in large
blocks, e.g., Mackay 2003). The noisiness and variability
(both with context and speaker) of vocal – or, indeed, sign-
ed – signals may, moreover, force a “digital” communi-
cation system, with a small number of basic messages:
that is, one that uses discrete units (phonetic features or
phonemes).
The basic phonetic inventory is transparently related to
deployment of the vocal apparatus, and it is also possible
that it is tuned, to some degree, to respect “natural” per-
ceptual boundaries (Kuhl 1987). Some theorists have
argued for more far-reaching connections. For example,
MacNeilage (1998) argues that aspects of syllable struc-
ture emerge as a variation on the jaw movements involved
in eating; and for some cognitive linguists, the perceptual-
motor system is a crucial part of the machinery on which
the linguistic system is built (e.g., Hampe 2006). The
depth of the influence of perceptual and motor control
on more abstract aspects of language is controversial, but
it seems plausible that such influence may be substantial.
6.3. Cognitive constraints on learning and processing
In our framework, language acquisition is construed not as
learning a distant grammar, but as learning how to process
language. Although constraints on learning and processing
are often treated separately (e.g., Bybee 2007; Hawkins
2004; Tomasello 2003), we see them as being highly
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intertwined, subserved by the very same underlying mech-
anisms. Language processing involves extracting regu-
larities from highly complex sequential input, pointing
to a connection between general sequential learning
(e.g., planning, motor control, etc.; Lashley 1951) and
language: both involve the extraction and further proces-
sing of discrete elements occurring in complex temporal
sequences. It is therefore not surprising that sequential
learning tasks have become an important experimental
paradigm for studying language acquisition and processing
(sometimes under the heading of “artificial grammar/
language learning” [Go´mez & Gerken 2000] or “statistical
learning” [Saffran 2003]). Sequential learning has thus
been demonstrated for a variety of different aspects of
language, including: speech segmentation (Curtin et al.
2005; Saffran et al. 1996a; 1996b); discovering complex
word-internal structure between nonadjacent elements
(Newport & Aslin 2004; Onnis et al. 2005; Pen˜a et al.
2002); acquiring gender-like morphological systems
(Brooks et al. 1993; Frigo & McDonald 1998); locating
syntactic phrase boundaries (Saffran 2001; 2002); using
function words to delineate phrases (Green 1979); inte-
grating prosodic and morphological cues in the learning
of phrase structure (Morgan et al. 1987); integrating pho-
nological and distributional cues (Monaghan et al. 2005);
and detecting long-distance relationships between words
(Go´mez 2002; Onnis et al. 2003).
The close relationship between sequential learning and
grammatical ability has been further corroborated by
recent neuroimaging studies, showing that people trained
on an artificial language have the same event-related
potential (ERP) brainwave patterns to ungrammatical arti-
ficial-language sentences as to ungrammatical natural-
language sentences (Christiansen et al. 2007; Friederici
et al. 2002). Moreover, novel incongruent musical
sequences elicit ERP patterns that are statistically indistin-
guishable from syntactic incongruities in language (Patel
et al. 1998). Results from a magnetoencephalography
(MEG) experiment further suggest that Broca’s area
plays a crucial role in processing music sequences
(Maess et al. 2001). Finally, event-related functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) has shown that the same
brain area – Broca’s area – is involved in an artificial
grammar learning task and in normal natural language
processing (Petersson et al. 2004). Further evidence
comes from behavioral studies with language-impaired
populations, showing that aphasia (Christiansen et al., sub-
mitted; Hoen et al. 2003), language learning disability
(Plante et al. 2002), and specific language impairment
(Hsu et al. 2006; Tomblin et al. 2007) are associated
with impaired sequential learning. Together, these
studies strongly suggest that there is considerable
overlap in the neural mechanisms involved in language
and sequential learning14 (see also Conway et al. 2007;
Ullman 2004; Wilkins & Wakefield 1995, for similar
perspectives).
This psychological research can be seen as a foundation
for work in functional and typological linguistics, indicat-
ing how theoretical constraints on sequential learning
and processing can explain certain universal patterns in
language structure and use. One suggestion, from O’Grady
(2005), is that the language processing system seeks to
resolve linguistic dependencies (e.g., between verbs and
their arguments) at the first opportunity – a tendency that
might not be syntax-specific, but, instead, an instance
of a general cognitive tendency to attempt to resolve ambi-
guities rapidly in linguistic (Clark 1975) and perceptual
input (Pomerantz & Kubovy 1986). In a similar vein,
Hawkins (1994; 2004) and Culicover (1999) propose
specific measures of processing complexity (roughly,
the number of linguistic constituents required to link
syntactic and conceptual structure), which they assume
underpin judgments concerning linguistic acceptability.
The collection of studies in Bybee (2007) further under-
scores the importance of frequency of use in shaping
language. Importantly, these lines of work have begun
to detail learning and processing constraints that can
help explain specific linguistic patterns, such as the afore-
mentioned examples of pronoun binding (previous
Examples 1–4; see O’Grady 2005) and heavy NP-shift
(Examples 5–6; see Hawkins 1994; 2004), and indicate
an increasing emphasis on performance constraints within
linguistics.
In turn, a growing body of empirical research in compu-
tational linguistics, cognitive science, and psycholinguistics
has begun to explore how these theoretical constraints
may be instantiated in terms of computational and psycho-
logical mechanisms. For instance, basic word order patterns
may thus derive frommemory constraints related to sequen-
tial learning and processing of linguistic material, as indi-
cated by computational simulations (e.g., Christiansen &
Devlin 1997; Kirby 1999; Lupyan & Christiansen 2002;
Van Everbroeck 1999), human experimentation involving
artificial languages (e.g., Christiansen 2000; Reeder 2004),
and cross-linguistic corpus analyses (e.g., Bybee 2002;
Hawkins 1994; 2004). Similarly, behavioral experiments
and computational modeling have provided evidence for
general processing constraints (instead of innate subjacency
constraints) on complex question formation (Berwick &
Weinberg 1984; Ellefson & Christiansen 2000).
6.4. Pragmatic constraints
Language is likely, moreover, to be substantially shaped by
the pragmatic constraints involved in linguistic communi-
cation. The program of developing and extending Gricean
implicatures (Grice 1967; Levinson 2000; Sperber &
Wilson 1986) has revealed enormous complexity in the
relationship between the literal meaning of an utterance
and the message that the speaker intends to convey. Prag-
matic processes may, indeed, be crucial in understanding
many aspects of linguistic structure, as well as the pro-
cesses of language change.
Consider the nature of anaphora and binding. Levinson
(2000) notes that the patterns of “discourse” anaphora,
Example (7), and syntactic anaphora, Example (8), have
interesting parallels.
7. a. John arrived. He began to sing.
b. John arrived. The man began to sing.
8. a. John arrived and he began to sing.
b. John arrived and the man began to sing.
In both (7) and (8), the first form indicates preferred
co-reference of he and John; the second form prefers
non-coreference. The general pattern is that brief
expressions encourage co-reference with a previously
introduced item; Grice’s maxim of quantity implies that,
by default, a prolix expression will not be used where a
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brief expression could be, and hence prolix expressions are
typically taken to imply non-coreference with previously
introduced entities. Where the referring expression is
absent, then co-reference may be required as in
Example (9), in which the singer can only be John:
9. John arrived and began to sing.
It is natural to assume that syntactic structures emerge,
diachronically, from reduction of discourse structures –
and that, in Givo´n’s phrase, “Yesterday’s discourse is
today’s syntax” (as cited in Tomasello 2008). The shift,
over time, from default constraint to rigid rule is wide-
spread in language change and much studied in the sub-
field of grammaticalization (see sect. 7.1).
Applying this pragmatic perspective to the binding con-
straints, Levinson (1987a; 1987b; 2000) notes that the
availability, but non-use, of the reflexive himself provides
a default (and later, perhaps, rigid) constraint that him
does not co-refer with John in Example (10).
10. a. Johni likes himselfi.
b. Johni likes himj.
Levinson (2000), building on related work by Reinhart
(1983), provides a comprehensive account of the binding
constraints, and putative exceptions to them, purely on
pragmatic principles (see also Huang 2000, for a cross-
linguistic perspective). In sum, pragmatic principles can
at least partly explain both the structure and origin of lin-
guistic patterns that are often viewed as solely formal
and, hence, arbitrary.
6.5. The impact of multiple constraints
In section 6 so far, we have discussed four types of con-
straints that have shaped the evolution of language. Impor-
tantly, we see these constraints as interacting with one
another, such that individual linguistic phenomena arise
from a combination of several different types of constraints.
For example, the patterns of binding phenomena are likely
to require explanations that cut across the four types of con-
straints, including constraints on cognitive processing
(O’Grady 2005) and pragmatics (Levinson 1987a; Reinhart
1983). That is, the explanation of any given aspect of
language is likely to require the inclusion of multiple over-
lapping constraints deriving from thought, perceptual-
motor factors, cognition, and pragmatics.
The idea of explaining language structure and use through
the integration of multiple constraints goes back at least to
early functionalist approaches to the psychology of language
(e.g., Bates &MacWhinney 1979; Bever 1970; Slobin 1973).
It plays an important role in current constraint-based
theories of sentence comprehension (e.g., MacDonald et al.
1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell 1995). Experiments have
demonstrated how adults’ interpretations of sentences are
sensitive to a variety of constraints, including specific
world knowledge relating to the content of an utterance
(e.g., Kamide et al. 2003), the visual context in which the
utterance is produced (e.g., Tanenhaus et al. 1995), the
sound properties of individual words (Farmer et al. 2006),
the processing difficulty of an utterance as well as how
such difficulty may be affected by prior experience (e.g.,
Reali & Christiansen 2007), and various pragmatic factors
(e.g., Fitneva & Spivey 2004). Similarly, the integration of
multiple constraints, or “cues,” also figures prominently in
contemporary theories of language acquisition (see e.g., con-
tributions in Golinkoff et al. 2000; Morgan &Demuth 1996;
Weissenborn & Ho¨hle 2001; for a review, see Monaghan &
Christiansen 2008).
Themultiple-constraints satisfactionperspective on language
evolution also offers an explanation of why language is
unique to humans: As a cultural product, language has been
shaped by constraints from multiple mechanisms, some of
which have properties unique to humans. Specifically, we
suggest that language does not involve any qualitatively differ-
ent mechanisms compared to extant apes, but instead a
number of quantitative evolutionary refinements of older
primate systems (e.g., for intention sharing and understand-
ing, Tomasello et al. 2005; or complex sequential learning
and processing,15 Conway & Christiansen 2001). These
changes could be viewed as providing necessary pre-
adaptations that, once in place, allowed language to emerge
through cultural transmission (e.g., Elman 1999). It is also
conceivable that initial changes, if functional, could have
been subject to further amplification through the Baldwin
effect, perhaps resulting in multiple quantitative shifts in
human evolution. The key point is that none of these
changes would result in the evolution of UG. The species-
specificity of a given trait does not necessitate postulating
specific biological adaptations for that trait. For example,
even though playing tag may be species-specific and
perhaps even universal, few people, if any, would argue
that humans have evolved specific adaptations for playing
this game. Thus, the uniqueness of language is better
viewed as part of the larger question:Why are humans differ-
ent from other primates? It seems clear that considering
language in isolation is not going to give us the answer to
this question.
7. How constraints shape language over time
According to the view that language evolution is deter-
mined by the development of UG, there is a sharp
divide between questions of language evolution (how the
genetic endowment could arise evolutionarily) and histori-
cal language change (which is viewed as variation within
the genetically determined limits of possible human
languages). By contrast, if language has evolved to fit
prior cognitive and communicative constraints, then it is
plausible that historical processes of language change
provide a model of language evolution; indeed, historical
language change may be language evolution in microcosm.
This perspective is consistent with much work in functional
and typological linguistics (e.g., Bever & Langendoen 1971;
Croft 2000; Givo´n 1998; Hawkins 2004; Heine & Kuteva
2002).
At the outset, it is natural to expect that language will be
the outcome of competing selectional forces. On the one
hand, as we shall note, there will be a variety of selectional
forces that make the language “easier” for speakers/
hearers; on the other, it is likely that expressibility is a
powerful selectional constraint, tending to increase lin-
guistic complexity over evolutionary time. For instance,
it has been suggested that the use of hierarchical structure
and limited recursion to express more complex meanings
may have arrived at later stages of language evolution
(Jackendoff 2002; Johansson 2006). Indeed, the modern
Amazonian language, Piraha˜, lacks recursion and has one
of the world’s smallest phoneme inventories (though its
morphology is complex), limiting its expressivity (Everett
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2005; but see also the critique by Nevins et al. 2007, and
Everett’s 2007 response).
While expressivity is one selectional force that may tend
to increase linguistic complexity, it will typically stand in
opposition to another: ease of learning and processing
will tend to favor linguistic simplicity. But the picture
may be more complex: in some cases, ease of learning
and ease of processing may stand in opposition. For
example, regularity makes items easier to learn; the short-
ening of frequent items, and consequent irregularity,
may make aspects of language easier to say. There are
similar tensions between ease of production (which
favors simplifying the speech signal) and ease of compre-
hension (which favors a richer, and hence more infor-
mative, signal). Moreover, whereas constraints deriving
from the brain provide pressures toward simplification of
language, processes of grammaticalization can add com-
plexity to language (e.g., by the emergence of morphologi-
cal markers). Thus, part of the complexity of language, just
as in biology, may arise from the complex interaction of
competing constraints.
7.1. Language evolution as linguistic change
Recent theory in diachronic linguistics has focused on
grammaticalization (e.g., Bybee et al. 1994; Heine 1991;
Hopper & Traugott 1993): the process by which functional
items, including closed class words and morphology,
develop from what are initially open-class items. This tran-
sitional process involves a “bleaching” of meaning, phono-
logical reduction, and increasingly rigid dependencies
with other items. Thus, the English number one is likely
to be the root to a(n). The Latin cantare habeo (I have
[something] to sing) mutated into chanterais, cantare´,
cantaro` (I will sing in French, Spanish, Italian). The
suffix corresponds phonologically to I have in each
language (respectively, ai, he, ho – the have element has
collapsed into inflectional morphology; Fleischman
1982). The same processes of grammaticalization can
also cause certain content words over time to get bleached
of their meaning and become grammatical particles. For
example, the use of go and have as auxiliary verbs (as in
I am going to sing or I have forgotten my hat) have been
bleached of their original meanings concerning physical
movement and possession (Bybee et al. 1994). The pro-
cesses of grammaticalization appear gradual and follow
historical patterns, suggesting that there are systematic
selectional pressures operative in language change. More
generally, these processes provide a possible origin of
grammatical structure from a proto-language initially
involving perhaps unordered and uninflected strings of
content words.
From a historical perspective, it is natural to view many
aspects of syntax as emerging from processing or prag-
matic factors. Revisiting our discussion of binding con-
straints, we might view complementary distributions of
reflexive and non-reflexive pronouns as initially arising
from pragmatic factors; the resulting pattern may be
acquired and modified by future generations of learners,
to some degree independently of those initial factors
(e.g., Givo´n 1979; Levinson 1987b). Thus, binding con-
straints might be a complex product of many forces,
including pragmatic factors, and learning and processing
biases – and hence, the subtlety of those constraints
should not be entirely surprising. But from the present
perspective, the fact that such a complex system of con-
straints is readily learnable, is neither puzzling, nor indica-
tive of an innately specified genetic endowment. Rather,
the constraints are learnable because they have been
shaped by the very pragmatic, processing and learning
constraints with which the learner is endowed.
Understanding the cognitive and communicative basis
for the direction of grammaticalization and related pro-
cesses is an important challenge. But equally, the sugges-
tion that this type of observable historical change may be
continuous with language evolution opens up the possi-
bility that research on the origin of language may not be
a theoretically isolated island of speculation, but may
connect directly with one of the most central topics in
linguistics: the nature of language change (e.g., Zeevat
2006). Indeed, grammaticalization has become the center of
many recent perspectives on the evolution of language
as mediated by cultural transmission across hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of generations of learners (e.g.,
Bybee et al. 1994; Givo´n 1998; Heine & Kuteva 2002;
Schoenemann 1999; Tomasello 2003). Although the
present approach also emphasizes the importance of
grammaticalization in the evolution of complex syntax, it
differs from other approaches in that we see this diachro-
nic process as being constrained by limitations on learning
and processing. Indeed, there have even been intriguing
attempts to explain some aspects of language change
with reference to the learning properties of connectionist
networks. For example, Hare and Elman (1995) demon-
strated how cross-generational learning by sequential
learning devices can model the gradual historical change
in English verb inflection from a complex past tense
system in Old English to the dominant “regular” class
and small classes of “irregular” verbs of modern English.
7.2. Language evolution through cultural transmission
How far can language evolution and historical processes of
language change be explained by general mechanisms of
cultural transmission? And how might language be selec-
tively distorted by such processes? Crucial to any such
model are assumptions about the channel over which cul-
tural information is transmitted, the structure of the
network of social interactions over which transmission
occurs, and the learning and processing mechanisms that
support the acquisition and use of the transmitted infor-
mation (Boyd & Richerson 2005).
A wide range of recent computational models of the
cultural transmission of language has been developed,
with different points of emphasis. Some of these models
have considered how language is shaped by the process of
transmission over successive generations, by the nature of
the communication problem to be solved, and/or by the
nature of the learners (e.g., Batali 1998; Kirby 1999). For
example, Kirby et al. (2007) show that, if information is
transmitted directly between individual learners, and lear-
ners sample grammars from the Bayes posterior distribution
of grammars, given that information, then language asymp-
totically converges to match the priors initially encoded by
the learners. In contrast, Smith et al. (2003a), using a differ-
ent model of how information is learned, indicate how com-
positional structure in language might have resulted from
the complex interaction of learning constraints and cultural
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transmission, resulting in a “learning bottleneck.” Moreover,
a growing number of studies have started to investigate the
potentially important interactions between biological and lin-
guistic adaptation in language evolution (e.g., Christiansen
et al. 2006; Hurford 1990; Hurford & Kirby 1999; Kvasnicka
& Pospichal 1999; Livingstone & Fyfe 2000; Munroe &
Cangelosi 2002; Smith 2002; 2004; Yamauchi 2001).
Of particular interest here are simulations indicating
that apparently arbitrary aspects of linguistic structure
may arise from constraints on learning and processing
(e.g., Kirby 1998; 1999; Van Everbroeck 1999). For
example, it has been suggested that subjacency constraints
may arise from cognitive limitations on sequential learning
(Ellefson & Christiansen 2000). Moreover, using rule-
based language induction, Kirby (1999) accounted for
the emergence of typological universals as a result of
domain-general learning and processing constraints.
Finally, note that, in line with the present arguments, a
range of recent studies have challenged the plausibility
of biological adaptation to arbitrary features of the linguis-
tic environment (e.g., Christiansen et al. 2006; Kirby &
Hurford 1997; Kirby et al. 2007; Munroe & Cangelosi
2002; Yamauchi 2001).
The range of factors known to be important in cultural
transmission (e.g., group size and networks of transmission
among group members, fidelity of transmission) has been
explored relatively little in simulation work. Furthermore,
to the extent that language is shaped by the brain, enriching
the models of cultural transmission of language against the
backdrop of learning and processing constraints, will be
an important direction for the study both of historical
language change and language evolution. More generally,
viewing language as shaped by cultural transmission
(Arbib 2005; Bybee 2002; Donald 1998) only provides
the starting point for an explanation of linguistic regu-
larities. The real challenge, we suggest, is to delineate the
wide range of constraints, from perceptuo-motor to prag-
matic (as sketched earlier in sect. 6), that operate on
language evolution. Detailing these constraints is likely to
be crucial for explanations of complex linguistic regu-
larities, and how they can readily be learned and processed.
We note here that this perspective on the adaptation of
language differs importantly from the processes of cultural
change that operate through deliberate and conscious
innovation and/or evaluation of cultural variants. On our
account, the processes of language change operate to
make languages easier to learn and process, and more
communicatively effective. But these changes do not
operate through processes either of “design” or deliberate
adoption by language users. Thus, following Darwin, we
view the origin of the adaptive complexity in language as
analogous to the origin of adaptive complexity in biology.
Specifically, the adaptive complexity of biological organ-
isms is presumed to arise from random genetic variation,
winnowed by natural selection (a “blind watchmaker”;
Dawkins 1986). We argue that the adaptive complexity
of language arises, similarly, from random linguistic vari-
ation winnowed by selectional pressures, though here con-
cerning learning and processing (so again, we have a blind
watchmaker).
By contrast, for aspects of cultural changes for which
variants are either created, or selected, by deliberate
choice, the picture is very different. Such cultural products
can be viewed instead as arising from the incremental
action of processes of intelligent design, and more or less
explicit evaluations, and decisions to adopt (see Chater
2005). Many phenomena discussed by evolutionary theor-
ists concerning culture (e.g., Campbell 1965; Richerson
& Boyd 2005) – including those described by meme-
theorists (e.g., Blackmore 1999; Dawkins 1976; Dennett
1995) – fall into this latter category. Explanations of
fashions (e.g., wearing baseball caps backwards), catch-
phrases, memorable tunes, engineering methods, cultural
conventions and institutions (e.g., marriage, revenge kill-
ings), scientific and artistic ideas, religious views, and so
on, seem patently to be products of sighted watchmakers;
that is, they are products, in part at least, of many gener-
ations of intelligent designers, imitators, and critics.
Our focus here concerns, instead, the specific and inter-
dependent constraints which operate on particular linguis-
tic structures and of which people have no conscious
awareness. Presumably, speakers do not deliberately
contemplate syntactic reanalyses of existing structures,
bleach the meaning of common verbs so that they play
an increasingly syntactic role, or collapse discourse struc-
ture into syntax or syntactic structure into morphology.
Of course, there is some deliberate innovation in language
(e.g., people consciously invent new words and phrases).
But such deliberate innovations should be sharply
distinguished from the unconscious operation of the
basic learning and processing biases that have shaped
the phonological, syntactic, and semantic regularities of
language.
7.3. Language change “in vivo”
We have argued that language has evolved over time to be
compatible with the human brain. However, it might be
objected that it is not clear that languages become better
adapted over time, given that they all seem capable of
expressing a similar range of meanings (Sereno 1991). In
fact, the idea that all languages are fundamentally equal
and independent of their users – uniformitarianism – is
widely adopted in linguistics, preventing many linguists
from thinking about language evolution (Newmeyer
2003). Yet, much variation exists in how easy it is to use a
given language to express a particular meaning, given the
limitations of human learning and processing mechanisms.
The recent work on creolization in sign language pro-
vides a window onto how pressures towards increased
expressivity interact with constraints on learning and
processing “in vivo.” In less than three decades, a sign
language has emerged in Nicaragua, created by deaf
children with little exposure to established languages.
Senghas et al. (2004) compared signed expressions for
complex motions produced by deaf signers of Nicaraguan
Sign Language (NSL) with the gestures of hearing
Spanish speakers. The results showed that the hearing
individuals used a single simultaneous movement com-
bining both manner and path of motion, whereas the
deaf NSL signers tended to break the event into two con-
secutive signs: one for the path of motion and another for
the manner. Moreover, this tendency was strongest for
the signers who had learned NSL more recently, indicat-
ing that NSL has changed from using a holistic way of
denoting motion events to a more sequential, compo-
sitional format.
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Although such creolization may be considered as evi-
dence of UG (e.g., Bickerton 1984; Pinker 1994), the
results may be better construed in terms of cognitive con-
straints on cultural transmission. Indeed, computational
simulations have demonstrated how iterated learning in
cultural transmission can change a language starting as a
collection of holistic form-meaning pairings into a more
compositional format, in which sequences of forms are
combined to produce meanings previously expressed holi-
stically (see Kirby &Hurford 2002, for a review). Similarly,
human experimentation operationalizing iterated learning
within a new “cross-generational” paradigm – in which
the output of one artificial-language learner is used as the
input for subsequent “generations” of language learners –
has shown that such learning biases over generations can
change the structure of artificial languages from holistic
mappings to a compositional format (Cornish 2006). This
allows language to have increased expressivity, while
being learnable from exposure to a finite set of form-
meaning pairings. Thus, the change towards using sequen-
tial compositional forms to describe motion events in NSL
can be viewed as a reflection of similar processes of learning
and cultural transmission.
In a similar vein, the rapid emergence of a regular SOV
(subject-object-verb) word order in Al-Sayyid Bedouin
Sign Language (ABSL) (Sandler et al. 2005) can be inter-
preted as arising from constraints on learning and proces-
sing. ABSL has a longer history than NSL, going back
some 70 years. The Al-Sayyid Bedouin group, located in
the Negev desert region of southern Israel, forms an iso-
lated community with a high incidence of congenital deaf-
ness. In contrast to NSL, which developed within a school
environment, ABSL has evolved in a more natural setting
and is recognized as the second language of the Al-Sayyid
village. A key feature of ABSL is that is has developed a
basic SOV word order within sentences (e.g., boy apple
eat), with modifiers following heads (e.g., apple red).
Although this type of word order is very common across
the world (Dryer 1992), it is found neither in the local
spoken Arabic dialect nor in Israeli Sign Language
(ISL), suggesting that ABSL has developed these gramma-
tical regularities de novo.
In a series of computational simulations, Christiansen
and Devlin (1997) found that languages with consistent
word order were easier to learn by a sequential learning
device compared to inconsistent word orders. Thus, a
language with a grammatical structure such as ABSL was
easier to learn than one in which an SOV word order
was combined with a modifier-head order within phrases.
Similar results were obtained when human subjects were
trained on artificial languages with either consistent or
inconsistent word orders (Christiansen 2000; Reeder
2004). Further simulations have demonstratedhow sequen-
tial learning biases can lead to the emergence of languages
with regular word orders through cultural transmission –
even when starting from a language with a completely
random word order (Christiansen & Dale 2004; Reali &
Christiansen, in press).
Differences in learnability are not confined to newly
emerged languages but can also be observed in well-
established languages. For example, Slobin and Bever
(1982) found that when children learning English,
Italian, Turkish, or Serbo-Croatian were asked to act out
reversible transitive sentences, such as the horse kicked
the cow, using familiar toy animals, language-specific
differences in performance emerged. Turkish-speaking
children performed very well already at 2 years of age,
most likely because of the regular case-markings in this
language, indicating who is doing what to whom. Young
English- and Italian-speaking children initially performed
slightly worse than the Turkish children but quickly caught
up around 3 years of age, relying on the relatively consist-
ent word order information available in these languages,
with subjects preceding objects. The children acquiring
Serbo-Croatian, on the other hand, had problems deter-
mining the meaning of the simple sentences, most likely
because this language uses a combination of case-markings
and word order to indicate agent and patient roles in a sen-
tence. Crucially, only masculine and feminine nouns take
on accusative or nominative markings and can occur in any
order with respect to one another, but sentences with one
or more unmarked neuter nouns are typically ordered as
subject-verb-object. Of course, Serbo-Croatian children
eventually catch up with the Turkish-, English-, and
Italian-speaking children, but these results do show that
some meanings are harder to learn and process in some
languages compared to others, indicating differential
fitness across languages (see Lupyan & Christiansen
2002, for corroborating computational simulations).
Within specific languages, substantial differences also
exist between individual idiolects; for example, as demon-
strated by the considerable differences in language compre-
hension abilities among cleaners, janitors, undergraduates,
graduate students, and lecturers from the same British
university (Dabrowska 1997). Even within the reasonably
homogeneous group of college students, individual differ-
ences exist in sentence processing abilities because of
underlying variations in learning and processing mechan-
isms combined with variations in exposure to language
(for a review, see MacDonald & Christiansen 2002).
Additional sources of variation are likely to come from the
incorporation of linguistic innovations into the language.
In this context, it has been suggested that innovations
may primarily be due to adults (Bybee, in press), whereas
constraints on children’s acquisition of language may
provide the strongest pressure towards regularization
(e.g., Hudson Kam & Newport 2005). Thus, once we
abandon linguistic uniformitarianism, it becomes clear
that there is much variability for linguistic adaptation to
work with.
In sum, we have argued that human language has been
shaped by selectional pressure from thousands of gener-
ations of language learners and users. Linguistic variants
that are easier to learn to understand and produce; var-
iants that are more economical, expressive, and generally
effective in communication, persuasion, and perhaps
indicative of status and social group, will be favored. Just
as with the multiple selectional pressures operative in bio-
logical evolution, the matrix of factors at work in driving
the evolution of language is complex. Nonetheless, as we
have seen, candidate pressures can be proposed (e.g.,
the pressure for incrementality, minimizing memory
load, regularity, brevity, and so on); and regular patterns
of language change that may be responses to those press-
ures can be identified (e.g., the processes of successive
entrenchment, generalization, and erosion of structure
evident in grammaticalization). Thus, the logical problem
of language evolution that appears to confront attempts
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to explain how a genetically specified linguistic endow-
ment could become encoded, does not arise; it is not the
brain that has somehow evolved to language, but the
reverse.
8. Scope of the argument
In this target article, we have presented a theory of language
evolution as shaped by the brain. From this perspective, the
close fit between language learners and the structure of
natural language that motivates many theorists to posit a
language-specific biological endowment may instead arise
from processes of adaptation operating on language itself.
Moreover, we have argued that there are fundamental dif-
ficulties with postulating a language-specific biological
endowment. It is implausible that such an endowment
could evolve through adaptation (because the prior linguis-
tic environments would be too diverse to give rise to univer-
sal principles). It is also unlikely that a language-specific
endowment of any substantial complexity arose through
non-adaptational genetic mechanisms, because the prob-
ability of a functional language system arising essentially
by chance is vanishingly small. Instead, we have suggested
that some apparently arbitrary aspects of language structure
may arise from the interaction of a range of factors, from
general constraints on learning, to impacts of semantic
and pragmatic factors, and concomitant processes of gram-
maticalization and other aspects of language change. But,
intriguingly, it also possible that many apparently arbitrary
aspects of language can be explained by relatively natural
cognitive constraints – and hence, that language may be
rather less arbitrary than at first supposed (e.g., Bates &
MacWhinney 1979; 1987; Bybee 2007; Elman 1999; Kirby
1999; Levinson 2000; O’Grady 2005; Tomasello 2003).
8.1. The logical problem of language evolution meets
the logical problem of language acquisition
The present viewpoint has interesting theoretical impli-
cations concerning language acquisition. Children acquire
the full complexity of natural language over a relatively
short amount of time, from exposure to noisy and partial
samples of language. The ability to develop complex linguis-
tic abilities from what appears to be such poor input has
led many to speak of the “logical” problem of language
acquisition (e.g., Baker & McCarthy 1981; Hornstein &
Lightfoot 1981). One solution to the problem is to
assume that learners have some sort of biological “head
start” in language acquisition – that their learning appar-
atus is precisely meshed with the structure of natural
language. This viewpoint is, of course, consistent with
theories according to which there is a genetically specified
language organ, module, or instinct (e.g., Chomsky 1986;
1993; Crain 1991; Piattelli-Palmarini 1989; 1994; Pinker
1994; Pinker & Bloom 1990). But it is also consistent with
the present view that languages have evolved to be learn-
able. According to this view, the mesh between language
learning and language structure has occurred not because
specialized biological machinery embodies the principles
that govern natural languages (UG), but rather that the
structure of language has evolved to fit with pre-linguistic
learning and processing constraints.
If language has evolved to be learnable, then the
problem of language acquisition may have been misana-
lyzed. Language acquisition is frequently viewed as a
standard problem of induction (e.g., Gold 1967; Jain
et al. 1999; Osherson et al. 1986; Pinker 1984; 1989),
where there is a vast space of possible grammars that
are consistent with the linguistic data to which the child
is exposed. Accordingly, it is often readily concluded
that the child must have innate knowledge of language
structure to constrain the space of possible grammars to
a manageable size. But, if language is viewed as having
been shaped by the brain, then language learning is by
no means a standard problem of induction. To give an
analogy, according to the standard view of induction,
the problem of language acquisition is like being in an
unreasonable quiz show, where you have inadequate
information but must somehow guess the “correct”
answer. But according to the present view, by contrast,
there is no externally given correct answer; instead, the
task is simply to give the same answer as everybody else –
because the structure of language will have adapted to
conform to this most “popular” guess. This is a much
easier problem: Whatever learning biases people have, so
long as these biases are shared across individuals, learning
should proceed successfully. Moreover, the viewpoint that
children learn language using general-purpose cognitive
mechanisms, rather than language-specific mechanisms,
has also been advocated independently from a variety
of different perspectives ranging from usage-based and
functional accounts of language acquisition (e.g., Bates &
MacWhinney 1979; 1987; MacWhinney 1999; Seidenberg
1997; Seidenberg & MacDonald 2001; Tomasello 2000a;
2000b; 2000c; 2003) to cultural transmission views of
language evolution (e.g., Davidson 2003; Donald 1998;
Ragir 2002; Schoenemann 1999), to neurobiological
approaches to language (e.g., Arbib 2005; Deacon 1997;
Elman et al. 1996) and formal language theory (Chater &
Vita´nyi 2007).
From this perspective, the problem of language acqui-
sition is very different from learning, say, some aspect of
the physical world. In learning naı¨ve physics, the con-
straints to be learned (e.g., how rigid bodies move, how
fluids flow, and so on) are defined by processes outside
the cognitive system. External processes define the
“right” answers, to which learners must converge. But
in language acquisition, the structure of the language to
be learned is itself determined by the learning of gener-
ations of previous learners (see Zuidema 2003). Because
learners have similar learning biases, this means that the
first wild guesses that the learner makes about how some
linguistic structure works are likely to be the right
guesses. More generally, in language acquisition, the
learner’s biases, if shared by other learners, are likely to
be helpful in acquiring the language – because the
language has been shaped by processes of selection to
conform with those biases. This also means that the
problem of the poverty of the stimulus (e.g., Chomsky
1980; Crain 1991; Crain & Pietroski 2001) is reduced,
because language has been shaped to be learnable from
the kind of noisy and partial input available to young
children. Thus, language acquisition is constrained by
substantial biological constraints – but these constraints
emerge from cognitive machinery that is not language-
specific.
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8.2. Natural selection for functional aspects
of language?
It is important to emphasize what our arguments are not
intended to show. In particular, we are not suggesting that
biological adaptation is irrelevant for language. Indeed, it
seems likely that a number of pre-adaptations for language
might have occurred (see Hurford 2003, for a review),
such as the ability to represent discrete symbols (Deacon
1997; Tomasello 2003), to reason about other minds (Malle
2002), to understand and share intentions (Tomasello
2003; Tomasello et al. 2005), and to perform pragmatic
reasoning (Levinson 2000). There may also be a connection
with the emergence of an exceptionally prolonged childhood
(Locke & Bogin 2006). Similarly, biological adaptations
might have led to improvements to the cognitive systems
that support language, including increased working
memory capacity (Gruber 2002), domain-general capacities
for word learning (Bloom 2001), and complex hierarchical
sequential learning abilities (Calvin 1994; Conway &
Christiansen 2001; Greenfield 1991; Hauser et al. 2002),
though these adaptations are likely to have been for
improved cognitive skills rather than for language.
Some language-specific adaptations may nonetheless
have occurred as well, but given our arguments above
these would only be for functional features of language,
and not the arbitrary features of UG. For example,
changes to the human vocal tract may have resulted in
more intelligible speech (Lieberman 1984; 1991; 2003 –
though see also Hauser & Fitch 2003); selectional pressure
for this functional adaptation might apply relatively inde-
pendently of the particular language. Similarly, it remains
possible that the Baldwin effect may be invoked to explain
cognitive adaptations to language, provided that these adap-
tations are to functional aspects of language, rather than
putatively arbitrary linguistic structures. For example, it
has been suggested that theremight be a specialized percep-
tion apparatus for speech (e.g., Vouloumanos & Werker
2007), or enhancement of the motor control system for
articulation (e.g., Studdert-Kennedy & Goldstein 2003).
But explaining innate adaptations even in these domains is
likely to be difficult – because, if adaptation to language
occurs at all, it is likely to occur not merely to functionally
universal features (e.g., the fact that languages segment
into words), but to specific cues for those features (e.g.,
for segmenting those words in the current linguistic envi-
ronment, which differ dramatically across languages;
Cutler et al. 1986; Otake et al. 1993). Hence, adaptationist
explanations, even for functional aspects of language and
language processing, should be treated with considerable
caution.
8.3. Implications for the co-evolution of
genes and culture
Our argument may, however, have applications beyond
language. Many theorists have suggested that, just as
there are specific genetic adaptations to language, there
may also be specific genetic adaptations to other cultural
domains. The arguments we have outlined against biologi-
cal adaptationism in language evolution appear to apply
equally to rule out putative co-evolution of the brain
with any rapidly changing and highly varied aspect of
human culture – from marriage practices and food
sharing practices, to music and art, to folk theories of reli-
gion, science, or mathematics. We speculate that, in each
case, the apparent fit between culture and the brain arises
primarily because culture has been shaped to fit with our
prior cognitive biases. Thus, by analogy with language, we
suggest that nativist arguments across these domains
might usefully be re-evaluated, from the perspective that
culture may have adapted to cognition much more sub-
stantially than cognition has adapted to culture.
In summary, we have argued that the notion of UG
is subject to a logical problem of language evolution,
whether it is suggested to be the result of gradual biologi-
cal adaptation or other non-adaptationist factors. Instead,
we have proposed to explain the close fit between language
and learners as arising from the fact that language is
shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse.
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NOTES
1. For the purposes of exposition, we use the term “language
genes” as shorthand for genes that may be involved in encoding a
potential UG. By using this term, we do not mean to suggest that
this relationship necessarily involves a one-to-one correspon-
dence between individual genes and a specific aspect of language
(or cognition).
2. Intermediate positions, which accord some role to both
non-adaptationist and adaptationist mechanisms, are, of course,
possible. Such intermediate viewpoints inherit the logical pro-
blems that we discuss in the following sections for both types
of approach, in proportion to the relative contribution presumed
to be associated with each. Moreover, we note that our argu-
ments have equal force independent of whether one assumes
that language has a vocal (e.g., Dunbar 2003) or manual-
gesture (e.g., Corballis 2003) based origin.
3. Strictly, the appropriate measure is the more subtle inclus-
ive fitness, which takes into account the reproductive potential
not just of an organism, but also a weighted sum of the reproduc-
tive potentials of its kin, where the weighting is determined by
the closeness of kinship (Hamilton 1964). Moreover, mere repro-
duction is only of value to the degree that one’s offspring have a
propensity to reproduce, and so down the generations.
4. In addition, Pinker and Bloom (1990) point out that it is
often the case that natural selection has several (equally adaptive)
alternatives to choose from to carry out a given function (e.g.,
both the invertebrate and the vertebrate eye support vision
despite having significant architectural differences).
5. One prominent view is that language emerged within the
last 100,000 to 200,000 years (e.g., Bickerton 2003). Hominid
populations over this period, and before, appear to have under-
gone waves of spread; “modern languages derive mostly or
completely from a single language spoken in East Africa
around 100 kya . . . it was the only language then existing that
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survived and evolved with rapid differentiation and transform-
ation” (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 2003, p. 273).
6. Human genome-wide scans have revealed evidence of
recent positive selection for more than 250 genes (Voight et al.
2006), making it very likely that genetic adaptations for language
would have continued in this scenario.
7. This setup closely resembles the one used by Hinton and
Nowlan (1987) in their simulations of the Baldwin effect, and to
whichPinker andBloom (1990) refer in support of their adaptation-
ist account of language evolution. The simulations are also similar in
format to other models of language evolution (e.g., Briscoe 2003;
Kirby & Hurford 1997; Nowak et al. 2001). Note, however, the
reported simulations have a very different purpose from that of
work on understanding historical language change from a UG per-
spective, for example, as involving successive changes in linguistic
parameters (e.g., Baker 2001; Lightfoot 2000; Yang 2002).
8. Some recent theorists have proposed that a further pressure
for language divergence between groups is the sociolinguistic ten-
dency for groups to “badge” their in-group by difficult-to-fake
linguistic idiosyncrasies (Baker 2003; Nettle & Dunbar 1997).
Such pressures would increase the pace of language divergence,
and thus exacerbate the problem of divergence for adaptationist
theories of language evolution.
9. This type of phenomenon, where the genetically influenced
behavior of an organism affects the environment to which those
genes are adapting, is known as Baldwinian niche construction
(Odling-Smee et al. 2003; Weber & Depew 2003).
10. Indeed, a population genetic study by Dediu and Ladd
(2007) could, on the one hand, be taken as pointing to biological
adaptations for a surface feature of phonology: the adoption of a
single-tier phonological system relying only on phoneme-
sequence information to differentiate between words, instead
of a two-tier system incorporating both phonemes and tones
(i.e., pitch contours). Specifically, two particular alleles of
ASPM and Microcephalin, both related to brain development,
were strongly associated with languages that incorporate a
single-tier phonological system, even when controlling for geo-
graphical factors and common linguistic history. On the other
hand, given that the relevant mutations would have had to
occur independently several times, the causal explanation plausi-
bly goes in the opposite direction, from genes to language. The
two alleles may have been selected for other reasons relating to
brain development; but once in place, they made it harder to
acquire phonological systems involving tonal contrasts, which,
in turn, allowed languages without tonal contrasts to evolve
more readily. This perspective (also advocated by Dediu &
Ladd 2007) dovetails with our suggestion that language is
shaped by the brain, as discussed in sects. 5 to 7). However,
either of these interpretations would argue against an adaptation-
ist account of UG.
11. We have presented the argument in informal terms.
A more rigorous argument is as follows. We can measure the
amount of information embodied in Universal Grammar, U,
over and above the information in pre-existing cognitive pro-
cesses, C, by the length of the shortest code that will generate
U from C. This is the conditional Kolmogorov complexity
K(UjC) (Li & Vita´nyi 1997). By the coding theorem of Kolmo-
gorov complexity theory (Li & Vita´nyi 1997), the probability of
randomly generating U from C is approximately 22K(UjC). Thus,
if Universal Grammar has any substantial complexity, then it
has a vanishingly small probability of being encountered by a
random process, such as a non-adaptational mechanism.
12. Darwin may have had several reasons for pointing to these
similarities. Given that comparative linguistics at the time was
considered to be a model science on a par with geology and com-
parative anatomy, he may have used comparisons between lin-
guistic change – which was thought to be well understood at
that time – and species change to corroborate his theory of evol-
ution (Alter 1998; Beer 1996). Darwin may also have used these
language-species comparisons to support the notion that less
“civilized” human societies spoke less civilized languages,
because he believed that this was predicted by his theory of
human evolution (Raddick 2000; 2002).
13. Chomsky has sometimes speculated that the primary role
of language may be as a vehicle for thought, rather than com-
munication (e.g., Chomsky 1980). This viewpoint has its
puzzles: for example, the existence of anything other than seman-
tic representations is difficult to understand, as it is these over
which thought is defined; and the semantic representations in
Chomsky’s recent theorizing are, indeed, too underspecified to
support inference, throwing the utility of even these represen-
tations into doubt.
14. Some studies purportedly indicate that the mechanisms
involved in syntactic language are not the same as those involved
in most sequential learning tasks (e.g., Friederici et al. 2006; Pen˜a
et al. 2002). However, the methods used in these studies have sub-
sequently been shown to be fundamentally flawed (deVries et al. [in
press] and Onnis et al. [2005], respectively), thereby undermining
their negative conclusions. Thus, the preponderance of the evi-
dence suggests that sequential learning tasks tap into the mechan-
isms involved in language acquisition and processing.
15. The current knowledge regarding the FOXP2 gene is con-
sistent with the suggestion of a human pre-adaptation for sequen-
tial learning (Fisher 2006). FOXP2 is highly conserved across
species; but two amino acid changes have occurred after the
split between humans and chimps, and these became fixed in
the human population about 200,000 years ago (Enard et al.
2002). In humans, mutations to FOXP2 result in severe speech
and orofacial motor impairments (Lai et al. 2001; MacDermot
et al. 2005). Studies of FOXP2 expression in mice and imaging
studies of an extended family pedigree with FOXP2 mutations
have provided evidence that this gene is important to neural
development and function, including of the corticostriatal
system (Lai et al. 2003). This system has been shown to be
important for sequential (and other types of procedural) learning
(Packard & Knowlton 2002). Crucially, preliminary findings from
a mother and daughter with a translocation involving FOXP2
indicate that they have problems with both language and sequen-
tial learning (Tomblin et al. 2004).
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Abstract: Sign languages provide direct evidence for the relation between
human languages and the body that engenders them. We discuss the use of
the hands to create symbols and the role of the body in sign language verb
systems, especially in two quite recently developed sign languages, Israeli
Sign Language and Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language.
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Christiansen & Chater (C&C) succinctly announce the major
claim of their article in its title, which we will take the liberty
of relettering (changing an a to an i) as: language is shaped by
the brain. Our work on sign languages has led us to the
broader but more easily verifiable claim that languages are
shaped by the human body and its interaction with the world.
The greatest obstacle facing any claim about the relation
between languages and the brain is the simple fact that we
have precious little access to the inner workings of the human
mind/brain and no direct access to the relation between the
mind/brain and language. Indeed, C&C do not have much to
say concretely about how the human mind/brain actually con-
strains languages (see sects. 6.2–6.3 of the target article).
But once we extend our purview beyond the brain and under-
stand, as C&C do, that there are “other parts of our body involved
in language” (sect. 6, para. 1), especially parts of the body that are
visible to the naked eye, then we can literally see ways in which
human languages are shaped by the body, not just the mind/
brain part of it, and how they differ from the communication of
other primates. Here students of sign languages have a great
advantage over students of spoken languages, because sign
languages, lacking sound, are necessarily fully visible. Concrete
evidence for the relation between human languages and the
body that engenders them comes from our own research on a
number of sign languages, especially two quite recently devel-
oped sign languages, Israeli Sign Language (ISL) (Meir &
Sandler 2008) and Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL)
(Aronoff et al. 2008; Meir et al. 2007; Padden et al., in press;
Sandler et al. 2005).
Following Wilson (2002), we assume that “The mind must be
understood in the context of its relationship to a physical body
that interacts with the world” (p. 625). We doubt anyone could
quarrel with this statement, but it has broad consequences
when taken as more than a slogan. We will discuss here two
examples, both related to the iconicity afforded by visual
language: the use of the hands to create symbols and the role
of the body in sign language verb systems.
Sign languages use the hands to shape the often iconic symbols
that enter into the linguistic system. No matter how young the
language, and even in the absence of a community as in the
case of home signers, people spontaneously use their hands
and bodies to make symbols that represent other objects and
actions – a cup, a flower, to see. This seemingly obvious fact
reveals with startling clarity the essential difference between
the language of humans and the communication systems of
other primates. Nonhuman primates in the wild do use their
hands and bodies to gesture, but the literature on their communi-
cation systems documents no case where a chimpanzee, bonobo,
orangutan, or other primate relative uses its hands to represent a
termite or a banana or any object other than its hands (Call &
Tomasello 2007). The use of the body to represent the world
symbolically in sign language provides compelling evidence for
the view put forward by Deacon (1997) and others that symboli-
zation is a more basic feature of language than arbitrariness
(Sandler, in press). C&C “suggest that language does not
involve any qualitatively different mechanisms compared to
extant apes” (sect. 6.5, para. 3). Visual human languages call
that suggestion into question.
The body interacts with the linguistic system separately from
the hands in a complex way in the representation of the meanings
of signs denoting states of affairs (verbs) in all sign languages that
we know of (Meir et al. 2007). In what are called body-anchored
verb signs, the signer’s body consistently represents one argu-
ment of the verb, the subject, whereas the hands, moving in
relation to the body, represent all other components of the
event, including all other arguments. For example, the sign
EAT is signed in all known sign languages by moving the hand
towards the body (specifically, the mouth). The body represents
the subject of the eating event. The hands represent the object
being eaten and aspects of the event itself in EAT signs. This
division of labor between body and hands is a clear indication
of how the human body helps shape a grammatical system.
Common body-anchored signs in ISL are given in Table 1.
These signs are of many different semantic types and the
subject argument plays a different semantic role in each type;
yet in all semantic types the body corresponds to the subject
argument, the argument by which the event is predicted. Iconi-
city motivates the use of the body in this system, in which the
emergent grammatical construct is the notion of subject.
The signer’s body does not iconically stand for the subject in all
verbs in all sign languages. For one, this particular iconic use of
the body is typically limited to animate subjects. For another,
most sign languages have another major category of verbs,
usually called agreement verbs, in which the signer’s body plays
the role of grammatical first person (Padden 1988) and the use
of the body to represent first person overrides or blocks the
body-as-subject iconicity. Unlike the body-as-subject class,
agreement verbs or “verbs of transfer” (Meir 2002), such as
GIVE, SEND, SHOW, and TAKE, use reference points in the
space around the body abstractly to represent syntactic argu-
ments. See Aronoff et al. (2005) and Padden et al. (in press)
for details.
Observing the emergence of new sign languages in real time
allows us to take one step back in the development of language.
These languages reveal strikingly the reliance on the body in
expressing verbal notions. When they lack grammatical person
marking and hence agreement verbs, all the transfer notions
that are lexicalized as agreement verbs in established sign
languages are lexicalized instead as body-anchored expressions
and follow the body-as-subject pattern. We have documented
this phenomenon in detail for ABSL and have shown how the
emergence of the notion of grammatical first person in the dia-
chronic development of ISL shifted the language from the
body-as-subject pattern to the body-as-first-person pattern
(Meir et al. 2007). The study of sign languages, especially
Table 1. (Aronoff et al.) Common body-anchored signs in Israeli
Sign Language
Verb type Bodily anchor Subject role
Consumption:
EAT, DRINK
Mouth
Represents the
mouth of the
subject
Agent
Mental activity:
THINK, KNOW,
REMEMBER, LEARN
Temple or forehead
Represents the
site of the mental
activity of the
subject
Experiencer
Saying:
SAY, ASK, ANSWER,
TELL, EXPLAIN
Mouth
Represents the
mouth of the
subject
Agent
Psychological state:
HAPPY, LOVE,
SUFFER, UPSET
Chest
Corresponds to
the symbolic
location of
emotions of the
subject
Experiencer,
patient
Change of physical state:
BLUSH, GET-WELL,
WAKE-UP
Face, Chest or eyes
Represent the
relevant part of
the body of the
subject
Patient
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emerging sign languages, teaches us that our species relies on
the human body in the creation and structuring of languages
when it can.
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Abstract: We agree that much of language evolution is likely to be
adaptation of languages to properties of the brain. However, the
attempt to rule out the existence of language-specific adaptations a
priori is misguided. In particular, the claim that adaptation to “moving
targets” cannot occur is false. Instead, the details of gene-culture
coevolution in language are an empirical matter.
We wholeheartedly agree with Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s)
central point that much of language evolution is likely to be adap-
tation of languages, via cultural evolution, to leverage species-
typical properties of the brain. They are right to point out that
while many language universals have been taken to reflect prop-
erties of a genetically evolved Universal Grammar (UG), they
could equally well be universal culturally evolved properties of
languages. This possibility is insufficiently recognized and
should be a major focus of study.
What we take issue with, however, are the ideas that this is an
“either/or” issue and that it is possible to rule out a priori the exist-
ence of mechanisms that evolved specifically as a result of their
effects on language acquisition. Instead, how genes and culture
interact to produce language, andwhether domain-specificmech-
anisms exist for language acquisition, are empirical matters.
The biggest problemwith C&C’s argument lies in their attempt
to rule out the existence of UG a priori by proposing a “logical”
problem of language evolution: namely, that adaptation to
“moving targets” is impossible. Unfortunately, this claim is
simply false. “Moving targets,” in the sense of environments that
vary over space and time, are the norm rather than the exception
in biology. What matters for adaptation is not whether environ-
ments vary, but whether there are statistical regularities that
natural selection could track. It is very likely that the world’s
languages do possess statistical regularities, some of which C&C
point to.
In fact, it is not even necessary for the statistical regularities of
the environment to be stable over time in order for adaptation to
occur. One of the earliest ideas about this was Van Valen’s (1973)
“Red Queen” theory of antagonistic coevolution, in which differ-
ent species, such as predator and prey, could be locked in ever-
spiraling evolutionary arms races in which neither settle on a
stable equilibrium. Nevertheless, these species can still evolve
adaptations to the coevolving traits of the other, such as
adaptations for fast running. Such coevolution is possible even
when one party in the race can evolve “faster” than the other,
as in host-parasite coevolution. This does not make impossible
the existence of anti-parasite adaptations, such as the immune
system (which C&C mention).
Perhaps the clearest and most relevant demonstration that
genetic adaptation to culturally moving targets is possible can be
found in the work of culture-gene coevolution theorists (Boyd &
Richerson 1985; Richerson & Boyd 2005). The logic of these
models is precisely that delineated by C&C: namely, that cultures
vary substantially in time and space, such that precise genetic
tracking of every cultural detail is impossible. Nevertheless,
gene-culture coevolution models show that natural selection can
favor genetically evolved mechanisms that facilitate the acquisition
of local culture. Importantly, it is the statistical properties of cul-
tural information that the genes track.
These models and associated empirical findings (Richerson &
Boyd 2005) show that culture and genes can and do coevolve.
Although it is certainly possible to make models in which genes
are “locked in place” and culture evolves to them, or vice versa,
it is very unlikely that this is empirically what happens. Culture
exerts selection pressure on genes, and genes exert selection
pressure on culture, simultaneously. This means that questions
like “which came first, the genes or the culture?” are inherently
problematic. The “circularity trap” of C&C (sect. 3.2.1) is a
problem faced by people who think in an either/or way; it is
not a problem faced by the evolutionary process itself.
We suggest that the proper way to think about the gene pool of
our species – and about the pool of cultural phenomena such as
language – are as statistical clouds spread across space and
time, each adapting to the other. C&C are entirely right that
the properties of languages adapt to the statistical properties of
the mind to make it more learnable and more easily understood.
But there is, contrary to C&C’s claims, no a priori reason why
genes that do the exact same thing would not also be selected
for. Indeed, if such genes existed, they would inevitably be selec-
tively favored. It is a mistake to think either that language leaps
fully formed upon the stage, and genes evolve to it, or that a
genetic apparatus for language evolves, and then language
sprouts from it. The process is likely to have been coevolutionary,
all the way up.
What we expect, on this view, is a mesh, or fit, between geneti-
cally evolved mental mechanisms and language. The kinds of
mechanisms we expect are ones that fit well with the statistical
properties of language, and the statistical properties of language
should fit well with them; how much of this fit has evolved on
either side is an empirical matter. Language acquisition mechan-
isms can be seen as “prepared learning” mechanisms that reduce
the frame problems inherent in any kind of learning by expecting
certain kinds of regularities, or statistically present properties, to
exist in the local language. These might include properties like
long-distance dependencies; lexical types such as nouns and
verbs; word order as a disambiguating device; hierarchical struc-
turing; mechanisms for marking conceptual features such as
space, time, causation, agency, and mental states; and more.
We recognize that many of these features might be argued to
emerge from interaction with mental mechanisms that are not
language-specific, such as conceptual mechanisms (although
the language/conceptual interface could be a language-specific
adaptation). Moreover, C&C and others (including, perhaps,
Chomsky) might argue that these features should not be
regarded as part of “UG” because they are not “arbitrary” or
“non-functional.” However, we do not find it particularly useful
to restrict UG to only “non-functional” features of language;
among other things, it seems an odd way to carve up evolved
structures. The important questions, for us, are twofold: (1) Do
mechanisms exist that evolved because of their beneficial
fitness effects on language acquisition? and (2) what are the com-
putational properties of these mechanisms? We are happy to call
these “UG,” though they might end up being very different from
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what Chomsky proposed. While we applaud C&C’s efforts to
draw attention to the culturally evolved properties of language
that play a role in this evolutionary process, the authors have
not convinced us that we should stop trying to look for the
answers to questions (1) and (2).
Languages as evolving organisms – The
solution to the logical problem of language
evolution?
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) argue persuasively that
Universal Grammar (UG) could not have arisen through evolutionary
processes. I provide additional suggestions to strengthen the argument
against UG evolution. Further, I suggest that C&C’s solution to the
logical problem of language evolution faces several problems. Widening
the focus to mechanisms of general cognition and inclusion of animal
communication research might overcome these problems.
Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) arguments against sudden de
novo evolution of a highly complex domain-specific structure
(Chomskian Universal Grammar or UG) could be strengthened
by the following suggestions. C&C underemphasize the fact that
evolutionary change (e.g., mutations) occurs at the level of individ-
ual organisms. Therefore, we need to deal with more than the
problem of the extremely low likelihood of non-adaptationist
“arrival” of UG. In order to spread through the population, this
language acquisition device (which would require language as
input) would need to be passed on to the next generations; and
it is difficult to imagine what selective advantage would occur.
While a hypothetical lone organism who somehow macro-
mutated an eye would have an advantage over her eyeless peers,
a lone UG would be of questionable use in a community of non-
linguistic creatures.1 Furthermore, evolution never plans ahead
towards some future goal. Evolving a large, metabolically expens-
ive brain because it could be “tweaked” into future UG (as pro-
posed by Chomsky 1986; 2002) is almost certainly out of the
question. Because evolutionary processes are restricted by existing
structures and recruit not infrequently structures that originally
evolved for some other purpose (excaptations; cf., Gould & Vrba
1982), we would expect UG to be similar to and not substantially
different from other biological structures. These considerations
strengthen C&C’s arguments against the sudden occurrence of a
monolithic Universal Grammar module (e.g., the “instantaneous
Great Leap” defended by Chomsky as recently as 2006).
Concerning the problem of an adaptationist account of UG
evolution, I suggest that C&C’s arguments demonstrate convin-
cingly why a monolithic UG with fundamentally arbitrarily (as
opposed to functionally) determined constraints could not have
evolved through natural selection. However, C&C have not
shown that “specialized brain mechanisms specific to language
acquisition” (sect. 1, para. 2) necessarily need to have the struc-
ture of UG. The exact nature of UG is controversial even among
its proponents (e.g., Chomsky 1995; 2005b; 2006; Crain &
Pietroski 2001; Fitch et al. 2005; Hauser et al. 2002; Jackendoff
2002; 2007; Lightfoot 1999) and critics point at the inadequacy
of UG definitions (e.g., Cowie 1999; Deacon 1997; Pullum &
Scholz 2002; Tomasello 2003). C&C repeatedly stress that their
account is compatible with language-specific brain mechanisms
that differ from UG, and it would be desirable to specify these
mechanisms in some detail.
Having shown that a genetically determined brain structure
like UG could not have evolved, C&C propose to shift the
focus from brains to language itself. On their view (similar to pro-
posals by Atkinson et al. 2008; Bichakjian 2002; Clark 1996;
Deacon 1997; Kortlandt 2003; Ritt 2004; van Driem 2005),
languages can be understood analogous to organisms that are
shaped by brains and have evolved “to be easy to learn to
produce and understand” (sect. 1, para. 3). This elegant solution
to the logical problem of language evolution is not entirely unpro-
blematic, and the following issues need to be addressed.
C&C claim that selection pressures working on language to
adapt to humans are significantly stronger than pressures in the
other direction because language can only survive if it is learn-
able, whereas humans can survive without language (sect. 5,
para. 3). Survival is undoubtedly a necessary condition for
natural selection, but it is not sufficient. Organisms need to
reproduce to pass their traits on to the next generation. By
analogy, a male peacock presumably can survive without a tail,
but would he be able to attract a mate and reproduce? If
language plays a role in mate selection (Burling 2005; Deacon
1997; Dunbar 2005; Franks & Rigby 2005; Johansson 2005;
Miller 2000), then the selective pressures for language skills
may be stronger than C&C allow.
C&C’s suggestion that learnability is a constraint on languages
sounds compelling for our modern, highly complex languages.
But, assuming that the first (proto) languages were much
simpler, the question arises why language did not remain much
simpler. Further, as the example of language-specific perform-
ance differences in young Turkish, English, Italian, and Serbo-
Croatian children (sect. 7.3, para. 6) shows, we find considerable
differences in ease of learning and processing among existing
languages. C&C’s claim that languages are passed on as collec-
tion of interdependent features (sect. 5.2, para. 1) might
explain why these differences continue to persist. But why and
how did learnability differences arise in the first place? C&C
suggest that “individual constructions consisting of words or com-
binations thereof are among the basic units of selection”
(sect. 5.2, para. 2). Again, this already presupposes a fairly soph-
isticated language to be in place and sidesteps the important
question of how more fundamental components of language
evolved.
Finally, the intriguing computer simulations do not necessarily
show that the algorithms used are not language-specific. It seems
that in the examples cited, the problem space is limited by the
initial conditions of the simulation; and therefore the results
are compatible with UG (Bickerton 2003; Marcus 2001; Russell
2004). Further, the models seem to be restricted to some pre-
specified aspect of language, and it is not clear whether a com-
plete language would require some domain-specific scaffolding
(Marcus 1998; Russell 2004; Yang 2004).
Possibly some of these concerns can be addressed when we
consider language evolution in the broader context of the evol-
ution of other cognitive capacities. One interesting line of
thought is the proposal that language comprehension, rather
than production, was the driving force behind language evolution
(Bickerton, 2003; Burling 2000; 2005; Origgi & Sperber 2000).
Burling (2005) suggests that communication does not begin
with a meaningful vocalization or gesture but with the interpret-
ation of the behavior of another individual. An individual who can
understand another’s action even when no communication has
been attempted gains an evolutionary significant advantage.
This suggestion might direct us back at brain structures. Which
structures underlie cognition in general and language specifi-
cally? It appears plausible that language is handled by several
subsystems, which presumably also have non-linguistic functions
(Deacon 1997; Fitch et al. 2005; Johansson 2005). It might be
illuminating to include details emerging from research on
animal communication (e.g., Arnold & Zuberbu¨hler 2006;
Doupe & Kuhl 1999; Fitch 2005; Gentner et al. 2006; Hauser
et al. 2001; Orlov et al. 2000; Pepperberg 2000; Perruchet &
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Rey 2005; Ramus et al. 2000; Terrace 2001; Zuberbu¨hler 2005) in
an account of language evolution.
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NOTE
1. Chomsky (2002) claims that language could have “enormous
reproductive advantages” even if only possessed by a single person in
the universe. Considering that this first language user would not have
lived in a community of mute twentieth century intellectuals (but
among hunter-gathers), this theory appears somewhat implausible.
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) arguments share with
memetics the ideas that language is an evolving organism and that
brain capacities shape language by influencing the fitness of memes,
although memetics also claims that memes in turn shape brains. Their
rejection of meme theory is based on falsely claiming that memes must
be consciously selected by sighted watchmakers.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) argue that features of the human
brain have shaped language and that language itself is akin to an
organism. This view is remarkably similar to that which emerges
from memetics, and yet C&C summarily reject the views of
meme-theorists. I shall explore the similarities and differences
between memetics and C&C’s view and argue that their rejection
of memetics is misplaced.
In what sense is language an organism? C&C are slightly
equivocal in answering this question. Although, in the target
article’s Abstract, they claim to “view language itself as a
complex and interdependent ‘organism,’” the quotation marks
are a clue to their ambivalence, for later they claim that “Follow-
ing Darwin (1900), we argue that it is useful metaphorically to
view languages as ‘organisms,’” (sect. 1, para. 3) and then
repeat this metaphorical claim.
Darwin (1874) himself does not use the word “metaphor.” He
discusses parallels, homologies, and analogies, and writes of the
struggle for life amongst words and grammatical forms, claiming
that: “The survival and preservation of certain favoured words in
the struggle for existence is natural selection” (Darwin 1874,
p. 91; emphasis mine). My reading of Darwin is that he
thought languages and organisms were similar because they
both evolve by the processes of selection and modification with
descent.
For memetics, too, the similarity is not metaphorical. The
foundation of memetics (Dawkins 1976) is to apply universal
Darwinism beyond biology. That is, memetics begins with the
idea that information in culture is copied from person to
person with variation and selection, and is, therefore, a replicator,
just as genes are replicators. The term “meme” was coined to
make this claim explicit; not primarily as an analogy with
“gene,” but as an example of another replicator operating on
the same fundamental mechanisms.
Language is, on this view, a vast complex of memes, intercon-
nected and co-evolved, and hence like a biological organism. This
is not a metaphor; rather, biological organisms and languages are
both complexes of replicators that are copied, protected, and
work together for the same reason; their constituent replicators
thrive better within the complex than they could outside it. In
this sense, then, C&C propose a weaker version of the claims
made by both Darwin and memetics.
Is language a parasite? C&C refer to it as a “beneficial para-
site” (sect. 5.1, para. 4). I have, similarly, called it a parasite
turned symbiont. Indeed, I have argued the same for all of
culture (Blackmore 1999; 2001): Once imitation attained high
enough fidelity, memes were let loose, and then spread and
evolved, using human brains as their copying machinery. This
happened, as Dennett (1995) emphasises, not for our benefit
but for the benefit of the memes themselves. C&C point out
that parasites and their hosts often co-adapt, with the parasite
becoming less dangerous, but how dangerous was language
when it began? I have argued that memes might have killed
us off because of the burden they put on brain size, develop-
ment, and energy use. If so, then we were lucky to pull
through so that the brain and its parasite could begin to
adapt to each other. They are now so well adapted that we
cannot live without culture and language, and it is easy to
make the mistake of thinking that language evolved for our
benefit, rather than for its own.
C&C’s main claim is that language did not shape the brain, but
the reverse. They may have pushed this argument too far since
much physical adaptation has clearly occurred – for example,
in the restructuring of the larynx to improve articulation. Meme-
tics implies that the effects work both ways, as memeplexes and
biological organisms compete and co-evolve. Memes can shape
genes; for example, memes with higher fidelity are more success-
ful, and clearer articulation makes for higher fidelity, so that the
spread of machinery capable of that articulation is then favoured
(this is an example of “memetic drive,” or the co-evolution of a
replicator with its replicating machinery; Blackmore 1999;
2001). Also genes can shape memes, with memes that fit well
to existing human brains having an advantage – as C&C
describe.
Defending their view that biological adaptation to language is
negligible, C&C cite the fact that when two species with different
rates of adaptation enter a symbiotic relationship, the faster evol-
ving one adapts to the slower one, but not the reverse. This may
be so today, but we should not assume, from the speed of
language change we observe now, that language memes always
evolved much faster than genes. Indeed, evolutionary processes
generally begin slowly and accelerate. Models of meme-gene
co-evolution using increasing rates of memetic change have
shown that a transition occurs at a certain relative rate of
change, with gene evolution then effectively ceasing (Bull et al.
2000). It is therefore possible that early language memes did
cause changes in human genes even though they no longer do so.
From these comparisons, it seems that C&C’s views are, in
important respects, similar to those of memetics. Why then do
they so firmly reject the views “described by meme-theorists”
(sect. 7.2, para. 6)?
I think the reason they give is spurious, and it has prevented
them from seeing the potential value of memetics in explaining
language evolution. They argue that memes are “created or
selected by deliberate choice” (sect. 7.2, para. 6), whereas
the constraints operating on linguistic structures are those “of
which people have no conscious awareness” (sect. 7.2,
para. 7). But this is not a defensible distinction. We humans
may think that we are conscious, creative, “sighted watch-
makers” (sect. 7.2, para. 6); but this arrogance is just part of
the dualist illusion that we are not mere living machines but
are inner selves with consciousness and free will (Blackmore
1999; Dennett 1991). One advantage of memetics is that it
rejects this illusion and even tries to explain how it comes
about. Humans are the product of two competing replicators:
Biological creativity results from the evolutionary algorithm
operating on one of those replicators, and human creativity
from the same algorithm operating on the other (Blackmore
2007). Language is just one of the products of this blindly crea-
tive combination.
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Abstract: Languages emerge in response to the negotiation of shared
meaning in social groups, where transparency of grammar is
necessitated by demands of communication with relative strangers
needing to consult on a wide range of topics (Ragir 2002). This
communal exchange is automated and stabilized through activity-
dependent fine-tuning of information-specific neural connections
during postnatal growth and social development.
Every species has a unique way of being in the world, and linguis-
tic communication sets humans apart by providing a vehicle to
convey information about physically and temporally displaced
objects and events. Human languages utilize general-purpose
learning mechanisms that yield a human product unique in the
shear quantity and diversity of information. How is this possible?
We start by asking how the human brain gets its structure to the
point of being language-ready. The answer to this may be simple.
Early evolutionary changes in hominin developmental timing,
occurring over three million years ago, produced a larger brain,
relatively immature at birth, and open to postnatal restructuring.
Changes in developmental timing to permit the birth of a large,
skeletally immature infant accompanied a shift in posture and
the anterior-posterior narrowing of the birth canal. Progressive
prolongation of successive phases of fetal growth delayed skeletal
ossification until after birth and resulted in a significant enlarge-
ment of the hominin brain relative to the postnatal growth of
the body (Deacon 1997). Later divergence of brain from body
size, occurring approximately one million years ago, appears to
be linked to changes in diet and social organization (Aiello &
Wheeler 1995; Milton 1999a; 1999b; Ragir 2001). A larger brain
supported more sophisticated manipulations of the environment,
fine-motor coordination, expanded short-term memory, and
increased speed in information processing (Kien 1991). Such sys-
temic evolutionary change provides an explanation for the emer-
gence of capacities that make human brains language-ready.
The extended postnatal development of the human cortex
affords information-specific pathways and modules as emergent
features of neural organization. Dendritic and synaptic prolifer-
ation and pruning restructure the maturing brain in response
to the environment and to the community of practices in which
development is embedded (Adams & Cox 2002). In humans,
passive as well as participatory experiences tune cortical path-
ways throughout an extended period of brain development and
produce increasingly biased perceivers, more efficient learners,
as well as behavioral complexity and innovation (Kuhl 2000).
Statistical learning involves general learning mechanisms akin
to classical conditioning, but some statistics are picked up more
readily than others, with learning biases varying across primate
species (Newport et al. 2004). Language learning fundamentally
relies on memory of sequential and non-adjacent dependencies
in the linear ordering of either auditory or visual elements. Audi-
tory processing is especially well suited for tracking information
distributed over time (Conway & Christiansen 2005), and
humans show significant prenatal maturation and adaptations
in the auditory system. Enhanced linear processing and Bayesian
statistical learning mechanisms, however, are not language-
specific, nor are they sufficient for language readiness.
Language is not merely a product of a language-ready brain; it
is a cultural product of a community of practitioners. The crucial
task is to identify the processes by which shared interpretations of
the world are created among members of a community, as the
co-construction of shared understanding forms the basis for
any exchange of information. Co-constructed activities generate
shared understandings of the relationships between vocal,
manual, or body gestures that drop out and take meaning from
ongoing events. Through social interaction, children learn the
repetitive activity patterns of their community of which vocaliza-
tions form an integral part (Nelson 2006). As an accompaniment
to shared activity, vocalization is public, reflexive, and separates
out of ongoing events to stand for all or part of the activity
(Carpendale & Lewis 2004). Each learner engages with
the language that exists in the community to the extent that he
or she is developmentally and socially capable (Ninio 2006;
Wray & Grace 2005). One of the challenges for developmen-
tal theorists is to identify the entry points to this vast web of
cultural knowledge, and how the child’s activity within and rep-
resentations of this cultural system become elaborated over
time. Language acquisition requires a constant give-and-take
between the child and others about the meaning of communica-
tive exchanges in social interactions (Taylor 1997). Figure 1
adapts C&C’s Figure 3b to include the dynamic negotiation of
shared meaning occurring in the community.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) propose the analogy of language
as a “beneficial parasite” (sect. 5.1) symbiotic to the human brain in
so far as the systematicity of language is a function of how brains
learn. In our opinion, this analogy misleads and ignores the hom-
ology between language and all other human inventions. Dynami-
cally negotiated cultural systems such as tool manufacture, music,
and play are similarly constrained by body schema and the con-
struction of experience-dependent neural networks, and arise
from the needs of users to coordinate their perspectives and
Figure 1 (Brooks & Ragir). Negotiation and Constraint in Language Formation.
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goals. Complexity in any cultural system emerges over a historical
time frame; hierarchy and systematicity are emergent properties,
contingent on critical numbers of communicators and topics
(Kirby 1999). As work on the emergence of indigenous sign
languages demonstrates, languages are not elaborated without a
community of signers (Kegl et al. 1999; Ragir 2002; Senghas
et al. 2004). As a community increases in size, and members
lack intimate knowledge of one another, “rules” emerge from
the competing pressures of efficiency, clarity, and expressiveness,
and streamline the exchanges of information to reduce cognitive
effort (Kirby 1999; Ragir 2002; Wray & Grace 2005). In any cul-
tural system, arbitrary categories are difficult to keep track of,
and overlapping, redundant patterns of expression are favored.
Languages increase in semantic and grammatical complexity as
needed within developmental and historical time-scales. Such sys-
tematization is a universal property of culturally negotiated
systems, rather than a property of the brain (Bak 1996). Similarly,
pragmatic principles are not simply constraints, analogous to
perceptual-motor or cognitive capacities, but reflect social prac-
tices involved in coordinating perspectives for effective communi-
cation (Clark 1996a; Hilton 1995). While C&C suggest that the
possession of language might have fundamentally changed the pat-
terns of collective problem solving, we would argue that collective
problem solving led to the co-construction of language.
Finally, C&C make an unnecessary capitulation to the specu-
lations of evolutionary psychology in their concession that cog-
nitive pre-adaptations probably evolved through natural
selection before language emerged. We suggest that changes
in habitat, diet, and social organization co-evolved with the
increased nutritional demands of encephalization and the socia-
lization of dependent offspring during an extended childhood.
Just as human languages emerged out of the exchanges of infor-
mation within human societies, cooperation, joint attention,
theory of mind, symbolic thought, and pragmatic reasoning
are just as likely to have been products of dynamic negotiations
within communities.
Convergent cultural evolution may explain
linguistic universals
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) argument rests on an
assumption that convergent cultural evolution can produce similar
(complex) behaviours in isolated populations. In this commentary,
I describe how experiments recently carried out by Caldwell and
colleagues can contribute to the understanding of such phenomena.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) make an excellent argument, both
against the plausibility of an innate language-specific Universal
Grammar (UG) and for the likelihood of the cultural evolution
of language in response to selective pressures associated with
use and learnability. In terms of challenging the concept of an
innate UG, one of their strongest arguments concerns the
implausibility of the independent evolution of highly similar
UGs within isolated populations, and also the improbability
that a common ancestor UG could be maintained in its original
form should a previously unified population split and disperse.
C&C’s argument that apparent linguistic universals are there-
fore attributable to the cultural evolution of language, as
opposed to biological evolution of an innately specified UG,
hence depends on a notion of convergent cultural evolution.
In biological evolution, convergent evolution refers to a process
by which species that are only distantly related independently
evolve analogous adaptations in response to similar environmental
pressures. Convergent cultural evolution therefore refers to situ-
ations in which different populations independently develop
similar socially transmitted behaviours despite different ancestral
histories. In C&C’s account, similarities in languages will arise
due to similarities in human brains, thereby imposing similar selec-
tive pressures on the process of cultural evolution. In other
accounts (e.g., Deacon 1997; 2003a; 2003b), similarities may also
emerge as a result of functional constraints associated with com-
munication that are, in a sense, external to brains (Deacon
[2003a], for example, has suggested that many of the features
common to human languages might also be found in any symbolic
communication system, such as one used by an alien species from
another planet). On either of these accounts, however, it is essen-
tially convergent cultural evolution which is producing the
observed uniformities in behaviour across populations.
In order to fully develop and support such views, it would be
useful to understand more about how such cultural convergence
is likely to operate. Although there are many cases that can be,
with hindsight, attributed to convergent cultural evolution (e.g.,
the independent development of writing systems [Mesoudi et al.
2004]; or cross-cultural similarities in colour terms [Deacon
1997]), ideally we would have access to complete datasets to track
the relevant behavioural histories, and would be able to control
likely sources of variation. Mesoudi (e.g., Mesoudi 2007; Mesoudi
& O’Brien 2008) has argued that, for just such reasons, experimen-
tal approaches are particularly valuable in the study of culture.
In our experiments (e.g., Caldwell &Millen 2008) we have been
making use of “microsociety” (e.g., Baum et al. 2004), or “micro-
culture” (e.g., Jacobs & Campbell 1961), methods in order to
allow us to study cultural phenomena under controlled laboratory
conditions over short time periods. Generational succession is
simulated within small test groups of participants by periodically
removing the longest-standing member of the group and replacing
them with a naive individual. While in the test group, participants
are required to complete simple tasks using everyday materials,
with clear goals. In one of our procedures, participants were
instructed to build a paper aeroplane which flew as far as possible,
and in the other, they were instructed to construct a tower from
spaghetti and modelling clay which was as tall as possible. We
have shown that, in both cases, information accumulated within
the groups such that later generations produced designs which
were more successful than earlier ones.
However, more relevant from the point of view of the target
article is that we also have evidence of convergent cultural
evolution. For each of our tasks we ran ten chains each of ten par-
ticipants, and different chains had no contact with one another
(simulating isolated cultures). Photographs of the objects produced
by each participant were rated for similarity. Although there was
clear evidence of cultural variation (designs were rated as being
more similar to others from the same chain, compared with
those from different chains), there was also evidence of conver-
gence, since designs further down the chains were more similar
to one another compared with those at the start of the chains.
So, the tenth designs from each of the ten chains were rated as
being more similar to one another, compared with the first
designs from each of the chains. Thus, we have been able to
demonstrate experimentally that over generations of cultural trans-
mission, behaviours can become increasingly similar when shaped
by similar selection pressures (in our case, the goal measures).
Our experiments are admittedly highly simplified models of
cultural transmission, and the goals involved in our tasks are
very far removed from the communicative functions performed
by language. C&C also draw particular attention to the fact
that language evolution may be a special case in terms of cultural
evolution, in that users are not consciously designing their beha-
viours (although see Mesoudi 2008 for a different view). All the
same, we believe our results are illustrative of general
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phenomena which we suspect to be at work across a variety of
contexts involving cultural transmission. Importantly, our exper-
iments clearly show that complex adaptive behaviours can arise
through cultural transmission, and that these behaviours,
shaped by similar selection pressures, can show effects of conver-
gence across isolated populations.
Brain and behavior: Which way does the
shaping go?
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Abstract: Evolutionary contingencies select organisms based on what they
can do; brains and other evolved structures serve their behavior. Arguments
that brains drive language structure get the direction wrong; with functional
issues unacknowledged, interactions between central structures and
periphery are overlooked. Evidence supports a peripherally driven
central organization. If language modules develop like other brain
compartments, then environmental consistencies can engender both
structural and functional language units (e.g., the different phonemic,
semantic, and grammatical structures of different languages).
If evolutionary contingencies select organisms based on what they
can do, then brains and other evolved structures serve behavior.
Behavior is an essential starting place for understanding those
structures. But Christiansen & Chater (C&C), starting from a
different direction, recommend the brain as starting place; they
acknowledge an environmental role in the shaping of languages
by language users, but offer precious little about details.
Central to C&C’s position is Universal Grammar (UG), which
resides in the brain. In their case, UG’s particulars arise from pat-
terns of language use rather than from innate sources, whether
evolved or originating in some other way. We are not told how it
got there, although C&C make a case for its emergence through
interactions among language learners and users (perhaps a step
backwards from Pinker & Bloom’s [1990] BBS argument for
language as an evolved system, but maybe a step toward acknowl-
edging memetic roots in the evolution of particular languages).
Neither are we told much about the properties of UG, which, as
C&C acknowledge, have been a moving target since UG was
initially proposed (e.g., Colapinto 2007).
However UG is defined, and whatever its locus, either inside
the head or extending into the language communities that
according to C&C have engendered it, its import is primarily
structural. It bears little on semantics (it doesn’t really matter
what people say as long as they do so grammatically) or on sen-
tence function (the properties of imperatives don’t really
depend on what people do upon hearing them). In fact, probably
C&C would not regard questions about function as even within
the purview of linguistics: If questions are not about grammar,
they are not about language (see also Jackendoff’s [2003] BBS
treatment, which dealt with structural relations among syntactic,
semantic, and phonetic systems but attended little to function).
The trouble is not just that such accounts leave out too many
phenomena that should be of interest, but also that such limit-
ations on the boundaries of inquiry may blind us to the interde-
pendence of structure and function (A. C. Catania 2000). It is as
if we were interested in locomotion but looked only at particular
interactions among muscles, examining coordinations as some
muscles flexed while opposing ones relaxed and studying
how movements at one joint depended on those at others. We
could generate a grammar of locomotion, say, for the horse;
and from it we might derive a systematic account of possible
and impossible gaits. We might categorize different gaits (trots,
canters, gallops), and perhaps could show that some not seen
in nature (the rack) are teachable but others are not. Maybe
we could go even further and show that some coordinations
entering into our grammar of locomotion are pre-wired in the
spinal cord (a Universal Grammar for Horses: UGH). But this
would tell us nothing about where or when a horse might run,
or with which gait, or whether in running it is following other
horses or fleeing predators. The details of its locomotion, and
thus the systems supporting it (e.g., muscles, tendons, bones,
brain), evolved in the service of successful running.
These limitations apply even if we look only at horse locomo-
tion. Suppose, however, that we sought a more general theory,
applicable to all mammalian quadripeds or, to make it really uni-
versal, to all organisms. How should we adapt our grammar to the
flippers or fins of aquatic animals? How about birds, and not just
when they fly, but also when they walk or swim? And how about
insects and arthropods, not to mention the vestigial limbs of
snakes and our own bipedal walking? We can hardly deal with
such differences without considering evolutionary contingencies,
and the essence of such contingencies lies in the functions of
locomotion. Were UGH adherents unwilling to extend UGH to
these marvelous diversities, we might be sorely tempted to
accuse them of a lack of imagination.
I argue, then, that C&C’s position on language is comparable
to the UGH grammarian’s on locomotion, with different language
communities substituting for our various locomoting species. In
both cases, far too much is left out. Why so little about how par-
ticular vocabularies are acquired, or how speech interacts with
other behavior? How might current environments shape linguis-
tic units within an individual lifetime?
Space precludes an account of what we know about functional
properties of language and ways in which contingencies shape
the behavior of speakers (see A. C. Catania 2003a; 2006). But
let us at least consider how the periphery might sculpt language
units. Developing nervous systems divide into functional regions
sometimes called compartments; of particular relevance is how
boundaries form between them (e.g., Irvine & Rauskolb 2001;
Kiecker & Lumsden 2005). For example, cortical tactile receptor
areas in primates include boundaries between the projection
areas for different fingers that can be visualized with appropriate
stains. The boundaries may arise because adjacent cells on one
finger are likely to be stimulated at the same time, whereas
those on a neighboring finger, though projected close by on the
cortex, are likely often to be stimulated separately. The number
of compartments is determined during development by periph-
eral units (e.g., the separate rays in the nose of the star-nosed
mole: K. C. Catania & Kaas 1997).
A long-standing puzzle is how exposure to linguistic environ-
ments can lead to discrimination among native phonetic units well
before children begin to produce them. If projections from basilar
membrane to auditory cortex have spatial properties thatmight cor-
respond to phonetic boundaries, then a similar system could lead to
separate b and p areas for children in an English-speaking environ-
ment and not for those in an Arabic-speaking environment, which
lacks separate b and p consonant classes. The categorical perception
emerging from such a process would certainly depend on the brain
but could hardly be understood without a role for acoustic environ-
ments. Language units so created could then interact with the
environment through other functional contingencies. And if it
worked so for phonetic structure, should we not extend the
account to syntactic and semantic structures?
If neural organization so depends on peripheral and environ-
mental organization, plausible arguments follow about how environ-
mental consistencies can sculpt boundaries and compartments
corresponding to verbal units and to both structural and functional
components of language (e.g., phonetic structure within given
language communities, particular vocabularies, and perhaps even
functional grammatical distinctions such as imperative versus
declarative).
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I have focused especially on directionality: To what extent
do anatomies, environments and behavior drive or become
driven by each other, and how might our understanding of
language be illuminated by taking their interactions into
account? In arguing that C&C have neglected the direction
from behavior to brain, I have not maintained that things
cannot go both ways.
Really, I do not doubt that the brain is important. But the
brain is an adaptable organ, and it variously accommodates
itself to the body and the broader environment within which
it finds itself. When the brain is damaged in a stroke, one part
of rehabilitation these days is to get the affected peripheral
parts moving again: If the left arm is partially paralyzed, get
the patient to use it by immobilizing the right arm. It is some-
times said that this treatment uses changes in behavior to
change the brain, but the target of the therapy is, after all, the
recovery of the behavior.
Both directions, from behavior to brain and from brain to
behavior, are obviously significant. It would be astonishing
to think that the same reciprocity does not exist for language.
To the extent that C&C argue otherwise, they fail to make
their case. It is premature to give up on evolutionary contingen-
cies (A. C. Catania 2001; 2003b); C&C can escape from a crea-
tionism in which language emerges from the brain, not a fully
grown Venus but ready to be shaped into one, by taking into
account how environments shape the brain.
Time on our hands: How gesture and the
understanding of the past and future helped
shape language
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Abstract: Recognising that signed languages are true languages adds
to the variety of forms that languages can take. Such recognition also
allows one to differentiate those aspects of language that depend
on the medium (voiced or signed) from those that depend on more
cognitive aspects. At least some aspects of language, such as symbolic
representation, time markers, and generativity, may derive from the
communication of the products of mental time travel, and from the
sharing of remembered past and planned future episodes.
The notion of Universal Grammar (UG) is, or was, one of the
most uneasy concepts in cognitive science. Not only has it ulti-
mately failed to capture the enormous diversity of human
language, but it also lacks credibility in evolutionary terms.
Chomsky himself was driven to conclude that language could
not be the outcome of natural selection, once declaring that
“It would be a serious error to suppose that all properties, or
the interesting structures that evolved, can be ‘explained’ in
terms of natural selection” (Chomsky 1975, p. 59) – although
he seems more recently to have had something of a change of
heart (see Hauser et al. 2002). Christiansen & Chater (C&C)
have done cognitive and evolutionary science an enormous
service by pointing out the deficiencies of UG as a plausible
concept, and giving breathing space to alternative, more natur-
alistic approaches.
I think, though, that their title is slightly misleading, as the
brain is scarcely mentioned in their article. Rather, they make
a good case for supposing that language is shaped by human
knowledge, learning capacities, and culture, and is not some
encapsulated system with its own rules. I would like simply to
add some points that I think support their general position.
In an endnote, C&C suggest that their arguments have equal
force regardless of whether language has its origins in vocaliza-
tions or in manual gestures (see Note 2 of the target article). It
may be useful, though, to note that even present-day language
can be either spoken or signed (Emmorey 2002), and is indeed
typically a combination of both (McNeill 1992). C&C do appeal
to evidence from newly emerging sign languages to support
their arguments concerning processes of grammaticalization,
but for the most part they equate language with speech. Adding
signed languages and manual gestures provides a better appreci-
ation of the full repertoire of human language, and can help
differentiate those aspects of language that depend on the parti-
cular medium of expression from those that may reflect more
cognitive aspects. Thus, in section 6.2, C&C note that “The serial-
ity of vocal output . . . forces a sequential construction of
messages” – the transformation known as linearization. But this
constraint is much less severe in the case of signed langua-
ges, which can allow some degree of parallel output, and spatial
mapping.
The notion of a “mother tongue” originating some 100,000 to
200,000 years ago, and giving rise to present-day languages,
also presumably applies to speech rather than to language
itself. Present-day signed languages appear to have emerged
independently of any spoken language. One example, mentioned
by C&C, is Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (ABSL), which
bears little relation to the other languages, spoken or signed, of
the region (Sandler et al. 2005). I agree with C&C that this is
not proof of an innate UG, but, equally, it cannot be construed
as a descendent of any mother tongue. It also allows one to specu-
late that language itself goes back much further than the last
100,000 or 200,000 years ago, as proposed by Bickerton (2003)
or Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (2003). I see no reason why our
large-brained forebears of 500,000 or 1,000,000 years ago could
not have invented something like ABSL, though perhaps with
some vocal accompaniment (Armstrong &Wilcox 2007; Corballis
2004; 2006).
One cognitive domain that may have influenced, and perhaps
even shaped, the evolution of language is mental time travel –
the ability to mentally relive events in the past (episodic
memory) or imagine events in the future. This is arguably
uniquely human (Suddendorf & Corballis 1997; 2007). Language
seems almost tailor-made to allow individuals to share past
experiences and future plans, with adaptive consequences
(Corballis & Suddendorf 2007). The features of language that
may derive from mental time travel, or that perhaps co-evolved
with it, include the following:
1. Symbolic representations allowing reference to actions,
actors, objects, and so forth, that were part of episodes at times
and places other than the present.
2. Ways of referring to different points in time, including past,
present and future, and for making other temporal distinctions,
such as action completed versus action ongoing. Languages
have different ways of doing this. Many languages, such as
English, have systems of tense, whereas others, like Chinese,
have no tense but use other kinds of time markers (Lin 2005).
Culture may play a hand here; thus, the Piraha˜ seem merely to
distinguish between events that are in the present from those
that are not (Everett 2005).
3. Generativity. The imagining of future events includes the
generation of different possible scenarios – and even episodic
memory appears to involve an element of construction – to the
point that “memories” are often false (e.g., Roediger &McDermott
1995). Closely related to mental time travel, I suspect, is
fiction – the deliberate construction of stories that are not
based on fact, but that nonetheless serve as surrogates for experi-
ence. Correspondingly, the generativity of human language is
perhaps its most distinctive property.
If we marry the emergence of mental time travel with a
language that was based on manual gestures, we can look nostal-
gically back to an era when we had time on our hands.
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underlies the cultural evolution of languages
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Abstract: Universal Grammar (UG) is indeed evolutionarily implausible.
But if languages are just “adapted” to a large primate brain, it is hard to
see why other primates do not have complex languages. The answer is
that humans have evolved a specialized and uniquely human cognitive
architecture, whose main function is to compute mappings between
arbitrary signals and communicative intentions. This underlies the
development of language in the human species.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) correctly pinpoint a number of
serious problems for a detailed, innate Universal Grammar
(UG). Language turns out to be, after all, just a part of culture,
participating in all the associated processes of twin-track co-evol-
ution (Durham 1991), including the cognitive filtering of possible
cultural products (Levinson & Jaisson 2006). Recent work shows
just how grammatical features are subject to cultural evolutionary
processes (Dunn et al. 2005).
However, we should avoid throwing out the proverbial baby
with the bathwater: There is a biological basis for language in
two areas at least. First, the input/output systems (auditory
specializations, vocal anatomy) clearly involve biological evol-
ution (Lieberman & Blumstein 1988). Second – and this is the
subject of this commentary – there is an underlying cognitive
infrastructure for human communication. To see this, consider
the conundrum the target article authors now face. Most proper-
ties of the human brain are just enlarged versions of ancient
structures shared throughout the primate order and beyond.
Our nearest cousins, the two chimp species, are highly intelligent
animals that can master most human tasks not mediated by
language (Tomasello & Call 1997). So how come they do not
have the kinds of elaborate communicative systems we call
language?
The answer to this, we think, is that humans have inherited a
cognitive infrastructure for communication that probably goes
way back in the hominin line. This infrastructure is perhaps
correlated with the increasing encephalization characteristic
of hominin evolution, the characteristic that makes language
possible.
We agree with C&C that these prerequisites for the emergence
of language are not to be found in the structural properties of
languages themselves. However, contra C&C, we believe that
they cannot be found in the “accidental” properties of our general
cognitive abilities either. Instead, we propose that humans have
developed what we would quite generally term communicative
intelligence (see Enfield & Levinson 2006). The main function
of this specific type of intelligence is to encode and decode the
communicative intentions behind any type of potentially com-
municative behavior, linguistic, nonverbal, or otherwise (e.g., ges-
tures). Without such specialized structures, the speed and
flexibility with which language (in multiple modalities) is used,
learned, and changed, even within one generation, would not be
possible.
Empirical evidence for our assumption comes from the follow-
ing findings.
A. Even for adults who have fully mastered their native
language(s), linguistic signals are abundantly ambiguous and
underdetermined. The idea that thoughts are encoded into linguis-
tic utterances, sent to a receiver through amedium such as voice or
hands, and then are decoded back into the original thought – a
naive idea that has been endorsed by many scientists, from Saus-
sure to Shannon – can and has repeatedly been shown to be
false (see Levinson 1983; 2000 for multitudes of examples and
further references). There is therefore a fundamental mismatch
between coded content and communicative import, and the gap
is filled by reasoning about likely communicative intentions. The
upshot here is that it is not language that enables us to communi-
cate; rather, it is our communicative skills that enabled us to use
language.
B. Many systematic “errors” that at first sight appear to be cog-
nitive “limitations” of humans, are in fact highly functional in the
context of human communication (Levinson 1995). Key among
these is the tendency to attribute intentional design to natural
objects, events, and processes, with all the attendant irrationalities
of magic, superstition, religion, and gambling. But that tendency
is exactly what is needed to understand complex communicative
signals, where one has to work out the communicative intention
behind them. The ability to “read” these signals appears to
carry with it the overdeterminative interpretations of events that
are characteristic of human reasoning (Tversky & Kahneman
1977).
C. Languages are independent of sensory modality, as shown
in human haptic or sign languages (Emmorey 2002). These ges-
tural languages can develop from scratch in cultures (Senghas &
Coppola 2001) and even in families (Goldin-Meadow 2005).
Comparing this rapid development of systems of form-meaning
mappings with the enormous efforts involved in getting intelli-
gent species of mammals to communicate using language (see,
e.g., Herman et al. 1984; Savage-Rumbaugh 1984) provides
strong support for the existence of innate communicative
capacities in humans.
D. Human communication is amazingly flexible and effective
even in the absence of a shared, conventional language. Several
recent studies have shown that participants who are confronted
with the need to communicate, but have only limited and pre-
viously unknown channels at their disposal, are able to develop
new signal-to-meaning mappings on the fly, within a matter of
minutes (De Ruiter et al. 2007; Galantucci 2005). De Ruiter
et al. have shown that in performing these types of tasks, both
senders and receivers of signals show activation in the same small
and well-defined brain region, suggesting that senders and recei-
vers simulate one another’s inferential processes in order to
achieve successful communication.
The evolution of language becomes much less mysterious
when this communicative or pragmatic infrastructure is given
its proper place. This cognitive infrastructure has evolved
slowly over the six million years of separation from our nearest
primate relatives, is shared by all humans, and is invariant
across all human languages (Levinson 2006). Languages are not
adapted to just any primate brain – they are created and filtered
by brains that are biologically endowed with communicative
intelligence. Together with the vocal/auditory apparatus, this
cognitive adaptation for communication makes possible the cul-
tural evolution of spoken languages.
Why is language well designed for
communication?
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Abstract: Selection through iterated learning explains no more than
other non-functional accounts, such as Universal Grammar (UG), why
language is so well designed for communicative efficiency. It does not
predict several distinctive features of language, such as central
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embedding, large lexicons, or the lack of iconicity, which seem to serve
communication purposes at the expense of learnability.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) rightfully observe that commu-
nicatively arbitrary principles, such as UG, are unable to
explain why language is adequate for communication. The
same criticism can be addressed, however, to their own
account. If the main driving force that led to language emer-
gence is learnability rather than communicative efficiency,
language should be locally optimal for the former and not for
the latter. Evidence suggests that, in several respects, the
exact opposite is the case.
What would language be like if, as C&C claim, the cultural
selection of learnable languages were “stronger” than the biologi-
cal selection of brains designed for efficient communication? If
language can compare with a “viral” entity that gets selected
for its ability to resist vertical cultural transmission, we predict,
for instance, iconic signifiers, especially gestures, to win the
contest. Yet, although analogue resemblance makes learning
almost trivial, linguistic evolution shows that non-iconic signifiers
tend to prevail, even in sign languages.
The “viral” theory of language does not explain the size of
lexicons either. Ideally, an expressive code is easiest to learn,
and resists iterated transmission best, if words are limited in
number and have separate and unambiguous meanings. Yet,
real vocabularies include tens of thousands of words, massive
near synonymy, and many rare unpredictable word combinations
(Briscoe 2006). Such evidence suggests that there may be some
“viral” cause for the existence of plethoric lexicons, but its
action is opposite to what is expected from selection for learning
efficiency.
Language, as mainly shaped by selection through repeated
learning, is supposed to mirror the general human induction
bias. Efficient induction systems (Solomonoff 1978), including
human learning (Chater 1999) and analogy making (Cornue´jols
1996), are guided by a complexity minimization principle. If
languages were the bare expression of a simplicity-based induc-
tion device looping on itself, we should expect the complexity
of languages to converge to a minimal amount. A similar claim
is that general-purpose learning devices, except in rote learning
mode, produce only “good shapes” (Gestalten) – that is, struc-
tures that are left invariant by operations forming an algebraic
group (Dessalles 1998a). Language has not, so far, been
described as involving good shapes. For instance, syntactic struc-
tures, contrary to many other aspects of cognition, cannot be
induced as invariants of transformation groups (Piattelli-Palmar-
ini 1979) and seem to thwart general inductive processes
(Piattelli-Palmarini 1989).
In a bio-functional account of language emergence, learn-
ability puts limits on what is admissible, but is subordinate to
communicative functions. The two main proximal functions of
language in our species, as revealed by the observation of spon-
taneous language behavior, are conversational narratives and
argumentative discussion (Bruner 1986; Dessalles 2007). From
a bio-functional perspective, iconicity is dispensable if the
problem is to express predicates for argumentative purposes
(Dessalles 2007). Lexical proliferation is predicted if the
problem is to signal unexpectedness in narratives and to
express nuances in argumentative discussion (Dessalles 2007).
And language-specific learning bias is expected if early language
performance makes a biological difference. Let us consider a
fourth example to show that functional aspects of language
could evolve at the expense of learnability.
Non-functional accounts of language, including cultural
selection through iterated learning, do not account for the
existence of central embedding (the fact that any branch may
grow in a syntactic tree), a feature present in virtually all
languages. Recursive syntax has been shown to emerge
through iterated learning, but only when individuals already
have the built-in ability to use recursive grammars to parse
linguistic input (e.g., Kirby 2002). A bio-functional approach
to language provides an explanation for the presence of
central embedding in language. As soon as the cognitive
ability to form predicates is available, possibly for argumenta-
tive purposes (Dessalles 2007), predicates can be recruited to
determine the arguments of other predicates. This technique is
implemented in computer languages such as Prolog. To
express “Mary hit Paul” for listeners who do not know Mary,
the speaker may use “Mary ate with us yesterday” to determine
the first argument of “hit.” Prolog achieves this through explicit
variable sharing, whereas human languages connect phrases
for the same purpose: “The girl who ate with us yesterday hit
Paul” (Dessalles 2007).
Predicates P1i can therefore be used to determine arguments
in a given predicate P1; but each P1i may require further predi-
cates P1ij to determine its own arguments. This possibility leads
to recursive syntactic processing that produces central embedded
phrase structures. Models that ignore functions such as predicate
argument determination cannot account for the necessity of
embedded phrase processing. They merely postulate it, either
as a consequence of some fortuitous genetic accident (Chomsky
1975) or deduced from a general cognitive ability to perform
recursive parsing (Kirby 2002). But then, the adequacy to the
function is left unexplained as well. No single genetic accident
and no selection through repeated learning can predict that
phrase embeddingwill efficiently fulfill predicate argument deter-
mination. Only a bio-functional approach that derives the exist-
ence of phrase embedding from its function can hope to explain
why recursive processing came to exist and why it is locally
optimal for that function.
From a phylogenetic perspective, we may wonder why, if
human languages have been selected to be easily learned, chim-
panzees are so far from acquiring them, spontaneously or not.
One must hypothesize some yet unknown qualitative gap
between animal and human general learning abilities. Invoking
such “pre-adaptation” remains, for now, non-parsimonious. Not
only is the emergence of “pre-adaptations” not accounted for in
iterated learning models and more broadly in non-functional
models, but their subsequent assemblage into a functional
whole remains mysterious as well. Bio-functional approaches to
language emergence avoid the “pre-adaptation” trap. They do
not attempt to explain why a given feature did not occur in
other lineages by invoking the lack of required “pre-adaptations.”
Language is not a marginal habit that would be incidentally
used in our species. It has dramatic influence, not merely on sur-
vival, but on differential reproduction, which is what determines
natural selection. Individuals who fail to be relevant are excluded
from social networks and become preferential victims (Dessalles
1998b; 2007). Given the crucial impact of conversational per-
formance on reproductive success, it would be highly unlikely
that human brains could have evolved independently from
language.
Language as shaped by social interaction
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Abstract: Language is shaped by its environment, which includes not
only the brain, but also the public context in which speech acts are
effected. To fully account for why language has the shape it has, we
need to examine the constraints imposed by language use as a
sequentially organized joint activity, and as the very conduit for
linguistic diffusion and change.
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I welcome Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) contention that cog-
nitive scientific approaches to language should take seriously the
idea that language is adapted to its environment. Although C&C
concentrate on the private cognitive and neural structures that
each language user possesses, my commentary concerns a differ-
ent aspect of the environment of language, one which is no less
responsible for the shape language takes: namely, the public
social-interactional setting in which language is learned and
used, and which is the central conduit for the historical distri-
bution and development of language in populations.
C&C consider the implications of a dual-inheritance model
by which human genetic evolution proceeds in parallel with
much faster processes of historical evolution of culture in
domains such as kinship, social values, technology, and language
(Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman 1981; Durham 1991; Richerson &
Boyd 2005; cf. Enfield 2005; 2008, for language). A great dis-
crepancy between the high speed of language change and the
relatively low speed of genetic evolution drives C&C’s argument
that language (evolving historically) is adapted to the brain
(evolving phylogenetically), rather than the other way around.
This requires that language change be analyzed in evolutionary
terms. To this end, C&C draw a parallel between the language
system and the organism, as others before them have done.
However, this may not be the most apt analogy. In genetic evol-
ution, the organism serves as a vehicle for the replication of
genes. In language, the vehicle for replication of linguistic units
(e.g., words or constructions; Nettle 1999) is not the language
system as a whole. The larger system is an aggregate of inter-
related linguistic items. It may be stored in individual brains,
or in linguistic descriptions, but it is not a vehicle for replication
of linguistic units.
The vehicle by means of which linguistic items are used and dif-
fused is the speech act (or utterance; Croft 2000). Through being
used in speech acts, linguistic items maintain circulation in popu-
lations; and it is through this circulation that selection of linguistic
variants takes place. Diffusion of linguistic variants involves not just
brains, but a see-sawing process, from private mental states (con-
ceptual representations, communicative intentions), to public
states of affairs (speech acts), back to new brain states (interpret-
ations of speech acts leading to new conceptual representations,
new communicative intentions), and on to new states of affairs
(more speech acts). It is a continual chain of transition from
private to public to private to public, and so on (Sperber
2006) – as is the case in the historical evolution of cultural variants
more generally (Richerson & Boyd 2005; Rogers 1995).
Linguists of many stripes recognize the privileged status of
something closely akin to the speech act as the basic shape for lin-
guistic organization: variously described, for example, as the
“clause” (Foley & Van Valin 1984), “intonation unit” (Chafe
1994), “turn-constructional unit” (Sacks et al. 1974), “growth
point” (McNeill 1992), and so on. Why should just this unit con-
stitute the privileged shape for linguistic organization? The
answer is that the speech act or utterance is a basic unit at the
level of informational delivery; that is, an utterance conveys
one idea at a time (Pawley & Syder 2000), thereby effecting
one increment of social action at a time (Heritage & Atkinson
1984). Is there something about the brain that privileges linguis-
tic units of just this shape? Or are there other reasons that the
speech act (utterance, clause, turn, etc.) should be a privileged
shape for linguistic structure?
There is reason to think that the one-speech-act-at-a-time struc-
ture of grammar is shaped by contingencies of the conversational
settings in which language is learned, used, and diffused. Human
social interactions are sequences of moves and counter-moves
(Goffman 1964), each move being a response to an immediately
prior move, and a stimulus for a subsequent move (Sacks et al.
1974). This pattern of rapid response and counter-response is
what characterizes free conversation, the basic format for language
acquisition and use in everyday life.1 Once we view the use of
language in human interaction as a type of joint activity (Clark
1996b), and not just an event of information processing that
happens to involve more than one brain (Hutchins 1995; 2006),
thenwe see how language is shapedby the sequential contingencies
of social interaction. Grammar’s basic “chunking” delivers minimal
units, such that each unit contributes to a sequence of social inter-
action as an adequate response to a prior unit (Schegloff 2006). To
be effective, any such unit increment must not only be successfully
formulated by a speaker, but must also be successfully compre-
hended by a listener. The organization of language in chunks of
“turn” size gives interlocutors the opportunity tomonitormisfirings
andmisunderstandings as soon as they happen, and to correct them
if necessary (Schegloff et al. 1977). This co-contingency of unit
contribution and response may be argued to serve as a direct det-
erminant shaping linguistic organization, including many of the
properties of “Universal Grammar” that C&C are looking to
explain without reference to an innate language faculty (cf.
Tomasello 1995; 2004).
In sum, the acquisition and use of language involves not just
the brain’s private structures, but also the public patterns of co-
dependent, interlocking contributions to sequences of social
interaction. The preferred locus of grammatical organization –
the speech act – is an optimal solution to multiple constraints
of information-packaging in an environment where not just for-
mulation of social action, but the possibility of timely monitor-
ing of intersubjective understanding and appropriateness of
response is as definitive of linguistic well-formedness as any
arbitrary unit of sentence-level syntactic structure.
NOTE
1. Surprisingly little is known about the structure of language in con-
versation, apart from a rich body of work on English (see Schegloff [2007]
and references therein). Comparative work on conversational structures
is beginning to appear (see Enfield & Stivers 2007; Sidnell 2007).
The origin of language as a product of the
evolution of double-scope blending
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Abstract: Meaning construction through language requires advanced
mental operations also necessary for other higher-order, specifically
human behaviors. Biological evolution slowly improved conceptual
mapping capacities until human beings reached the level of double-
scope blending, perhaps 50 to 80 thousand years ago, at which point
language, along with other higher-order human behaviors, became
possible. Languages are optimized to be driven by the principles and
powers of double-scope blending.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) are correct in their claim that it is
implausible that language as we know it is the product of biological
evolution for a complex, language-specific endowment. As they
point out, this is not in itself an unusual claim. For example,
Hauser et al. (2002) argue that the sole language-specific capacity
might be recursion, and that even recursion might not be
language-specific. However, our reasoning to this claim is quite
different from C&C’s. Language as we know it requires advanced
capacities for meaning construction. Any view of language as
having been active in quasi-advanced forms before about 50 thou-
sand years ago, advancing further by refinements, runs up against
the unlikelihood that human beings who enjoyed these near-
modern capacities of meaning construction through language
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(blending, hypothetical and counterfactual thought, negatives,
framing, mappings of many sorts, viewpoint and perspective,
metaphor, speech acts, deixis, etc.) failed to use them to achieve
even the rudiments of the other human higher-order cognitive
achievements that we know require those very same mental
resources: art, music, mathematical and scientific discovery, reli-
gious practices, representation, fashion, advanced social cognition,
and so on.
The archeological record (Klein 1999; Mithen 1996), genetic
record (Cavalli-Sforza 2000; Thompson et al. 2000), and modern
understanding of the uniformity of conceptual mappings in mul-
tiple, superficially diverse areas of human behavior all converge
to indicate that biological evolution slowly produced not language
but, rather, capacities not specific to language, evolving along a
cline of increasing power. Once those capacities reached a
certain sine qua non stage on the gradient, language and other
human singularities became possible (Fauconnier & Turner
2002; 2008; Turner 1996).
One (and perhaps the) mental operation whose evolution was
crucial for language is conceptual blending (Coulson 2006;
Coulson & Oakley 2000; 2005; Fauconnier & Turner 1998;
2002; Turner 1996). Conceptual blending is a fundamental
mental operation whose rudimentary forms are evident in the
mammalian line of descent. The most advanced form, double-
scope blending, consists of integrating two or more conceptual
arrays as inputs whose frame structures typically conflict in
radical ways on vital conceptual relations, such as cause-effect,
modality, participant structure, role-value, and so on, into a
novel conceptual array whose frame structure draws selectively
from the frame structures of the inputs and dynamically develops
emergent structure not found in either of the inputs.
There is now massive evidence that double-scope blending is
indeed a necessary feature of all the human singularities men-
tioned above, including language. Conceptual blending itself
has been evolving since at least deep in the mammalian line.
Once the stage of double-scope blending was achieved, the full
range of human higher-order singularities became possible.
They arose in concert, reinforcingly, in cultural time. The arche-
ological record suggests that the stage of double-scope blending
was reached not millions of years ago and not even at the stage of
anatomical speciation for human beings (about 150 thousand
years ago), but rather, more recently, perhaps 50 to 80 thousand
years ago (Mithen 1996).
Grammatical constructions are products of conceptualmapping.
Specifically, they are double-scope blends (Fauconnier & Turner
1996; Liddell 2003; Mandelblit 1997). Accordingly, the existence
of language requires the capacity for double-scope blending.
Because double-scope blending is necessary for these patterns of
meaning construction, because grammatical constructions in
general are not possible absent the capacity for double-scope
blending, and because double-scopeblending is necessary for equi-
potentiality – the amazing ability of language to be used effectively
in any situation, not just those that fit a finite list of frames (Faucon-
nier & Turner 2002) – language (like other human higher-order
conceptual singularities) appears only once mapping capacities
have evolved to reach the stage of double-scope blending. Inter-
mediate stages of the mapping capacities are useful and adaptive,
but not for language, which demands equipotentiality. This
explains the absence of intermediate stages of language as an obser-
vable product.
There is no evidence known to science of simple languages
now or at any time during our phylogenetic descent, because
there are no simple or rudimentary languages. Once the stage
of double-scope blending is achieved, fully complex language
comes on like a flood, in cultural time rather than in biological
time. In the early twentieth century, scientists at last gave up
the argument that the cave paintings of France and Spain
could not date from the Upper Paleolithic. They had assumed
that art must have gone through stages of increasing complexity
and accomplishment, that it must have been simple at its
birth. We argue that a century later, scientists must give up the
same argument and the same mistaken assumptions about
language.
There is evidence of simpler stages, not of language or art, but
of the mental operation underlying these behaviors – conceptual
integration. The more rudimentary forms of conceptual inte-
gration remain available to all human beings, who moreover
use those simpler forms constantly. Arguably, the evolution of
mapping capacities in human beings was adaptive, and took
place in standard fashion, but left no “fossils” of the singularities
(such fossils being “simpler” languages, “simpler” religions, and
“simpler” drawings and cave paintings).
There is a long tradition, inherited by generative grammar
from structuralism, of studying languages as formal systems,
divorced from their deeper purpose, which is to prompt for ela-
borate meaning construction (Dancygier & Sweetser 2005;
Hougaard & Oakley 2008; Liddell 2003). In contrast to this tra-
dition, recent research offers very strong evidence for uniform
conceptual mapping capacities that cut across domains. The cul-
tural construction of classical mathematics through successive
double-scope conceptual blends is demonstrated in detail in
Lakoff and Nu´n˜ez (2000). Similar detailed research now exists
for religion and magic (Slingerland 2008; Sørensen 2006); design
(Imaz & Benyon 2007); technology (Hutchins 2005; Pereira
2007; Williams 2005); poetry, fiction, and theater (Dancygier
2006); music (Zbikowski 2001); social cognition (Turner 2001);
and, of course, grammar (Fauconnier & Turner 1996; Mandelblit
1997). Strikingly, none of these highly typical human domains of
action andmeaning are possible without double-scope conceptual
blending, and their emergence takes place at the beginning of our
own cultural time, circa 50 thousand years ago (Klein 1999).
We concur with C&C’s second principal claim: that language is
shaped by the brain. But again, we reach this conclusion by a
different route of reasoning. Once the brain, through evolution-
ary time, acquired the capacity for double-scope blending,
language, along with other human singularities, became possible.
Language is only one of the universal surface manifestations of
the deeper unity of highly human-specific meaning construction,
requiring double-scope capacity, and constrained by the consti-
tutive and governing principles of integration (Fauconnier &
Turner 2002). Languages can then change through cultural
time subject to such constraints, and the well-studied pressures
and mechanisms of diachronic linguistics. It remains highly
doubtful that such change makes languages better adapted, as
C&C wish to think. However even if it did, the capacity for
more or less adapted, but fully expressive, languages, attested
only in recent cultural time, would remain on their account an
unexplained singularity. Accordingly, we view C&C’s specu-
lations about linguistic change in cultural time as orthogonal to
the central problem of how evolving mental capacities reached
a critical point where human singularities, including language,
became possible.
Co-evolution of phylogeny and glossogeny:
There is no “logical problem of language
evolution”
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Abstract:Historical language change (“glossogeny”), like evolution itself,
is a fact; and its implications for the biological evolution of the human
capacity for language acquisition (“phylogeny”) have been ably explored
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by many contemporary theorists. However, Christiansen & Chater’s
(C&C’s) revolutionary call for a replacement of phylogenetic models
with glossogenetic cultural models is based on an inadequate
understanding of either. The solution to their “logical problem of
language evolution” lies before their eyes, but they mistakenly reject it
due to a supposed “circularity trap.” Gene/culture co-evolution poses a
series of difficult theoretical and empirical problems that will be
resolved by subtle thinking, adequate models, and careful cross-
disciplinary research, not by oversimplified manifestos.
A core claim of the target article by Christiansen & Chater
(C&C) – that languages change, and that theories of language
evolution must take this into account – is undoubtedly correct.
Language change, or “glossogeny” (Hurford 1990), plays an
important role in language evolution, recognized and explored
by many scholars (Deacon 1997; Fitch 2005; 2007; Keller 1994;
Kirby 1999; Kirby et al. 2007; Lieberman et al. 2007; Pagel et al.
2007). C&C review some good reasons why. But their core asser-
tion that “Language has been shaped by the brain, rather than vice
versa” (sect. 4, para. 9) is based on a false dichotomy. The explana-
tory role of glossogeny is complementary to, not in competition
with, that of biological evolution. The keyword is “co-evolution”
(Deacon 1997; Dunbar 1993; Durham 1991; Feldman & Laland
1996). C&C’s argument pervasively mixes metaphors, uses slip-
pery terms like “language” and “Universal Grammar (UG)” chi-
merically and without definition, and fails as a contribution to
this literature. The “logical” problem is not with the logic of evol-
utionary reasoning, but with C&C’s understanding of it.
C&C’s rejection of the possibility of biological evolution of a
human-specific language capacity is grounded on a misguided
rejection of what they mistake for “circular” reasoning. One of
Darwin’s core insights was that the biological past influences
the evolutionary future. Despite the power of natural selection
to tailor organisms to their environment, adaptation occurs
within a limited range determined by past evolutionary history.
Thus, inevitably, today’s “effects” are tomorrow’s “causes.”
Despite the essential correctness of this way of thinking, it has
been dogged since its inception by accusations of circularity
and tautology (Mayr 1982), which periodically reappear due to
a failure to fully understand the nature of biological causality
(e.g., Moorhead & Kaplan 1967; Peters 1976; Stebbins 1977).
C&C’s “logical problem of language evolution” (target article,
Abstract) provides another example of this failure, addressing
problems easily solved with standard evolutionary reasoning.
But C&C rule out such solutions due to their supposedly
“obvious” circularity. Like many previous critics of evolutionary
theory, C&C have fallen into the “linearity trap”: thinking that
the only logically permissible form of causal reasoning is a one-
way movement from causes to effects. Such reasoning is
inadequate for understanding biological causality, in develop-
ment or evolution, which is far more complex and indeterminate
than this: multiple effects at one point in time become the causes
of subsequent effects in a never-ending cycle (Mayr 1961; 1988).
Cyclicity is a core characteristic of the phenomenon under study;
and by ruling out appropriately cyclical forms of explanation
under the heading of “circular reasoning,” C&C create a
problem where there is none.
C&C argue that languages change so fast that any biases to
learning a particular language, selected in one generation, will
be unsuited to a later version of that language generations
later. If this “logical problem of language evolution” is indeed
as severe as C&C claim, it is not just linguists who should be
worried: any biologist interested in adaptation to a rapidly chan-
ging environment (e.g., individual learning) or culturally trans-
mitted system (e.g., bird or whale song) should be alarmed.
Birdsong is a well-studied example of “animal culture” (Catchpole
& Slater 1995; Marler & Slabbekoorn 2004). Many birds learn
their song, and due to accumulated errors, the songs of local
populations diversify, form dialects, which gradually change
over time (Baker & Cunningham 1985). Modern biologists uni-
versally accept the notion that birds have an “instinct to learn”
not just song in general, but their species-specific song (Gould
&Marler 1987; Marler 1991), an outcome that should be imposs-
ible if C&C were correct. Have all these birdsong biologists fallen
into the “circularity trap”? Of course not. Understanding gene/
culture co-evolution requires more sophisticated models, and
more subtle reasoning, than the simplistic options considered
by C&C (cf. Boyd & Richerson 1985; Marler 1991; Nottebohm
1972).
Consider what happens when some new culturally transmitted
display arises for non-genetic reasons (e.g., a copying error) and
proves popular among display recipients. For whatever reason,
some members of the current population may find this cultural
variant easier to master than do others; and if there is any genetic
basis for this difference, this biological variant will increase in fre-
quency in subsequent populations: the alleles responsible may
experience consistent positive selection. Crucially, some types of
constraints (e.g., a proclivity for specific details) will have no
long-term advantage, because of rapid dialectal change. For
other constraints (e.g., better sequence memory), the constraint
may be abstract and general enough to apply across time, to
many different chronodialects. Rapid cultural change thus selects
for abstract constraints on learning, just as rapid change in the
physical environment selects for “generalist” species that solve pro-
blems via plastic responses to the environment (e.g., biased learn-
ing) rather than fixed instincts (West-Eberhard 1989). The “instinct
to learn” continues to evolve biases and constraints, but for abstract
features rather than details. Similarly, language change does not
entail a cessation of selection. Rather, consistent positive selection
occurs only for variants capable of abstracting over rapid glossoge-
netic variation. A proto-constraint (“UG1”) shapes proto-language,
which influences further evolution of the constraint (“UG2”),
which shapes later glossogeny, and so on. Far from it being “inevi-
table” that UG would adapt to “specific word order, phonotactic
rules, inventory of phonemic distinctions, and so on,” as C&C
claim (sect. 3.2.3, para. 2, emphasis theirs), language change
makes this outcome extremely unlikely. This conclusion does not
involve “circular reasoning,” just a clear recognition of the essen-
tially cyclical nature of evolution itself.
In a recent chapter inquiring whether language evolution is the
“hardest problem in science,” Christiansen and Kirby correctly
assert that language is the “most complex behaviour we know
of” (Christiansen & Kirby 2003). If so, the real traps for evol-
utionary approaches to this problem are oversimplification and
a reliance on inappropriate models, metaphors, and preconcep-
tions. By oversimplifying the nature of genes, evolution, the
brain, and language, C&C do a disservice to the hypothesis
they intend to champion. Increases in our understanding of
language demand sophisticated models of the co-evolutionary
interplay between ontogeny, glossogeny, and phylogeny, not a
simplistic replacement of one by the other.
Universal Grammar? Or prerequisites for
natural language?
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Abstract: This commentary aims to highlight what exactly is controversial
about the traditional Universal Grammar (UG) hypothesis and what is
not. There is widespread agreement that we are not born “blank
slates,” that language universals exist, that grammar exists, and that
adults have domain-specific representations of language. The point of
contention is whether we should assume that there exist unlearned
syntactic universals that are arbitrary and specific to Language.
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The notion of Universal Grammar (UG) is generally understood
to embody a particular hypothesis, namely, that some substantial
portion of human language is based on universal domain-specific
syntactic principles that are biologically determined (“innate” or
unlearned). The UG Hypothesis thus involves four interrelated
claims:
1. Domain-specificity: Language acquisition is constrained by
representations or principles that are specific to language.
2. Universality: These representations or principles are
universal.
3. Innateness: These representations or principles are not
learned.
4. Autonomous syntax: These representations or principles
require reference to syntax, not to possible functional correlates
of syntax.
Versions of each of these claims, taken independently, are not at
all controversial. As Christiansen & Chater (C&C) make clear, no
one believes that language arises from nothing. Our biological
endowment is what separates us from the Amazon horned frog
and is what ultimately ensures that humans have language while
frogs do not. This is not the issue; the question is whether what sep-
arates us includes unlearned linguistic (i.e., domain-specific) rep-
resentations concerning syntax. Generalizations about universals of
human conceptual structure or about the human vocal tract do
not provide evidence of Universal Grammar insofar as Universal
Grammar is understood to be about grammar.
It is likewise clear that learning itself requires prior biases of
one sort or another, since without any a priori similarity metrics
or attentional biases, a system would not know on what basis to
generalize; all input would be weighted equally or in some
random fashion. But again, this general fact in no way requires
that the metrics or biases must be domain-specific. Clearly, too,
everyone recognizes that there are some language universals;
the question is whether the universals make reference to auton-
omous syntactic generalizations, or whether instead they are
explicable in terms of domain-general abilities and/or the seman-
tics or pragmatics of the constructions involved (cf. Bates 1993;
Goldberg 2006; Newmeyer 2005, for relevant discussion). In
addition, we can all agree that adults have representations that
are specific to language (for example, their representations of indi-
vidual constructions); the question is whether these represen-
tations can be learned.
“Universal Grammar” has alternately been interpreted, not as a
hypothesis, but as a definitional label. It can be defined as the
“initial state” of the child before exposure to language, or as the
set of constraints that narrows the set of all logically possible
languages to the set of all humanly possible languages. Neither
of these interpretations of UG embodies a controversial claim.
Surely infants (at least younger prenatal) can be said to be in some
initial state before they are exposed to language. Certainly there
are constraints on the range of possible human languages. On
eitherof these interpretations, onceagain,UGmaynotbespecifical-
lyabout grammar at all. The initial state and the set of factors that
constrain human language may be comprised entirely of domain-
general abilities and mechanisms that conspire to give rise to the
inclination and ability to create, learn, and use language.
Everyone also understands that language must be compatible
with the human brain in that processing mechanisms and social
forces are recognized to constrain language.1 Chomsky himself
has recently emphasized the role of domain-general processes. In
fact, he has acknowledged that he remains unconvinced by any pro-
posals for domain-specific innate syntactic representations or prin-
ciples, with the (possible) exception of recursion, noting, “We
hypothesize that FLN [the domain-specific Faculty of Language]
only includes recursion” (Hauser et al. 2002, p. 1569).2
The target article by C&C highlights the challenges that defen-
ders of the four interrelated claims (listed above) face in detailing
how unlearned, communicatively arbitrary universals of grammar
might have evolved (see also, Deacon 1997; Elman et al. 1996).
Moreover, while it made sense for researchers to explore the
UG Hypothesis at the time it was proposed (Chomsky 1965),
we are now in a better position to appreciate the power of stat-
istics, implicit memory, the nature of categorization, emergent
behavior, and the impressively repetitive nature of certain
aspects of the input.
In order to avoid prejudging whether any of the necessary abil-
ities and constraints on language are domain-specific (specifically
syntactic), a better term than Universal Grammar might be Pre-
requisites for Natural Language. As Liz Bates used to say, “It’s
not a question of Nature vs. Nurture; the question is about the
Nature of Nature” (Bates 1993).
Of course, if universal syntactic representations have not evolved
biologically, then various questions immediately come to the fore,
many of which are briefly discussed by C&C. What domain-
general processes account for each cross-linguistic regularity? Why
are there impressive generalizations within any given language?
What distinguishes us from other primates such that only we spon-
taneously create and learn language? How exactly is language
learned and processed? More generally, what exactly are the Pre-
requisites for Natural Language and how do they interact to yield
the constrained complexity that is language? These are exactly the
questions that are currently the focus of a tremendous amount of
ongoing work (cf. references in the target article).
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NOTES
1. It is possible to agreewithC&C’s and others’ arguments that our brains
have not likely evolved to encode a complex system of arbitrary constraints on
grammar, without embracing the notion that languages evolve to suit the
human brain. Surely it is wars, assimilation, and dispersion, not processing
difficulty, that lead to language spread (or death, depending on which side
of the spear a speaker is on). Also, Creole specialists may well balk at the
idea that “language has adapted through gradual processes of cultural evol-
ution [in order] to be easy to produce and understand” (target article, sect.
1, para. 3). This would seem to imply that newer languages might be less
easy to learn or use than older, more highly “evolved” languages, but there
is no evidence that this is the case. Each natural language must satisfy the
simultaneous and potentially conflicting constraints of expressive power,
learnability, and processing ease.
Amore natural perspective thatC&Cadopt in other parts in their article is
that combined pressures of learnability, processing ease, and expressive
power operate at the level of individual constructions. Individual words
and constructions do change (or “evolve”) to meet the changing demands
of the overall system, as well as demands of external cultural forces. This
insight harkens back to the structuralists and has recently received
renewed attention (e.g., de Saussure 1916/1959; Ellis 2002; Enfield 2002).
2. See Pinker and Jackendoff (2005) for arguments against recursion
being domain-specific and for other candidate domain-specific attributes.
Their suggestions emphasize speech and semantics more than universal
principles of syntax.
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Abstract: We propose that some aspects of language – notably
intersubjectivity – evolved to fit the brain, whereas other aspects – notably
grammar – co-evolved with the brain. Cladistic analysis indicates that
common basic structures of both action and grammar arose in phylogeny
six million years ago and in ontogeny before age two, with a shared
prefrontal neural substrate. In contrast, mirror neurons, found in both
humans and monkeys, suggest that the neural basis for intersubjectivity
evolved before language. Natural selection acts upon genes controlling the
neural substrates of these phenotypic language functions.
While we concur with Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) well-
reasoned thesis that “language has been shaped to fit the
human brain” (target article, Abstract), we see co-evolution of
the brain and human language as an additional process. Here
we critique a few assumptions implicit in C&C’s argument and
buttress our claim that, while language evolved to fit the
human brain, the brain and language also co-evolved.
The richest source of evidence regarding the co-evolution of
language and the brain is overlooked by C&C: cladistic analysis.
The study of a clade – a group of species sharing a common
ancestor – allows inferences about traits likely to have been
present in a common phylogenetic ancestor. Here, the relevant
clade consists of Homo sapiens, Pan paniscus (bonobos), and
Pan troglodytes (chimpanzees). Cladistic analysis fits with C&C’s
conclusion that human “language does not involve any qualitatively
different mechanisms compared to extant apes, but instead a
number of quantitative evolutionary refinements of older
primate systems”(sect. 6.5, para. 3). Similarities in functional
brain structures across the clade, paired with similarities in beha-
vioral phenomena that correspond to simple forms of human
language, lead to probable inferences that both brain and behavior
co-evolved after the phylogenetic split of the species about six
million years ago, producing larger brains, with particular expan-
sion in the prefrontal cortex, and complex human language.
Concerning the co-evolution of brain and language, we disagree
with the assumption that an adaptationist position towards the evol-
ution of language entails viewing “arbitrary principles of UG” (sect.
2, para. 6) as genetically encoded. By offering an alternative to arbi-
trary UG (Universal Grammar), we obviate the need to solve
C&C’s “logical problem of language evolution” (target article,
Abstract, their emphasis). Rather, we point to the structure of
action as the genetically encoded basis of language structure and
meaning (Greenfield 1978; 1991; Greenfield & Lyn 2006). Exam-
ining action structure as the phylogenetic origin of grammar pro-
vides new and different evidence for the authors’ notion that
“language may be rather less arbitrary than at first supposed”
(sect. 8, para. 1).
Both apes and human children structure their semiotic combi-
nations to express actions composed of semantic elements such as
action, agent, object, and location (Greenfield & Lyn 2006). The
expression of these basic action structures, such as action-agent
or agent-object, by young members of the human, bonobo, and
chimpanzee species became, on our theory, the building blocks
for more complexity in both the phylogeny and ontogeny of
human language (Greenfield 1978; Greenfield & Lyn 2006;
Greenfield & Smith 1976; Greenfield et al. 1972). Particularly
important to the connection between action and grammar are
manual actions, including gesture. Indeed, an intermediate onto-
genetic stage between single symbols and symbolic combinations
typical of proto-language consists of a gesture combined with a
symbol throughout the clade (Greenfield et al. 2008).
This integration of hand andmouth is basic to the ontogeny and
phylogeny of proto-grammar, which may not be as variable as the
authors assert. C&C use cultural variability of proto-language to
dismiss co-evolution of brain and language. However, commonal-
ities in the ontogeny of language across members of the clade
(and across various human languages) suggest that proto-
language is more constant than C&C hypothesize. These univer-
sal and cross-species features include cross-modal integration of
indexicality and representation (e.g., gesture plus word in the
communication of young hearing humans), plus structures
expressing relations such as agent-action and action-object
(Greenfield & Lyn 2006; Greenfield et al. 2008).
On the neural level, a key neural substrate for linguistic
grammar – Broca’s area – controls the processing of grammar
of action tasks in human adults (Molnar-Szakacs et al. 2006).
Mirror neuron research supports this connection between gram-
matical structure and action structure. Mirror neurons for motor
actions are found in Broca’s area (Iacoboni et al. 1999) and in
Broca’s homologue in monkeys (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998). Here
is neural evidence that grammatical structure may be an evol-
utionary exaptation of the structure of action. Lateralization of
the ape homologue of Broca’s area and asymmetry in its acti-
vation during gestural communication further suggest a similar
substrate across the clade (Cantalupo & Hopkins 2001).
A comparison of themicroscopic anatomy of theplanum tempor-
ale (Wernicke’s area in humans) between nonhuman apes and
humans shows that only humans have asymmetrically wider and
denser mini-columns in the left planum temporale (Buxhoeveden
et al. 2001). This micro-structural lateralization specific to human
primates suggests that increases of connectivity between peri-
sylvian regions (such as Broca’s and Wernicke’s areas) may have
coincided with the evolution of language (Catani et al. 2005). Simi-
larities and differences in ontogeny, behavior, and anatomy across
the clade suggest that C&C’s brilliantly argued assertion that
language evolved to fit thebrain should be temperedby recognizing
the importance of the co-evolution of language and the brain.
Intersubjectivity may be an important area in which language
evolved to fit the brain. Like C&C, we reject Chomsky’s claim
that the communicative function of language was secondary to
its representational function evolutionarily. A mirror neuron
system adapted for relating self-generated actions to others’ beha-
viors may have provided the intersubjectivity necessary for the
evolution of language. The existence of a mirror neuron system
in monkeys and humans (Rizolatti & Arbib 1998) implies a very
old pre-linguistic origin of intersubjectivity and therefore fits
with C&C’s thesis that language evolved to fit the human brain.
Intersubjectivity allows people to learn language by co-construc-
tion whereby the conversational partner’s contribution becomes
part of one’s own communication (Greenfield & Smith 1976;
Scollon1979).Mirror neurons enable imitation inhumans (Iacoboni
et al. 1999), a very basic form of dialogue. Repetition (imitation with
varying pragmatic forces) is an essential part of both co-construction
and the ontogeny of pragmatics shared across humans and apes
(enculturated into interspecies communication) (Greenfield &
Savage-Rumbaugh 1993; Keenan-Ochs 1977; Tannen 1987).
C&C note four constraints upon the evolution of human
language: thought, perceptuo-motor factors, cognition, and prag-
matics. To these the preceding argument implies that we must
add a fifth: ontogeny. The way in which language develops con-
strains mature language: an examination of ontogenies across the
clade necessitates the inclusion of this constraint. In final con-
clusion,we assert that (1) both co-evolution andbrain-first evolution
are processes in the evolution of language, and (2) both intersubjec-
tivity and the structure of action provide phenotypic expressions of
the genetic bases for the evolution of human language.
Why and how the problem of the evolution
of Universal Grammar (UG) is hard1
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) suggest that language is an
organism, like us, and that our brains were not selected for Universal
Grammar (UG) capacity; rather, languages were selected for learnability
with minimal trial-and-error experience by our brains. This explanation is
circular: Where did our brain’s selective capacity to learn all and only
UG-compliant languages come from?
The problem of the evolutionary origins of Universal Grammar
(UG) is not as readily solvable as Christiansen & Chater (C&C)
suggest.
UG is a complicated set of grammatical rules, but not the ones
we learned in school. We were never taught them, we are not
aware them, we cannot put them into words, and we would not
recognize them if they were explicitly told to us by a professional
grammarian. Yet we all “know” the rules of UG “implicitly,”
because they are the rules that make us able to produce all and
only the sentences that are grammatically well formed, according
to UG. It is rather as if we all knew implicitly how to play
chess – we could make all and only the legal moves – yet we
had no explicit idea what rules we were following.
The rules of chess, however, are simple; we learned them, and
we can verbalize them. UG’s rules are abstract, complex, and
technical. Since Chomsky first discovered the existence of
these rules, linguists have gradually been figuring them out
through decades of hypothesis, trial, and error, guided by the
grammatical intuitions we all share about what can and cannot
be said. The result is a set of rules that allow all and only the sen-
tences we all recognize as well formed, and disallow all those we
recognize as ill formed. That set of rules turned out to have some
surprising properties. UG turned out to be universal: All
languages obey the very same set of rules. But the most surprising
property was that children do not learn the rules of UG itself.
Children cannot learn the rules of UG because they are too
complicated to learn by observation and trial and error on the
basis of the information available to the language-learning
child. Nor are they taught by explicit instruction: Before
Chomsky, no one even knew the rules, let alone taught them,
even though our species had been speaking language for a
hundred thousand years.
The reason the child cannot learn UG is that the data from
which the rules of UG would have to be learned do not contain
anywhere near enough of the information needed to infer the
rules from them. This is called the “poverty of the stimulus.” In
order to be learned at all, the rules of UG would have to be learn-
able through trial and error, with error-correction, just as chess
rules have to be, when we learn them without explicit instruction:
I try to move my bishop in a certain way, and you tell me, “No,
that’s not a legal move, this is,” and so on. Children cannot
learn the rules of UG that way because they basically never
make (or hear) any UG errors (“wrong moves”). Hence, children
never get or hear any UG error-corrections.
It is not that children speak flawlessly from birth. But the little
the child experiences during the relatively brief period of tran-
sition from being unable to speak to being able to speak does
not involve any errors (or error-corrections) in the rules of UG,
either from the child or from the speakers the child hears.
There are conventional grammatical errors and corrections
aplenty, but no UG violations produced, heard, or corrected.
UG rules are never broken, never corrected, hence never
“learned.” Therefore, they must already have been inborn.
But that raises the hard question of the evolutionary origin of
those inborn rules. Evolution has more time available than the
child, but it has an even more impoverished database: What
would serve as error-correction, and what would count as right
and wrong, in order to shape UG in the usual Darwinian way,
through trial-and-error genetic variation and selective retention,
based on advantages in survival and reproduction?
In explaining the origins of other complex biological structures,
such as fins, wings, and eyes, or biological functions, such as the
capacity to see, learn, or reason, there is no problem in principle
for the usual kind of evolutionary trial-and-error explanation.
But with UG there is a deep problem in principle (Harnad
1976). The problem is not just UG’s complexity but that UG has
no apparent adaptive advantages. For although a professional
grammarian’s lifetime is long enough to work out most of UG’s
rules explicitly by trial-and-error induction, it turns out that
(with the possible exception of a few small portions of UG gov-
erned by optimality constraints) no logical or practical advantage
has yet been discerned that favors what UG allows over what it
disallows, or over an altogether different set of grammatical rules
(perhaps even a much simpler and learnable set).
C&C rightly express skepticism about alternative “piggy-back”
theories of the evolutionary origin of UG. There is no credible
“precursor” with a prior adaptive advantage of its own that
could later have been “co-opted” to do the duties of UG as
well. But C&C’s alternative proposal is no more convincing:
C&C say that language, too, is an “organism” (target article,
Abstract), like people and animals; that it too varies across gener-
ations, historically; and that the shape that language took was
selectively determined by the shape the brain already had, in
that only the languages that were learnable by our brains success-
fully “survived and reproduced.”
The trouble with this hypothesis is that it is circular: We were
looking for the evolutionary origin of the complex and abstract
rules of UG. C&C say (based on their computer simulations of
far simpler rule systems, not bound by the poverty of the stimulus):
Do not ask how the UG rules evolved in the brain. The rules are in
language, which is another “organism,” not in the brain. The brain
simply helped shape the language, in that the variant languages
that were not learnable by the brain simply did not “survive.”
This hypothesis begs the question of why and how the brain
acquired an evolved capacity to learn all and only UG-compliant
languages in the first place, despite the poverty of the stimulus –
which was the hard problem we started out with in the first place!
It would be like saying that the reason we are born already
knowing the rules of chess without ever having to learn them
by trial and error is that, in our evolutionary past, there was vari-
ation in the games (likewise in “organisms”) that we organisms
tried to play, and only those games that we could play without
having to learn them by trial and error survived! (That still
would not even begin to explain what it is about our brains that
makes them able to play chess without trial and error!)
This circularity is partly a result of a vagueness about what
exactly is the target of language evolution theory. Pinker and
Bloom (1990) had already begun the misleading practice of
freely conflating evolutionarily unproblematic questions (such
as the origins of phonology, learnable aspects of grammar, voca-
bulary, “parity”) with the one hard problem of the origins of UG,
which specifically concerns the evolutionary origins of complex
rules that are unlearnable because of the poverty of the stimulus.
Language, after all, is not just grammar, let alone just UG. If, on
the one hand, the adaptive value of language itself (Cangelosi &
Harnad 2001; Harnad 2005; 2007) could have been achieved with
a much simpler grammar than UG (perhaps even a learnable
one), then the evolutionary origin and adaptive function of UG
becomes all the harder to explain, with C&C’s historical variation
in the language “organism’” occurring far too late in the day to be
of any help. If, on the other hand, the adaptive advantages of
language were impossible without UG, then we are still left
with the hard problem of explaining how and why not.
Chomsky (2005a) himself has suggested that UG may be a
necessary property of being able to think at all. He has been
right about so much else that this possibility definitely needs to
be taken seriously. But to solve the hard problem, we would
also have to explain how UG is logically or functionally necessary
in order to be able to think at all.
NOTE
1. An unabridged draft of this commentary is available online at:
http://cogprints.org/6008/.
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Niche-construction, co-evolution, and
domain-specificity
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Abstract: That language is shaped to fit the human brain is close to the
Chomskyan position. The target article by Christiansen & Chater
(C&C) assumes an entity, “(the) language,” outside individual heads.
What is the nature of this entity? Linguistic niche-construction and
co-evolution of language and genes are possible, with some of what
evolved being language-specific. Recent generative theory postulates
much less than the old Universal Grammar (UG).
I have much sympathy with the general view advocated by Chris-
tiansen & Chater (C&C) in the target article. But I find some dis-
turbing problems with its particular emphases.
In classic generative grammar, the explanandum is the distinc-
tive features of human language, and the explanans is the postu-
lated LAD (language acquisition device) or UG (Universal
Grammar). Further, UG is said to reside in the human brain.
Thus, classic generative grammar explains why language is the
way it is because of innate properties of the human brain. How
does this view differ from the position taken in the target article,
that “language has been shaped to fit the human brain” (Abstract)?
In both cases, the brain has certain properties first, and then
language grows to fit those properties. There are differences
between the two positions, but these differences are rather subtle.
The first difference to notice is the perfect tense in “has been
shaped,” which invokes a diachronic, evolutionary process. The
classic generative position accords no explanatory power to evol-
ution, or to any diachronic processes (outside of ontogeny). In the
classic view, languages grow their characteristic form, in toto
once in each human lifetime, with every person’s ontogeny,
just as an organ grows. The slow, cumulative historical process
advocated by C&C is surely plausible. But then the comparison
with a bodily organ can no longer hold, because successive gen-
erations do not share the same physical organs. So the thing that
grows, a language, has to be something outside of individuals.
This risks getting Platonic, and C&C do not address this
danger. It can be averted by stating that there is enough faithful,
mind-external record of the whole structure of a language in the
total ambient experience of each child. And this total ambient
experience is provided by a society of other individuals who are
all themselves at various stages of acquiring their own interna-
lized representations of the language, in response to their own
experiences of it. The “it” here is the language, a slowly moving
target, as the authors point out. The classic I-Language/
E-Language distinction is not undermined here. But the
E-Language is given a status as an evolving social entity, which
has a real causal influence, worth studying and not impossible
to study, on the successive I-Languages of its speakers.
C&C argue against the view that human genes have adapted to
a specifically “linguistic” environment. Throughout section 3.2 of
the target article, there is a subtle vagueness about what is meant
by “linguistic” and “language,” the entity to which UG may have
adapted. It would be absurd to suggest that during the course of
recent human biological evolution, fully-fledged languages like
French, Arabic, and Tamil existed, and that such languages
with their rich structure constituted the environmental challenge
to which the human genome adapted. To attack this view is to
attack a straw man, as no one advocates recent adaptation to
the detailed structure of fully modern languages.
But the remote ancestors of human languages were only in the
barest ways like modern human languages. (This excludes the
remote possibility that modern human languages suddenly
appeared, fully formed, as a result of some macro-mutation or
saltation.) Just around the dawn of our species, there would
have been rudimentary genetic dispositions, different from
those in our ape ancestors, biasing us toward acquiring communi-
cation systems of some rudimentary sort, the remote forerunners
of modern languages. Now these rudimentary forms were not yet
“linguistic” in the modern sense, but they differed from anything
previously existing. The target article only considers in a last brief
section (sect. 8.2) the possibility of a kind of niche-construction
in the specific domain of the unique type of communication
embarked upon by proto-humans. Here C&C concede that
there could have been natural selection for functional aspects
of language. (Well, of course, whoever heard of natural selection
for anything non-functional?)
Given that human language is spectacularly unique, and spec-
tacularly functional, it would not be surprising to find some
overlap between the unique aspects and the functional aspects.
And this would give us domain-specificity of functional aspects
of language. In this case, general cognitive capacities, used in
non-linguistic domains, such as navigation, planning, and recall
of past events (all without the aid of inner speech), cannot be
summoned up to explain the relevant features of language.
I will be little more specific than C&C about what these
unique-to-language features might be. But a few reasonable can-
didates are: (1) the ability to acquire a massive inventory of form-
to-meaning mappings (vocabulary); (2) the ability to manage a
communication system with duality of patterning (double articu-
lation), that is, a system with two combinatorial layers, phonology
and syntax; and (3) the ability to manage nested long-distance
dependencies, where the co-dependent items are in no way rep-
resented outside the head of the producer while speaking. All
human languages have these properties which must be mastered
in a few years by the child; and, barring pathology, children
achieve mastery spectacularly well. These properties are arguably
specific to language only, and there could well have been
runaway biological adaptation, with a feedback loop, to the
embryonic beginnings of systems with such properties. One
force driving such adaptation would have been the peculiar
hominid social setup, with large groups of mutually cooperative
individuals. This all needs to be argued in detail, but the idea is
as well developed as any alternative suggested by C&C in the
target article.
Finally, ironically, the target article mentions the difficulty of
adapting to a moving target. The innate UG that the authors
attack is itself a notoriously moving target. Their target is “the
extremely rich and abstract set of possibilities countenanced by
the principles of UG” (sect. 3.2.3, para. 1). The generative enter-
prise based on this formulation has been turned upside-down by
the more recent insistence on minimalism and the proposal that
all that is distinctive about human language is recursion. So
maybe C&C are pushing at an open door, or flogging a dead
horse. The issues raised by the authors are important, and
always have been. These issues need further work – and in a
positive empirical direction, please.
Language enabled by Baldwinian evolution of
memory capacity
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Abstract: The claim that language is shaped by the brain is weakened
by lack of clear specification of what necessary and sufficient properties
the brain actually imposes. To account for human intellectual
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superiority, it is proposed that language did require special brain evolution
(Deacon 1997), but thatwhat evolvedwas amerely quantitative change – in
representation space – rather than a radically new invention.
To say that language is shapedby characteristics of thebrain implies
that to understand language evolution, we need to know how
the brain’s capabilities and limits apply to language. However,
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) say little more than that the brain
had developed the needed perceptual, motor, and general cogni-
tive abilities before language emerged. In their own research and
theorizing, C&C have steadfastly objected to the arguments of
Chomsky, Pinker, and other researchers that seem to suggest that
calling something we cannot explain “innate” excuses us from
trying to understand how it works (grammar is an instinct – duh!).
Yet C&C seem to have done something close to that here, saying
that language evolution is shaped by the brain without telling us
how. This could be a strategic divide-and-conquer step, but its
use by the authors without explanation is disappointing. I take a
stab here at rectifying the omission in a way that leaves the main
idea intact: hypothesizing an important quantitative brain evolution
that would have been a necessary enabler of cultural language
evolution.
There has been dramatic progress in the last few decades, some
of it attributable to Christiansen and Chater in various works, in
creating and evaluating computational mechanisms that do much
of what human brains do in acquiring and using language based
solely on the kinds of language experience that all humans have.
These models offer empirical examples of fundamentally simple
mechanisms that learn to do things that have often been declared
impossible to learn. I focus here onLatent Semantic Analysis (LSA;
Landauer & Dumais 1997), and mention two others, the Topics
model of Steyvers and Griffiths (2007) and the BEAGLE model
of Jones and Mewhort (2007), which employ different means to
achieve similar results in mimicking human use of many tens of
thousands of words to convey meaning. Then I add some extrapo-
lative conjectures on how these successes suggest ways in which
culturally steered (Baldwinian) genetic evolution could have
played a crucial role in language evolution by expanding something
already important.
These models all learn to simulate human language phenomena
solely by mathematical analysis of large-text corpora that closely
resemble what average literate people have read. They all eschew
any direct aid from language experts – such as grammatical annota-
tions or semantic hierarchies – that must themselves be results of
the causal mechanisms sought. Each in its own way achieves a rep-
resentation of words and passages as numerical vectors that obey
the compositional constraint that every meaningful passage be a
combination of components chosen from the same set; for
example, sets of English words or Chinese characters. All three
models closely simulate human performance in language tasks,
such as answering synonym tests and mimicking free association.
For more examples, LSA learns word meanings at the same daily
rate as children; and has come close to equaling humans in
judging coherence of book chapters, the topical similarity of conver-
sational utterances, the semantic similarity of test essays, and in
identifying translated documents in widely differing languages
when given only partially overlapping experience with them. (For
more on these examples and many others, see Landauer et al.
2007.) Lest a reader be tempted to discount these achievements
because LSA almost completely ignores grammar (reflecting an
apparent assumption of grammar’s near equivalence with language
in the target article and elsewhere in the innateness debate), con-
sider the following two observations: (a) in a study in which two
independent expert readers and LSA each estimated the quality
of substantive content of essays, the mutual information between
LSA and humans was 90% of that between two humans; and (b)
the possible information in a typical sentence attributable to word
choice is about nine times that of word order (Landauer 2002).
Now for the conjecture on how Baldwinian evolution may have
been essential to language. The fundamentally simple mathematics
by which LSA learns and uses its word and passage vector represen-
tations requires a representational space of about 1013 bits.1 (The
other models make similar demands.) This is some 10,000 times
the amount of learned information accumulated in a normal
human lifetime (Landauer 1975). Of this, more than one-tenth is
knowledge of word meanings. By this analogy, the space needed
to support language is tauntingly similar to the increases in
primate and human cortex size over the probable period of develop-
ment of gesture, proto-, and fully Homo sapiens sapiens languages
(Deacon 1997). Acknowledging some unresolved questions in this
arena, it appears that language may have simply needed much
more relevant brain space. Importantly, the new space was most
likely the same kind of space – analogous to increasing general-
purposememory capacities in a computer – not somethingwonder-
fully novel like Universal Grammar (UG).
So, suppose that the explosive human cortical growth started
with a mutational decrease in the usual amount of death of neo-
natal neural cells, and this let some early male get a tiny bit
better at composing multi-utterance mating calls, which let him
sire more people like him . . . The resulting genetically adapted
brain size growth would be no more mysterious, or take longer
to happen, than the differentiation of Great Danes and Chihua-
huas; and it could have eventuated in great vocabularies that
made possible great minds that supported intelligent cultures
that in time invented many grammars whose possibly equally
simple underlying mechanisms we have not yet discovered. Learn-
ing how every one of more than 100,000 words relates to any other
word, and how their combinations yield meaning, appears as
complex and difficult to me as learning a grammar, yet succumbs
to mathematical simulations, given enough space.
NOTE
1. “Representational space” is not the same as permanent memory
storage space: the former includes locations where unique, transiently
computed values need to be represented without interference.
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Abstract: Neural circuits linking local operations in the cortex and the
basal ganglia confer reiterative capacities, expressed in seemingly
unrelated human traits such as speech, syntax, adaptive actions to
changing circumstances, dancing, and music. Reiteration allows the
formation of a potentially unbounded number of sentences from a
finite set of syntactic processes, obviating the need for the hypothetical
“Narrow Faculty of Language.”
What is missing from the otherwise excellent discussion presented
by Christiansen & Chater (C&C) are insights from current studies
on how brains might actually work. The traditional Broca-
Wernicke theory, though straightforward, is wrong.
Neural circuits.Complex brains contain distinct neuroanatomi-
cal structures that perform local operations, such as processing
tactile, visual, or auditory stimuli. However, an isolated neural
structure or cortical area generally is not the “seat” of a
complex behavior. Instead, a particular neural structure may
support many anatomically segregated groups – populations
– of neurons that carry out a similar “local” operation. Each
neuronal population is linked to – projects to – an anatomically
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distinct neuronal population in another region of the brain,
forming a neural circuit. The circuit regulates an observable
aspect of behavior, such as walking, talking, dancing, compre-
hending syntax, and so on. Moreover, within a given neural struc-
ture, distinct anatomically segregated neuronal populations may
occur, that project to different brain structures forming multiple
circuits that regulate other behaviors. Therefore, a given neural
structure may be involved in different aspects of behavior, each
regulated by a different circuit.
A class of cortico-striatal-cortico circuits involves links
between cortical areas and the subcortical basal ganglia. Cum-
mings (1993), in his review article, identifies five parallel basal
ganglia circuits that are involved in motor control, cognition,
attention, and other aspects of behavior. Disruptions in behavior
seemingly unrelated, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder
(Greenberg et al. 2000), schizophrenia (Graybiel 1997), and Par-
kinson’s disease (Jellinger 1990), derive from the impairment of
these neural circuits. Behavioral changes usually attributed to
frontal lobe cortical dysfunction can be observed in patients
having damage to basal ganglia (e.g., Flowers & Robertson
1985; Lange et al. 1992).
Reiteration. The basal ganglia enable humans to generate a
potentially unbounded number of motor acts, such as words or
dances, by the process of reiteration, selecting and sequencing a
finite set of “pattern generators” that each specify a sub-movement.
Individual motor pattern generators may entail selectional con-
straints, yielding hierarchical structures. Walking, for example,
involves executing a heel strike at an appropriate point in a
sequence of leg and foot sub-movements. The basal ganglia also
reiterate cognitive pattern generators that constitute sub-elements
of thought processes. Parkinson’s disease (PD), which damages
the basal ganglia, mostly sparing cortex, thus yields deficits such
as tremors, rigidity, and disruptions in speech production. PD
patients can have difficulty producing and comprehending sen-
tences that have complex syntax (Grossman et al. 1991; 1993;
Illes et al. 1988, Lieberman et al. 1990; 1992; Natsopoulos et al.
1993). As PD progresses, patients are unable to readily form or
change cognitive sets (Cools et al. 2001; Flowers & Robertson
1985).
Neuroimaging studies confirm the essential cognitive role of
the basal ganglia. Monchi et al. (2001) used functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to monitor brain activity of neurologi-
cally intact subjects in a version of the Wisconsin Card Sorting
Test (WCST), which evaluates a person’s ability to form and
shift cognitive criteria. Bilateral activation was observed in the
prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and thalamus. Dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortical areas were active when the subjects had to
relate the current match with earlier events stored in working
memory. Mid-ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, caudate nucleus,
putamen, and thalamus were active when subjects had to shift
to a different matching criterion. Stowe et al. (2004) used posi-
tron emission tomography (PET) imaging of neurologically
intact subjects in a sentence comprehension study. The basal
ganglia to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex circuit was active when
subjects had to change their interpretation of an ambiguous sen-
tence, confirming that basal ganglia set shifting manifests itself in
language. Other neuroimaging studies show basal ganglia linked
to cortex during sentence comprehension and word retrieval
tasks (Klein et al. 1994; Kotz et al. 2003; Rissman et al. 2003;
Stowe et al. 2004). In short, the basal ganglia act in concert
with cortical areas of the brain to reiterate pattern generators
in motor, cognitive, and linguistic tasks.
The “narrow faculty of language.” The evidence noted here
(cf. Lieberman 2000; 2002; 2006) suggests that the productive
aspects of speech and syntax derive from cortico-striatal-cortico
circuits that confer reiteration. This negates the most recent
version of Universal Grammar (UG), the “narrow faculty of
language” (NFL) (Hauser et al. 2002). The human and language-
specific NFL supposedly is the key to recursion, which involves
inserting identical elements, usually sentences (Ss), into a underlying
phrase marker. Generative grammars since Chomsky (1957) claim
the relative clause in a sentence such as, The boy who was talking
fell down, derives froma sentence node “S” inserted into a hypothe-
tical underlying sentence. In the 1957 system, transformational
rules acted on the underlying sentence to yield the sentence that
might be uttered or written. In Chomsky’s (1995) current “minim-
alist” grammar, the syntactic rule merge inserts S nodes; the rule
move and subsequent operations then rewrite the string of words
to yield the sentence that one actually hears or reads. But is
there any neurophysiological evidence for inserted S nodes in a
hypothetical abstract structure formed by serial algorithms that
have no demonstrable neural bases?
In contrast, “hard” data from imaging and behavioral studies of
the linguistic deficits of PD, hypoxia (which has a profound effect
on the basal ganglia; Lieberman et al. 1992; 2005), and the
FOXP2 transcriptional gene studies (e.g., Lai et al. 2003;
Vargha-Khadem et al. 1998) show that neural circuits involving
the basal ganglia provide the productive capacity of syntax, as
well as speech, and seemingly unrelated distinctly human traits
such as music and dance.
The mark of evolution. Should we be surprised to discover that
the basal ganglia, subcortical structures that can be traced back to
anurans similar to present-day frogs, play a critical role in
language? As Darwin (1859/1964) first observed, organs initially
adapted to control one function take on “new” tasks. Seen in this
light, the local motor sequencing operations in the subcortical
basal ganglia appear to be precursors for similar operations in
cognitive domains. In the course of evolution, they have been
adapted to serve as a reiterative engine in cognitive domains
including language.
Has anyone ever seen a chimpanzee dancing?
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Abstract: The proposal that language has evolved to conform to general
cognitive and learning constraints inherent in the human brain calls for
specification of these mechanisms. We propose that just as cognition
appears to be grounded in cross-modal perceptual-motor capabilities,
so too must language. Evidence for perceptual-motor grounding comes
from non-arbitrary sound-to-meaning correspondences and their role in
word learning.
Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) proposed account of the
manner in which language and its acquisition are constrained
by general cognitive mechanisms offers a compelling alternative
explanation of language evolution and the relationship between
language and the brain. We enthusiastically endorse C&C’s pro-
posal that language adapted to fit the general nature of human
cognitive and neural processing. However, specification of the
mechanisms by which cognitive and learning processes constrain
language structure is critical. A particularly promising mechan-
ism is perceptual grounding. Growing evidence suggests that
both cognitive and language processing are grounded in multi-
modal perceptual-motor representations (Barsalou 1999; Clark
1997; Glenberg & Robertson 2000). We propose that this evi-
dence informs the nature of cognitive processing and its relation-
ship to the structure of language. C&C focus primarily on the
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morphosyntactic structure of language. Our work extends these
arguments to a consideration of lexical processing and the seman-
tic system. In particular, we investigate the structural relation-
ships between sound and meaning at the word or segmental
level of analysis. We find that the basic structure of verbal
symbols reflect a perceptual-motor grounding of language.
Sound-to-meaning mapping. Arbitrariness has long been con-
sidered a hallmark of spoken (and signed) language (de Saussure
1916/1959; Hockett 1977). Within the domain of semantics, the
sound sequences that comprise individual words (unlike gestures
or pictorial representations, for example) bear no resemblance to
their referent, nor do they contain sounds consistently associated
with specific meanings. There is no systematic relationship, the
account goes, between particular phonemes or phoneme
sequences and particular semantic features. Boutique phenom-
ena, such as onomatopoeia, and language-specific phenomena,
such as Japanese mimetics (Hamano 1998), have been regarded
as notable and forgivable exceptions.
Arbitrariness offers a variety of cognitive advantages that have
been highlighted in domain-general accounts of language. The
flexibility, abstractness, generativity, referential specificity, and
even memory advantages afforded by the arbitrariness of
language are significant cognitive constraints that likely facilitate
language learning and communicative effectiveness (de Saussure
1916/1959; Gasser 2004; Monaghan & Christiansen 2006). As
languages evolve, pressures imposed by the constraints of the
cognitive system facilitate gradual convergence on an arbitrary
communicative system.
Recent evidence of reliable sound-symbolic aspects of meaning
calls into question this notion of a completely arbitrary system of
sound-meaning associations (Nuckolls 1999). For example, Berlin
(1994) noted a reliable relationship between vowel height and
size of animal within the domains of birds and fish in theHuambisa
language. In a comprehensive inventory of phoneme-meaning
correspondences in Indonesian, McCune (1983) suggested that
virtually all words in this language include some sound-meaning
correspondences (see also Hutchins [1998] and Bergen [2004]
regarding sound-meaning correspondences in English). Classic
work by Ko¨hler (1947) and, more recently, by Ramachandran
and Hubbard (2001), Maurer et al. (2006), and Westbury (2005)
suggest that English-speaking adults and children will interpret
non-words such asmaluma and bouba as referring to round, amoe-
boid shapes and words like takete and kiki as referring to angular
figures. Each of these findings suggests a cognitive association
between particular sound sequences and meaning that guide and
constrain the evolution of linguistic reference within a particular
language.
Sound-to-meaning correspondence and learning. Our work
explores (a) whether these sound-meaning correspondences
extend cross-linguistically, and (b) the extent to which concor-
dances between sounds and meaning facilitate word learning.
This work was inspired in part by a study by Kunihira (1971) in
which monolingual English speakers were asked to select
which of two antonyms (e.g., fast vs. slow) was being expressed
by spoken Japanese words. Kunihira found that subjects accu-
rately inferred the correct meaning at above chance rates from
the sound structure of these words alone. Our work has extended
this basic finding to other languages, including Danish and
Russian (Nygaard et al., in preparation).
We demonstrated the functional advantages of these non-
arbitrary sound-to-meaning mappings, using a learning task in
which monolingual English speakers were taught Japanese words
that either had correct word-to-meaning mappings (e.g., ue
meaning up), were mapped to the word’s antonym (e.g., ue
meaning down), or were randomly paired with a meaning (e.g.,
ue meaning slow). We found a consistent learning advantage for
correct over incorrect mappings (Nygaard et al. 2008). This
finding is consistent with C&C’s assumption that properties of
language, in this case residual non-arbitrary mappings, evolved
because they ease learning and maximize cognitive efficiency.
Recent research from our lab and others also highlights how
another type of sound-to-meaning mapping, namely prosody, con-
strains word meaning. Shintel et al. (2006) found not only that
speakers modulated their speaking style (e.g., fundamental fre-
quency or speaking rate) to reflect properties of a scene they
were describing, but also that listeners were sensitive to these
modulations and could reliably identify which of two possible
scenes were being described based on speaking style. We have
recently shown that both adults and children can reliably utilize
prosodic information to infer the meaning of a novel word (see
also Kunihira 1971), and that speakers reliably recruit distinct
sets of acoustic properties to convey information about different
semantic domains (Nygaard et al., in press; Sasso et al. 2005).
Multiple constraints on the structure of language. We have
proposed that sound-meaning correspondences that facilitate learn-
ing stem from cross-modal perceptual-motor mappings. Such map-
pings would enable a speaker or listener to recruit acoustic-
phonetic information as a guide to potential word meanings by
evoking sensory-motor experiences that transcend the auditory
modality. Consistent with C&C, we suggest that compelling cogni-
tive pressures to generate arbitrary sound-meaning correspon-
dences interact with a system that draws on cross-modal sound-
meaning correspondences that offer more direct recovery of
meaning. We propose that the advantages offered by perceptually
grounded representations of spoken language compete with press-
ures to converge on an abstract, arbitrary system of meaning.
Competing constraints placed on the system by the arbitrary
versus non-arbitrary aspects of word meaning work in tandem to
maintain a system that is optimally efficient given the structure
and function of the human brain (Monaghan & Christiansen
2006; Monaghan et al. 2007). These competing constraints are con-
sistent with C&C’s assertion that “language will be the outcome of
competing selectional forces” (sect. 7, para. 2). We conclude that if,
as C&C argue, language has adapted to the brain, and if, as we
argue, neural and cognitive constraints reflect a grounding in per-
ceptual-motor systems, then these properties must necessarily
permeate the fundamental nature and structure of language.
The potential for genetic adaptations
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Abstract:We suggest there is somewhatmore potential thanChristiansen
& Chater (C&C) allow for genetic adaptations specific to language. Our
uniquely cooperative social system requires sophisticated language skills.
Learning and performance of some culturally transmitted elements in
animals is genetically based, and we give examples of features of human
language that evolve slowly enough that genetic adaptations to them
may arise.
We welcome Christiansen & Chater’s (C&C’s) bold proposal that
“language is easy for us to learn and use, not because our brains
embody knowledge of language, but because language has
adapted to our brains” (target article, sect. 1, para. 3). Whether
our language capabilities derive from a Universal Grammar
(UG) or draw on more “domain-general” mechanisms, we
believe there is somewhat more potential than C&C want to
allow for genetic adaptations to language or language processing.
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Modern humans’ unique social system makes demands on
language unknown in any other species. We are the only
animal with complex systems of cooperation and exchange
among unrelated individuals. We help people we may never
see again; we have an elaborate division of labour; and we some-
times act in ways that benefit the group but at considerable cost
to our own fitness, even to the point of causing death. Our social
system is one based on reciprocation and trust and is therefore
vulnerable to cheats who take advantage of the goodwill of coop-
erators, without returning aid themselves.
Human language was almost certainly required to manage the
social complexity of modern human society (Pagel 2008). Some
of the most frequently used words in spoken communication
are those relating to “social coordinates” – the pronouns I, you,
he/she, we, they, who, and verbs to say and to know. As language
became more sophisticated in our ancestors, so also grew the
opportunities to use it for personal gain – to enhance one’s repu-
tation, to tell lies, and to spread rumours. Individuals with poor
language skills would have been markedly disadvantaged in a
society of shrewd, guileful, and self-interested speakers.
It does not matter for our view whether the selective pressures
for language and language skills built something like a Universal
Grammar or whether they modified elements of a more “domain-
general” apparatus (whatever form it may take). If the latter,
general traits (such as arms and legs or general cognitive abilities)
are typically shaped by competing demands of different functions
and environmental contingencies. Our position is that a facility
with language would have been one of the key sets of demands
shaping some of these domain-general mechanisms.
Bird-song is not a recursive symbolic language, but it illustrates
how the foundations for producing a culturally influenced and
geographically variable trait may be encoded genetically (Notte-
bohm 2005). In humans, evidence for genetic variation related to
language learning and processing may be all around us. Our
brains appear to be “wired for language” (Glasser & Rilling, in
press), brain structures related to language are likely to be heri-
table (Thompson et al. 2001), and people seem to vary greatly in
their abilities to express themselves verbally. The pervasive
phenomenon of dyslexia, which seems to affect both language
learning and production, and the phenomena associated with
FOXP2 variants also suggest that genetic variance for language
capabilities is common.
C&C argue that language changes too rapidly for genes to get a
fix and adapt to it. Possibly, but the human immune system has
diverged genetically around the world in response to rapidly evol-
ving parasites. We also note that not all elements of language
evolve at a high rate. Dunn et al. (2005) report phylogenetic
signals in Papuan language typology that may have been pre-
served for many millennia. We have shown that highly expressed
or frequently used words in the Indo-European lexicon evolve as
slowly as some genes (Pagel et al. 2007). The word for the
number “two” is highly expressed and is cognate across the
entire Indo-European language family. Thus, here is a lexical
item that has retained homology throughout roughly 130,000
language-years of evolution. By comparison, a genetic tolerance
in adults for lactose probably arose and spread to high frequen-
cies within the last 6,000 years in some populations of this
same language family (Burger et al. 2007).
We do not suggest that there is a gene for the number “two.”
But these examples from empirical studies may indicate that
there are general features of linguistic systems that, either on
their own or because of their links to other systems, change
slowly enough that we could expect to see genetic adaptations
for the cognitive mechanisms that process them. The frequency-
effect we document also depends on the part of speech. For a
given frequency of use, conjunctions evolve fastest, followed by
prepositions, then adjectives, verbs, nouns, special adverbs, pro-
nouns, and finally numbers, which evolve very slowly. Why parts
of speech influence the rate of evolution is unclear but may be rel-
evant in a very general way to C&C’s discussion of Frequency 
Regularity interactions. We wonder if, for example, the different
parts of speech are linked with (or overlap with) other features
of language that may make them less prone to change over time.
Alternatively, might the rank ordering of parts of speech corre-
spond to memory and production effects related to word “concre-
teness” (e.g., Bleasdale 1987; Jessen et al. 2000), with numbers the
most concrete and prepositions the least?
We see human language as a trait on which we have stamped
our cognitive and psychological signatures along the road to
ensuring that language is a useful tool for us. This is, in some
sense, the “flip side” of C&C’s view of languages as semi-auton-
omous systems that adapt to us. Some of the signatures of our
shaping of language may emerge from historical analyses of the
variation among languages. C&C discuss some, and the fre-
quency-effect discussed above may be another. Social factors
may also play a role. We have recently been able to show that
languages often exhibit a rapid or punctuational burst of evol-
ution around the time of their divergence from a sister language
(Atkinson et al. 2008). One interpretation of our findings is that
humans use language as a tool for establishing a distinct social
identity. If social forces such as this can leave their imprint on
languages over historical time, we should not be surprised to
find that features of our information processing systems can do
the same. Equally, for a trait of such importance to our lives
we should not be surprised that we have also adapted to it.
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) have taken the interactionist
approach to linguistic universals to an extreme, adopting the metaphor
of language as an organism. This metaphor adds no insights to five
decades of analyzing language universals as the result of interaction of
linguistically unique and general cognitive systems. This metaphor is
also based on an outmoded view of classical Darwinian evolution and
has no clear basis in biology or cognition.
For the last five decades, much linguistic research has adopted an
interactionist position about the sources for Universal Grammar
(UG). This approach partitions overt language universals into
those determined by inborn linguistic structures and those
shaped by language performance systems (e.g., learning and
general cognitive factors). For example,
Many an aspect of adult . . . linguistic structure is itself partially
determined by the learning and behavioral processes that are
involved in acquiring and implementing that structure . . .
some formally possible structures will never appear in any
language because no child can use [or learn] them. (Bever
1970, pp. 279–80)
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) adopt an extreme version of the
interactionist approach, eliminating the contribution of linguisti-
cally unique genetic bases for language in the brain. Their desig-
nated metaphor is language as an organism that has evolved to fit
the human brain: “Language is easy for us to learn and use,
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not because our brains embody knowledge of language, but
because language has adapted to our brains” (target article,
sect. 1, para. 3).
Yet, mentioning “the brain” does nothing to enrich or support
their claims. Unlike, for example, Deacon (1997), C&C say
nothing about which properties of the human brain are such
that language has adapted to them. C&C restate much that has
been said before about the influence of behavioral systems,
while claiming – without demonstration – that they exhaust the
constraints on linguistic universals. The critical claim is that the
individual language learner/user filters possible languages via
general cognitive, communicative, and physiological processes.
This is tantamount to the idea that language is a tool, ergonomi-
cally shaped to be maximally usable, no different in principle
from a Boeing 707 or recipes for Salzbuger Nockerl. Yet no one
would reasonably propose that airplanes or recipes are organisms
that evolved to fit the human brain. C&C suggest that it is the
alleged unconscious emergence of possible languages that makes
language unique from other tools. Perhaps so, but they do not
offer any theory of what the brain has to do with this that makes
it reasonable to apply the organismic evolutionary metaphor only
to language.
Characterizing language as evolving on its own also contributes
unnecessary confusion because C&C restrict their notions of
evolution to a classic model. For example, contrary to their
interpretation, the adaptive complexity of biological organisms
only marginally arises from random genetic variation, winnowed
by natural selection. The many non-selective processes they cite
(genetic drift, genetic hitchhiking, epigenetics, etc.), and others
(e.g., evolutionary capacitors [Rutherford & Lindquist 1998]
and alternative splicing [Blencowe 2006]), suggest that no
complex organism, never mind language, evolved via selective
winnowing of variants in the orthodox Darwinian model. Few
biologists today adopt that pristine model, while some go as far
as stating that “natural selection is just one, and maybe not
even the most fundamental, source of biological order” (Gibson
2005; see also Carroll 2001; Sherman 2007; Wagner 2005).
After ignoring many lessons from current models of evolution-
ary processes, C&C proclaim it “astronomically unlikely” (sect. 4,
para. 4) that non-adaptationist processes may have produced
genuine evolutionary novelties. But, there are many “unlikely”
cases in which non-selectionist mechanisms have been pivotal:
the evolution of the genetic determination of sex (Quinn et al.
2007), the development of the eye (Sherman 2007), and the
adaptive immune system (Hiom et al. 1998). Appraised “likeli-
hood,” of course, depends on the probability baseline that one
adopts. Given a specifiable genetic configuration, combined
with specifiable external and internal factors, the probability is
close to one. If the assumed probability baseline is a random
swirl of molecules (or a tornado in a junkyard, as Hoyle [1983,
pp. 18–19] and Pinker [1997] famously suggest), then indeed
the probability of evolving a camera eye, or Universal Gram-
mar – or a Boeing 707 – is vanishingly small. But why should
one take anything like that as a relevant baseline?
C&C note further that, “Small genetic changes lead to modifi-
cations of existing complex systems . . . they do not lead to the
construction of a new complexity” (sect. 4, para. 5). This state-
ment is false when master genes (homeoboxes) are involved
(see, e.g., Ronshaugen et al. 2002; Sherman 2007).
In brief, insofar as one takes seriously “language evolving” as a
meaningful metaphor, C&C’s archaic view of biological evolution
would render their arguments unlikely at best, and, most likely,
wrong.
Secondly, the properties of cognition that C&C invoke to
explain language occur in other species, including those that
are less clearly present (e.g., hierarchical processing; Conway &
Christiansen 2001). Why did language not “evolve” in the
service of these species? Humans must have innate equipment
quite different from those species that also display their version
of “general” human traits.
For “language as organism” to evolve under selective pressures
enforced by the brain requires a suitable starting point: C&C
suggest that a “proto-language” (sect. 7.1, para. 1) could fill the
void. They reference computational models of the emergence
of compositionality from a proto-language (cf. Smith et al.
2003b), but ignore a critical feature of these models – the
agents are equipped with a specific compositional mechanism
for grammar induction. Thus, at a bare minimum, the brain
must have contributed proto-language and such structural induc-
tive systems as hierarchical processing, and recursion – abilities
vastly undeveloped in primates (Conway & Christiansen 2001).
Furthermore, C&C still face the problem of innovation from
“proto-langauge.” What triggered the first truly structured sen-
tence? The first recursive utterance introduced a transcenden-
tally ungrammatical form. It is mysterious how this structure
would ever be produced in the first place, let alone persist in
the linguistic pool, if not for some innate capacity. At the very
least, a possible pathway for the transition between unidentified
cognitive mechanisms is needed, but C&C make no attempt to
explicate one.
Finally, C&C report evidence of Broca’s area involvement in
an artificial grammar task and normal natural language proces-
sing (Petersson et al 2004) but omit drastically opposite data
(Friederici et al. 2006; Musso et al. 2003).
On language and evolution: Why
neo-adaptationism fails
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Abstract: I identify a number of problematic aspects of Christiansen &
Chater’s (C&C’s) contribution. These include their suggestion that
subjacency and binding reflect non-domain-specific mechanisms; that
proto-language is a “cultural product”; and that non-adaptationism
requires overly rich innate structures, and is incompatible with acceptable
evolutionary processes. It shows that a fully UG (Universal Grammar)-free
version of the authors’ neo-adaptationism would be incoherent.
For all linguists who do not view language as a Platonic object, it
should be uncontroversial that there is a “fit” between language
and the brain (as expressed in Chomsky [1986], where
Chomsky introduces his notion of I-language). The common
goal is to find out how they fit, and to what extent our cognitive
system is dedicated to language.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) argue that no part is dedi-
cated to language. In brief, that there is no Universal
Grammar (UG). This is a strong position that deserves exten-
sive research, taking into account the properties we know
language possesses (the derivation of condition B, in Reuland
2005b, illustrates what this involves). How well, then, do the
authors succeed?
C&C focus on what they call “abstract” properties (see sect. 2)
and discuss two such properties to establish initial plausibility.
One is subjacency (Chomsky 1981). C&C argue that subjacency
is not specific to language, but derivable from general process-
ing constraints (sect. 6.3) or, possibly, “cognitive limitations
on sequential learning” (sect. 7.2), referring to Berwick and
Weinberg (1984) and Ellefson and Christiansen (2000) in this
regard. Subjacency effects are real. But we know by now that
restrictions on extraction result from a variety of factors (see Sza-
bolcsi [2005] for a state-of-the-art overview; and see, e.g., Kho-
mitsevich [2008] for cross-linguistic variation in island effects).
Subjacency is not a primitive. The nature of the resources for
language processing is still open, and more may be involved
Commentary/Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5 531
than just general working memory (see Reuland [forthcoming],
elaborating on Ullman [2004] and Baddeley [2007]). Even
granted C&C’s conception, the experiment in Ellefson and
Christiansen (2000) does not bear on subjacency: nothing
forces a forbidden extraction. The other issue C&C bring up is
binding (discussed further on).
The main line of the article takes a different tack: The assump-
tion of an innate UG leads to a logical problem of language evol-
ution. C&C argue that the emergence of a dedicated language
system/UG can neither be explained by adaptationist (Pinker
& Bloom 1990), nor by non-adaptationist mechanisms. Hence,
they conclude, there must be a third way: no UG and “language
is shaped by the brain” (emphasis added).
Their discussion gives the paradoxical impression that C&C,
though cognitive scientists, espouse a Platonistic view of
language: an object external to the mind, which evolves and
adapts to the latter; a view I characterize as neo-adaptationism.
Note that C&C just assume that “functional” principles are
domain-general, whereas only a moment’s reflection shows that
there is nothing “natural” in the way salience, topicality, and so
on, are encoded in natural language (Slioussar 2007). Isn’t
there a great rhetorical tradition in which what is most important
comes last?
C&C reject the non-adaptationist position, positing that non-
adaptationists postulate overly rich innate structures. But, in
view of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995) and the
approach to evolution in Hauser et al. (2002), this is incorrect.
No more is required than a finite set of vocabulary items
(lexical and functional), a combinatory operation of (external
and internal) Merge plus associated interpretive operations, a
checking operation (comparing the feature contents of
elements), and locality conditions in operations. These show up
in the form of restrictions on “attractors” for movement (“phase
heads” in current terminology) and in the form of restrictions
on the domain where attractors can find their targets. All this is
close to what C&C would have to assume anyway (also construc-
tion grammar does not allow dispensing with combinatory prin-
ciples, unless to the penalty of incoherence).
What is problematic in C&C’s presentation is that (1) they do
not make clear what language is, and – not surprisingly, given
(1) – that (2) they don’t discuss how language is encoded; and
(3) that, although they claim that “linguistic adaptation allows
for the evolution of increasingly expressive languages” (sect. 5,
para. 1), C&C say nothing about what it means for one
language-stage to be more expressive than another, and what dis-
continuities must be involved.
For reasons of space, I focus on signs here and argue that even
their evolution involves more “UG” than meets the eye. I start
with C&C’s characterization of the initial state, proto-language,
as a “cultural product likely to be highly variable over both
time and geographical locations” (sect. 2, para. 7). But even so,
language must be a product of the mind, not an external object
that emerged by miracle.
Such a proto-language minimally stands for a collection of
Saussurean signs, conventional pairings , f, i . , where f is a
form in a medium (sound, gesture) and i its interpretation as a
concept (see Saussure 1916). The term “cultural” glosses over a
crucial issue. The pairings themselves may be culturally deter-
mined, but the fact they are possible cannot be. Even a neo-adap-
tationist must assume an evolutionary discontinuity here. The
same applies to arbitrariness of pairings. Arbitrariness is a yes-
no property. It can only emerge by a discontinuity. By its very
nature, it must be dedicated to language, hence reflect UG as
commonly understood. So, even on their own terms, C&C are
committed to a minimal UG.
But more is at issue here. C&C leave open whether their
proto-language allows free combination of signs. However, free
combinability – recursion – must develop at some point. Recur-
sion minimally requires concatenation, combining two objects
into an object of the same type, which is in turn available for
concatenation. This entails that linguistic signs must be triples
of the general form in (1) shown below, rather than pairs.
1. , f, g, i .
with f and i as explained above and g a formal instruction
driving the computation.
The addition of g, as a formal instruction representing combin-
ability, leads us beyond the Saussurean sign. It is a minimal
change, but qualitative in nature. Adding this slot to the sign
frees the way for (varying) grammatical operations. Free combin-
ability requires a concomitant interpretive operation, determin-
ing the interpretation of a complex element in terms of the
interpretation of its parts.
A different change is needed for signs as abstract mental
objects, as in Example (2) shown below:
2. , cf, g, ci .
where cf and ci are “formal” mental encodings of instructions
for the language-external systems of realization and interpre-
tation.
This feature is needed for planning, embedded recursion, and
handling dependencies (see Reuland 2005a; in press). Such items
are not simple signs anymore, but instructions to form signs.
Forms and concepts may reflect culture, but the ability to form
such pairings does not. This ability involves, again, a qualitative
change, incompatible with neo-adaptationism.
Human language has many further characteristic properties.
Take Example (3), shown below, where he cannot be valued as
no one, since no one cannot denote an individual.
3. No one has a gun. Will he shoot? (the asterisk here indi-
cating ill-formedness)
But he can depend for its interpretation on no one in Example (4):
4. No one was convinced that he would be welcome.
Example (4) exhibits binding, that is, interpreting an
expression in terms of another expression. Again, this is a yes-
no property, not subject to gradation. Binding is a core feature
of language as we know it (see Reuland, under contract).
Binding transcends culture and pragmatics. Its emergence
involves a discontinuity that has to be encoded in the system
itself, and hence, reflects UG. Such discontinuities are a chal-
lenge for any neo-adaptationist approach, but fascinating to
investigate nonetheless.
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) focus solely on general-purpose
cognitive processes in their elegant conceptualization of language
evolution. However, numerous developmental facts attested in L1
acquisition confound C&C’s subsequent claim that the logical problem
of language acquisition now plausibly recapitulates that of language
evolution. I argue that language acquisition should be viewed instead as
a multi-layered construction involving the interplay of general and
domain-specific learning mechanisms.
In section 8.1 of the target article, Christiansen & Chater (C&C)
suggest that phylogeny (how language evolved in the species over
time) begets ontogeny (developmental properties of day-to-day
learning by the child), inferring that certain underlying mechan-
isms for these very different processes are the same. Focusing
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on L1 acquisition, I argue that the authors’ elegant conceptualiz-
ation and simulations of the logical problem of language evol-
ution do not necessarily translate to the untidy developmental
facts of language acquisition in the current linguistic environ-
ment. Specifically, it may be premature on C&C’s part to advo-
cate general-purpose cognitive mechanisms alone to explain
child language learning and the repertoire of rule types that
governs it.
As a first step, terms such as “language-specific constraints”
and “general-cognitive constraints” must be regarded with
caution. While domain specificity is often readily identified,
domain generality is frequently a “moving target,” precisely
because it is definable by degree. That is, we say that a mechan-
ism is domain-specific so long as it only does what it evolved to
do, or as long as it is only used for learning within its domain.
But we can only say that a mechanism is more or less domain-
general: It is more domain-general or neutral the more it gener-
alizes to other tasks outside its domain. In principle, this effect
may not be problematic – after all, lots of phylogenic and onto-
genic distinctions involve matters of degree. In synchronic
terms, any general mechanisms of cognition do not dispense
with the specific ones; instead, the existence of general machin-
ery presupposes the existence of functionally related specific
mechanisms. When dealing with the countless complexities of
linguistic structure, Skinner’s box cannot afford to be empty: it
must at least contain a random assortment of various entities
(paraphrasing Satterfield & Saleemi 2003). In other words, the
basis from which L1 development commences had better be
minimally equipped to supply learners with knowledge of gram-
matical functions, and Case systems, and so on, just in case chil-
dren encounter these properties in their primary linguistic data.
Second, C&C state that
if language is viewed as having been shaped by the brain, then
language learning is by no means a standard problem of induc-
tion . . . instead, the task is simply to give the same answer as
everybody else – because the structure of language will have
adapted to conform to this most “popular” guess. (sect. 8.1,
para. 2)
This view has several consequences in the developmental context
that are not easy to explain. Consider the following cases: (1)
Children in American English-speaking environments are
widely attested to omit subject pronouns in tensed clauses
(e.g., Toys in there; Hyams 1986). (2) They also insert an extra
wh-expression in long-distance questions: for example, “What
do you think what pigs eat?” (Crain & Thorton 1998). The struc-
tures in question seem to be at odds with “everybody else” – for
example, with adult English, which contains no such features
(although these are by no means “wild guesses,” since in the
former case [1], languages like Standard Spanish and Italian
pattern somewhat in this way; and in the latter case [2], certain
German dialects would be appropriate). However, it would be
computationally “easier” to simply have a zero or deleted Com-
plementizer in this site, rather than the wh-word. These tokens
beg the question of why children should exhibit such tendencies
at all. Perhaps the task requires children to initially exert multiple
types of “biases” in order to obtain the maximal advantages of the
grammar (Gawlitzek-Maiwald & Tracy 2005; Roeper 1999;
Saleemi 2002; Satterfield 1999a; 1999b; Yang 1999; 2002).
On common ground with C&C, it is doubtful that a highly
language (domain)-specific Universal Grammar (UG) functions
as the sole machinery in the child’s task of language acquisition.
However, this position need not exclude the possibility that child-
ren pick which apparatuses they use, more-generalized or less-
generalized tools, and to what degree, in a flexible and adaptive
manner. Keeping this postulation in mind, consider the critical
period in L1 acquisition. It has been successfully argued that
not all aspects of language display critical period effects. Specifi-
cally, the acquisition of lexical items, the concatenation of words,
and the nuts and bolts of semantically based principles of word
order seem immune to age-related “atrophy” of language acqui-
sition (Hudson & Newport 1999; Jackendoff 2002; Sorace 2003).
However, the capacity to acquire other parts of language in
late language learning, such as the inflectional system or real
intricacies in phrase structure, appears to be largely dimini-
shed (Lardiere 1998; 2000). These common L1 versus L2
conditions become at once isolatable by viewing language acqui-
sition as a multi-layered construction with distinct learning
mechanisms.
Ultimately, the solution to the logical problem of language
acquisition may reside in the possibility of possessing several
initial knowledge states in which domain-general mechanisms
interact with domain-specific components designed to acquire
the most arbitrary and least systematic knowledge of the target
grammar. States that stabilize over several progressive stages
could then emerge, with the help of additional domain-general
learning mechanisms, which handle increasingly more systema-
tic principles of the grammar. In sum, each transitional state
may be shaped by the myriad effects of learning, or, more appro-
priately, of acquisition, which can be viewed as the combina-
tion of experience and internally determined processes such
as maturation, learning mechanisms, and language-specific
computations.
The brain plus the cultural transmission
mechanism determine the nature of language
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Abstract: We agree that language adapts to the brain, but we note that
language also has to adapt to brain-external constraints, such as those
arising from properties of the cultural transmission medium. The
hypothesis that Christiansen & Chater (C&C) raise in the target article
not only has profound consequences for our understanding of
language, but also for our understanding of the biological evolution of
the language faculty.
Christiansen & Chater (C&C) provide a thought-provoking
account of language as a cultural adaptation to the minds of
language learners: Language evolves through repeated cultural
transmission, adapting to multiple pressures impinging upon its
learning, representation, and use. This strikes us as a powerful
explanatory framework, and we hope the target article will stimu-
late more work fleshing out the precise relationship between con-
straints on language arising from the brain and features of
linguistic structure.
In fact, we believe that there are two respects in which the
target article actually understates the full implications of this
hypothesis. First, C&C focus on language as an adaptation to
language learners’ brains – but language must also adapt to con-
straints external to the human mind. Second, in discussing their
account’s implications for understanding biological evolution,
C&C point out the “moving target” problem – but there are at
least two further issues with the interaction of cultural and bio-
logical evolution they do not recognize. Taken together, these
completely change the viability of accounts based on the adaptive
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evolution of a strongly constraining, domain-specific biological
faculty for language.
Although there are, of course, fundamental differences
between the account offered by C&C and the Universal
Grammar (UG) account they contrast it with, it is useful never-
theless to focus on a point of similarity: Both argue that language
is how it is because the mind forces it to be so (the crucial differ-
ence being the extent to which the relevant mental components
are domain-specific or domain-general, and who does the fitting
to what). Both postulate a good fit between observed properties
of language and properties of the human mind: if we see some
linguistic property in the world, we can reasonably infer that it
reflects a property of our minds.
We have previously demonstrated, however (Kirby 1999;
Kirby et al. 2004), that mental properties cannot simply be
read off from language universals, because the cultural process
mediating between aspects of the mind and features of language
distorts the underlying biases of human learners. For example,
culture can amplify weak biases to give strong universal effects.
This means that cultural transmission can obscure underlying
differences in mental structure: for example, strong universal
tendencies towards regularity can result from various levels of
preference for regularity in individual learners, and (in extreme
cases) the same observed distribution of languages can result
from learners with widely differing strengths of preference for
regularity (Kirby et al. 2007).
This suggests that, while we can probably get an idea of the
general flavour of the human mind from observable linguistic
properties, making specific inferences is more risky. To draw
appropriate conclusions from a given distribution of languages,
we must understand the rather opaque relationship between
mental properties and linguistic properties resulting from cul-
tural transmission.
Furthermore, not all pressures acting on language during its
transmission are mental: language is not only well adapted to
its users’ brains, but also to its medium of transmission. Compu-
tational modelling work highlights the importance of the learning
bottleneck: learners must infer the structure of an infinitely large
language from a finite subset. This bottleneck introduces a
pressure for generalisation to which language must adapt, for
example, by becoming compositional (Kirby 2001; Smith et al.
2003a). Importantly, the bottleneck is not a property of language
learners’ brains, but rather of the medium through which
language is transmitted, namely, a finite dataset. Linguistic prop-
erties that are eminently learnable (and therefore well adapted to
the brain) may be disfavoured due to this transmission factor, or
vice versa. Consequently, linguistic features represent a product
of, or a compromise between, several pressures acting on
language transmission, some (but not all) of which reside in the
human brain.
There are therefore good practical reasons for taking cultural
evolution seriously. However, cultural evolution is more than
just a methodological hassle for cognitive scientists: the same
arguments radically alter the plausibility of scenarios for the evol-
ution of the language faculty. C&C point out one problem for
biological evolution, which arises from cultural transmission –
evolution is chasing a moving target. We raise an additional
problem: Given the opaque relationship between mental and
linguistic features, much of the human biological capacity for
language will be shielded (Ackley & Littman 1992) from evol-
ution. For example, Kirby et al. (2007) show that the strength
of prior preferences for particular structures in language
arising from an individual’s biology may have no effect on the
strength of the resulting universals. Under this scenario, selection
is completely blind to the strength of the prior biases of indivi-
duals and there is no selection for nativisation, nor for stronger,
“more desirable” prior preferences for certain languages
(Smith & Kirby 2008).
Furthermore, cultural transmission may actually hinder the
evolution of a priori functional domain-specific features of the
language faculty: Evolving biases for communicatively functional
languages is problematic for culturally transmitted languages,
because the biases of individual learners require a critical mass
of learners and a reasonable span of cultural time to make their
advantageous properties felt (Smith 2004). Indeed, based on
such models, we expect that practically the only scenario under
which biological evolution will favour particular language-learn-
ing predispositions is when those predispositions are domain-
general, and selected for on account of their less problematic
(acultural, non-linguistic) applications. While this is entirely con-
sistent with C&C’s argument, we believe it also follows naturally
from taking cultural evolution seriously.
So if evolving a functional domain-specific set of language
biases is problematic, how can we best understand the evolution
of the human faculty for language? C&C force us to revisit
the human uniqueness of language from a comparative pers-
pective, and (we suggest) pose a fascinating, important new
challenge for evolutionary biology: Which of their suggested
domain-general pressures responsible for shaping language
are unique to humans, and what can this tell us about the evol-
utionary origins of the species-unique trait of language? Are
there pre-adaptations for the cultural transmission of linguistic
systems (e.g., vocal learning capacity; intention-sharing ability)?
If so, how much linguistic structure naturally falls out of the
cultural transmission process once these pre-adaptations are
in place?
Case-marking systems evolve to be easy
to learn and process
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Abstract: Christiansen & Chater (C&C) suggest that language is itself an
evolutionary system, and that natural languages “evolve” to be easy to
learn and process. The tight economy of the world’s case-marking
systems lends support to this hypothesis. Only two major case systems
occur, cross-linguistically, and noun phrases are seldom overtly case-
marked wherever zero-marking would be functionally practical.
All languages employ some morphosyntactic means of dis-
tinguishing the core noun phrase (NP) arguments within a
clause. The two basic predicate types are intransitive and transi-
tive verbs, giving three core grammatical functions: S indicates
intransitive subjects (The girl slept); A, “agent” of a transitive
verb (The girl saw a pig); and P, “patient” (The girl saw a pig).
Some languages (e.g., Chinese, English) distinguish A and P
using word order: thus, we know which mammal saw which,
because A always precedes the verb and P follows.
However, many languages employ case-marking to distinguish
A and P, as in Latin:
1a. Puella venit.
girl.(NOM) come.PRES.3SG
“The girl comes.”
1b. Puella puer-um audit.
girl.(NOM) boy-ACC hears.PRES.3SG
“The girl hears the boy.”
1c. Puella-m puer audit.
girl-ACC boy.(NOM) hear.PRES.3SG
“The boy hears the girl.”
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Since S (intransitive subject) never co-occurs in a clause with
either A or P, it needs no unique marking. Conversely, A and P
always co-occur, and therefore must be marked differently to
avoid confusion. Assuming a resolution of the tension between
speaker effort (only produce essential morphemes) and listener
comprehension (keep potentially ambiguous forms distinct),
there are two major solutions. To distinguish A and P morpho-
logically, it is most economical to either group S and A together,
using the same case-marking for both, or else group S and P
together, again using the same case for both.
These groupings, maximizing economy and comprehensibility,
are exactly what we find: only two major morphosyntactic systems
occur in the world’s languages. The “accusative” system groups
all subjects together (nominative), as opposed to all objects (accu-
sative), as in Latin, Turkish, and Japanese, giving an [SA][P]
pattern. Conversely, the “ergative” system groups intransitive
subjects and objects together (absolutive case), as opposed to
transitive subjects (ergative), giving an [SP][A] pattern. Here is
an illustration of this from the Australian language Yalarnnga
(taken from Blake 1977):
2a. ngia wakamu
me.(ABS) fell
“I fell.”
2b. nga-tu kupi walamu
me-ERG fish.(ABS) killed
“I killed a fish.”
2c. kupi-ngku ngia tacamu
fish-ERG me.(ABS) bit
“A fish bit me.”
Strikingly, languages rarely mark each of the three core func-
tions; clearly, only one member of the opposition needs overt
marking. We therefore usually find a morphologically unmarked
case: in the accusative system, the SA grouping (i.e., nominative),
and in the ergative system, the SP grouping (i.e., absolutive).
Thus, in the Latin examples, only accusative P has an overt
suffix, while nominative SA is unmarked; and in Yalarnnga, only
ergative A has a case suffix, while absolutive SP is unmarked
(the parentheses in the [1] and [2] examples shown earlier
indicate this null case morphology on SA and SP, respectively).
In both systems, the unambiguous argument S is typically unmarked,
again maximizing economy and clarity.
Both the accusative and the ergative systems are widespread,
among languages which are really and genealogically diverse.
Clearly, humans are not genetically adapted for one or the other
system; moreover, since these are the major, but not the only
systems that occur cross-linguistically, it would be incoherent to
suggest that they are parametrized. It seems reasonable to con-
clude, then, that languages have generally adapted to maximize
learnability and economy by utilizing the major systems.
Logically, other possible alignments of A, S, and P exist. For
instance, [AP][S] marks A and P in the same way, but S differ-
ently; this, however, would set up exactly the confusion
between A and P, which the major attested systems neatly
avoid. This system occurs in a restricted set of pronominals in
some Iranian languages; however, Comrie (1989, p. 118) notes
that it is not stable, instead representing the change from an
earlier ergative system to an accusative system. Such marking is
unattested for core NPs. Since it does not occur, it is most
likely unlearnable – hardly surprising, since it is dysfunctional.
Three broad possibilities remain. First, a tripartite system con-
sistently uses a distinct form to mark each of A, S, and P. This
lacks the economy of the two major attested systems, and is van-
ishingly rare. One or two Australian languages are reported as
having a tripartite system for all NPs: Warrungu (Comrie 2005)
and Wangkumara (Breen 1976). Clearly, this system is learnable,
but is strongly dispreferred by human learners; as predicted,
then, languages have generally not adopted this system. Second,
a neutral system would not differentiate between A, S, and P at
all, either by position within the clause, case-marking, or head-
marking (i.e., verbal morphology indicating the person/number
of the core arguments). Although this occasionally occurs, in a
very restricted manner, for pronominals (Comrie 2005), it is
again unattested as a system for marking core NPs, and is thus,
we can speculate, unlearnable. The third possibility is the split-
S, or active system, which case-marks S (intransitive subjects)
differently according to whether they are semantically agents or
patients. This case system does occur, but is cross-linguistically
rare (Blake 2001, p. 124), arguably, again, because it lacks the
economy of the two major systems.
Mixed systems, however, occur frequently. Both major systems
exhibit DIFFERENTIAL CASE-MARKING (see Ja¨ger 2007), meaning
that NPs receive different – or zero – marking according to their
position on a hierarchy of animacy and/or definiteness, sketched
in Example (3) below (Blake 2001, p. 137):
3. 1st person pronoun . 2nd person pronoun . 3rd
person pronoun . proper noun . full NP
Accusative languages typically mark P overtly only towards
the top of the hierarchy; English has case distinctions for a
subset of pronouns (I/me, etc.), but none for full NPs. In fact,
accusative languages nearly always have differential object-
marking (Blake 2001, p. 119). P arguments lower on the hierar-
chy are zero-marked, while higher ones are overtly accusative.
Conversely, ergative systems work upwards, typically confining
overt ergative marking to full NPs, or a subset thereof: Blake
(2001, p. 192) notes that the Australian language Mangarayi
marks ergative only on inanimate nouns, lowest on the hierarchy.
In both systems, restricting overt marking to a subset of argu-
ments achieves greater economies. Interestingly, most ergative
languages are actually “split ergative,” often marking NPs high
on the hierarchy (pronouns) by the accusative system, but
lower NPs as ergative. This alignment may appear difficult to
learn, but Ja¨ger (2007) demonstrates, using evolutionary game
theory, that split ergative is actually highly efficient and stable,
and fully functionally motivated.
Finally, case-marking and head-marking often co-occur within
a language as grammatical function-signalling strategies for core
NPs. Crucially, though, these strategies typically conspire, ensur-
ing that no function is marked twice: a case/agreement hierarchy
has subjects at the top (generally signalled by verb agreement) and
indirect objects and other non-core NPs at the bottom (often
signalled by case). This is another highly efficient system, and
again illustrates the way languages apparently evolve to be
learnable.
Language as shaped by the brain; the brain
as shaped by development
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Abstract: Though we agree with their argument that language is shaped
by domain-general learning processes, Christiansen & Chater (C&C)
neglect to detail how the development of these processes shapes
language change. We discuss a number of examples that show how
developmental processes at multiple levels and timescales are critical to
understanding the origin of domain-general mechanisms that shape
language evolution.
Christiansen&Chater (C&C) argue that language is shaped by the
constraints of the brain, and that, over time, language changes to fit
those constraints. They demonstrate the implausibility of an innate
Universal Grammar (UG) that encodes arbitrary principles of
language, and suggest that the features of language we observe
are those best suited to the domain-general constraints humans
bring to the problem of language acquisition. Both the innate
UG that C&C reject and the domain-general constraints that
they propose are thought to arise through evolution – they are
encoded in the genome. However, genes do not function in iso-
lation from their environment, and domain-general learning
mechanisms do not exist in the absence of external input (see,
e.g., Spencer et al., in press). Therefore, understanding the mech-
anisms that shape language change involves understanding how
domain-general processes are shaped by the interaction of genes
and environment. This interaction is tied to development over
multiple timescales. Research suggests that even domain-general
processes, like those C&C outline, change over the course of
in-the-moment learning and developmental time. Unless we
provide an explanation of language evolution with respect to devel-
opmental process, we have done little more than substitute one set
of genetically encoded principles for another.
Interactions occur at multiple levels, from gene expression and
cell signaling to the formation of neural networks and behavior
(Tomblin & Christiansen, in press). The rise of molecular gen-
etics has greatly changed how we investigate cognition, neuro-
development, and behavior. At present we understand very little
about how genes are involved in these processes. However, we
do know that genes make regulatory factors and signaling mol-
ecules that interact in highly complex frameworks, modulated
by environmental influences, to build and maintain the brain.
These processes can have an impact on the nature of domain-
general learning mechanisms that may drive language change.
For example, brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) is a
protein that is important for synapse formation, and, in particu-
lar, modulates hippocampal learning. Egan et al. (2003) found
that BDNF polymorphisms are associated with differences in
verbal episodic memory. Given that language learning is reliant
upon long-term storage of arbitrary mappings, BDNF is widely
believed to contribute to vocabulary learning. Thus, inheritance
of a particular polymorphism may influence word learning abil-
ities. At the cellular level, secretion of BDNF leads to changes
in neurotransmitter activity, synaptic connectivity, and long-
term potentiation (LTP). In addition, external stimulation that
produces LTP influences the expression of BDNF (Patterson
et al. 1992). Thus, the interaction between genes, their
expression, and the environment is critical for determining the
properties of learning systems relevant to language.
At higher levels, we see evidence of complex interactions in the
development of domain-general capacities. MacDonald and
Christiansen (2002) demonstrated this in a neural network that
was trained to predict the next word in a sentence. Performance
in this task is dependent on the network’s processing capacity
for word sequences. Their simulations showed that processing
capacity is an emergent property dependent on both the architec-
ture of the network and its experience. Similarly, Ross-Sheehy
et al. (2003) showed that 4-month-olds have a visual short-term
memory capacity for only one object, whereas by 13 months,
infants’ capacity increases to four objects. Thus, infants are not
born with an adult-like short-term memory. Rather, this capacity
depends on developmental processes and is likely to be modu-
lated by biological and environmental factors. Those factors
include the way memory representations are brought to bear on
in-the-moment behavior; Spencer et al. (2008) have shown that
the visual working memory capacity of preschoolers depends on
the specifics of how memory representations are probed. This pro-
vides evidence of change in domain-general processes at the level
of the in-the-moment timescales from which learning and devel-
opment emerge (see also, Samuelson & Horst 2008).
How might developmental changes in these domain-general
mechanisms impact language processing? We know that age
and previous linguistic experience influence the process of
language acquisition and that there are large differences in the
ability of children and adults to learn language. Acquisition of a
first language is accomplished with relative ease; in fact, children
are remarkable language learners. Second language acquisition
as an adult, however, is quite difficult. One way to explain this
difference is to consider the different developmental histories
children and adults bring to the problem of learning a language.
If developmental history affects future learning, we might
suppose that information learned earlier will be weighted more
heavily than information learned later. Under this assumption,
adults will have difficulty learning a new language because of
their developmental history (i.e., they assign less weight to new
information given previous language experience). Even though
adults and children bring the same domain-general learning con-
straints to the problem, differing developmental histories can
affect their ability to learn a language.
Experimental work by Hudson Kam and Newport (2005) has
demonstrated that developmental history can impact the learning
processes that shape language change. When adults and 5- to
7-year-old children were exposed to an artificial language with
an inconsistent grammar, the children regularized the language,
producing more consistent constructions than the ones they had
heard, while the adults produced only the constructions they
had heard. Hudson Kam and Newport hypothesized that this
difference in regularization is caused by differences in the way
children’s and adults’ learning processes are constrained by
prior developmental history. Thus, the temporal aspect of devel-
opment, that is, that children have less accumulated develop-
mental history, can have an impact on how languages will form
and change over time.
These examples demonstrate that development is essential for
describing the learning processes that drive language acquisition
and language evolution. Factors that determine the learnability
and expressivity of language are shaped by developmental
history. This history is determined by an interaction between
an organism and its input and between genes and the environ-
ment at multiple timescales. Therefore, we agree with C&C
that language has changed to fit the brain. However, in order
to understand how language changes, we must also understand
how it develops in the individual.
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Abstract: Language learning is not primarily driven by a motivation to
describe invariant features of the world, but rather by a strong force to
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be a part of the social group, which by definition is not invariant. It is not
sufficient for language to be fit for the speaker’s perceptual motor system.
It must also be fit for social interactions.
Christiansen&Chater’s (C&C’s) target article is a clear and thought-
provoking presentation of the many inconsistencies within and
between various versions of the Universal Grammar (UG) theory.
One of the clearest examples of such inconsistencies, which is
not directly touched upon in this article, is the question of
what happened to the original “poverty of the stimulus” argument
(Chomsky 1980), claiming that language simply cannot be learned
with the ease and speed observed in children without help from a
genetic source. This argument is crucial for upholding any kind of
theory about aUG.Without it, the pressure for a genetic component
in language disappears. However, cleverly avoiding many of the
earlier inconsistencies, the Minimalist Program (e.g., Hauser et al.
2002) only maintains that rules for recursion are innate, thereby
leaving at least 99.9% of all language content to be learned. This is
paradoxical. Why is this rule impossible to learn, if the rest can be
learned, and vice versa?
We therefore welcome a theory of language which emphasises
the close relationship between linguistic utterances and the
content that they represent (e.g., along the lines of Talmy
2000). The pairing of language and meaning in the brain, in
the most simple case of direct referencing, probably happens
through synchronous firing of auditory and visual cortices
(Hebb 1949). Without prior knowledge to guide understanding,
these activations will probably spread throughout association cor-
tices along the major fibre pathways; and wherever these two
“streams” of information meet, an association is likely to be
encoded. This means that linguistic representations are likely
to be stored in regions overlapping with or contiguous to
perceptuo-motor processing regions (Shallice 1988). Evidence
for this line of thinking has been brought forward in relation to
action words in premotor cortex (e.g., Hauk et al. 2004) and/or
temporal cortex contiguous to V5/MT, a region selective for
visual motion perception (Noppeney 2004; Wallentin et al.
2005), spatial relations in posterior parietal cortex (Mellet et al.
1996; 2002; Wallentin et al. 2006; in press), and perspective
taking in the frontal eye fields (Wallentin et al. 2008).
With this said, it remains an open question the extent to which
the “cognitive system” is a stable unit, or whether it is also open to
the influence of language/culture. Even language tied to the
most “basic” cognitive operations, such as spatial processing
(Levinson 2003) and colour detection, shows a wide spectrum
of variation across cultures.
This is not to say that the cognitive system does not constrain
language learning at all, but that cognitive processes are them-
selves subject to the effects of learning. Effectively, what we see
is that both language and the cognitive system adapt to each
other to a certain degree, even in the case of spatial processing
(e.g., Levinson 2003) and colour categorisation (e.g., Gilbert
et al. 2006; Winawer et al. 2007). What results in the case of
colour categories are “near-optimal divisions” of colour space
(Regier et al. 2007). But why not an optimal division? Given
the speed of language evolution and the strong innate bias
towards certain focal colours, due to the anatomy of the
colour-sensitive photoreceptors in the retina (e.g., Bear et al.
2001), why would there be any variation at all? The answer to
this question points towards something crucial in language
learning, namely, that the motivation to learn a language is
probably not primarily driven by a motivation to learn about
invariant features of the world, but rather by a strong force to
be a part of the social group/society, which by definition is
not invariant.
When thinking about language as a system that adapts to con-
straints imposed by the brain, it is probably important, therefore,
to distinguish between language evolution directed towards
enhancing fitness in the face of the learner’s perceptuo-motor
system and language evolution directed towards enhancing
language fitness in relation to social dynamics. Where the
former is driven by an optimisation of “rational” perceptual/
linguistic referencing of the exterior world, the social optimis-
ation will mainly be based on social reinforcement markers.
These markers may be proto-linguistic signs, such as facial
expressions, or they may themselves be linguistic utterances,
giving room for a “run-away” effect, known from sexual selection
(Fisher 1999). In other words, socially endowed linguistic
changes may happen very fast and to a certain extent be orthogonal
to those imposed by the perceptual/linguistic referencing system.
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Abstract: Our target article argued that a genetically specified
Universal Grammar (UG), capturing arbitrary properties of
languages, is not tenable on evolutionary grounds, and that the
close fit between language and language learners arises because
language is shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse.
Few commentaries defend a genetically specified UG. Some
commentators argue that we underestimate the importance of
processes of cultural transmission; some propose additional
cognitive and brain mechanisms that may constrain language
and perhaps differentiate humans from nonhuman primates; and
others argue that we overstate or understate the case against
co-evolution of language genes. In engaging with these issues,
we suggest that a new synthesis concerning the relationship
between brains, genes, and language may be emerging.
R1. Introduction
In our target article, we argued for a number of potentially
highly controversial theses concerning the relationship
between human language and the cognitive and neural
systems that support it. Our starting point was Chomsky’s
(1965; 1980) bold proposal that a core concept in linguis-
tics and biology is Universal Grammar (UG). This species-
specific innate endowment comprises a set of universal
properties that allow language to develop in the mind
of the child in the same biologically determined fashion
that a chicken grows its wings. Crucially, the properties
of UG are construed as being arbitrary, that is, as having
no motivation in terms of how language functions (e.g.,
as a system for communication). It is from this perspective
that Chomsky sees linguistics as, first and foremost, a
branch of biology – because the nature of UG is presumed
to characterize, albeit at a high level of abstraction, the
structure of the brain mechanisms involved in language
acquisition (and to a lesser extent, language processing).
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UG therefore provides an explanation of the apparently
neat “fit” between the structure of human languages and
the processes of language acquisition. Children are able
to find the “right” linguistic regularities, even in the face
of linguistic data that might seem noisy and partial
(according to the “poverty of the stimulus” [POS] argu-
ment; Chomsky 1980), because the “right” linguistic prop-
erties are genetically built-in, as part of UG.
The Chomskyan viewpoint constitutes an extremely
strong hypothesis concerning the nature of language devel-
opment, and has attracted considerable controversy (e.g.,
Bates & MacWhinney 1987; Pullum & Scholz 2002;
Seidenberg 1997; Tomasello 2003; 2004). It is also a
strong hypothesis concerning the brain basis for language
and its genetic underpinnings, and here too there has been
much debate (e.g., Clark & Misyak, in press; Elman et al.
1996; Mu¨ller, in press). While UG may be challenged on
either of these grounds, or, indeed, concerning whether it
provides the right type of theoretical framework for under-
standing purely linguistic data (e.g., Croft 2001; Goldberg
2006; O’Grady 2005), we argued that the UG approach
runs theoretically aground when faced with the logical
problem of language evolution1: that there is no credible
account of how a genetically specified UG might have
evolved.
Any genetically based biological structure can arise from
two types of process: either through a process of (more or
less) gradual adaptation driven by selection pressure, or
through some non-adaptationist process, by which the
structure emerges by “accident.” In the target article, we
argued that neither story is viable for UG as conceived
in Chomsky’s framework. An adaptationist account of
UG cannot work, because language change is typically pre-
sumed to be far more rapid than genetic change. Hence,
the linguistic environment is a “moving target,” which
changes too quickly for a genetically based UG to track.
We also pointed out that the spread of human populations
creates a further problem. If the adaptationist story is
correct, each subpopulation would be expected to adapt
to the local linguistic environment, resulting in different
UGs across different populations. But such a conclusion
contradicts the assumption that UG captures universal
properties of human language. Finally, we argued that
the non-adaptationist viewpoint is ruled out because the
coincidence required to accidentally construct a system
of the intricacy and subtlety of UG is too extreme to be
credible, according to a simple information-theoretic
argument.
The target article put forward a different theoretical
viewpoint, which is challenged, amplified, and explored in
the highly stimulating commentaries to the article. In par-
ticular, we suggested that the fit between language learners
and the patterns observed in human languages – a fit which
appears to be required to explain how language learning is
possible – does not arise because languages are shaped
by an innate UG, genetically hardwired in the learner’s
brain. Instead, this fit arises because languages themselves
have adapted to be readily learned and processed. Rather
than construing the world’s languages as fixed and asking
how they are learnable, we proposed that it is more appro-
priate to consider languages as evolving systems, which have
many common patterns in part because they have adapted
to common selectional pressures from human learning and
processing mechanisms. From this viewpoint, the focus on
the genetic basis for language shifts from the search for
genes underpinning linguistic constraints, to understanding
the pre-existing neural and cognitive machinery on top of
which the cultural construction of language was possible.
In responding to the commentaries here, we suggest
that this viewpoint can be seen as part of a new theoretical
framework for understanding the relationship between
brains, genes, and language. We divide our discussion
into four broad, although interrelated, themes:
1. Rethinking classical UG. The commentaries, and the
wider current literature, indicate that theorists – except for
a few holdouts (Harnad) – are either working outside
(Goldberg;Hurford), or at minimum substantially recon-
ceptualizing, the classic UG framework (Barrett, Fran-
kenhuis, & Wilke [Barrett et al.]; Piattelli-Palmarini,
Hancock, & Bever [Piattelli-Palmarini et al.];
Reuland; Satterfield). Somewhat to our surprise,
there is relatively little argument to the effect that an evol-
utionary account can be offered for anything like classical
UG. Nonetheless, the commentators raise a range of
important issues concerning the possible innate basis for
language.
2. Too much emphasis on the brain? The issue here is:
How far can cultural learning of a system for communi-
cation explain language structure, independent of cognitive
and neural constraints? Some commentators focus on the
explanatory power of learning mechanisms (Catania),
while others emphasize the mechanisms of cultural trans-
mission (Blackmore; Caldwell; Smith, Kirby, & Smith
[Smith et al.]).
3. The biological and cognitive basis for language. A
diverse range of forces are identified, by which lan-
guage may have been shaped by the brain and beyond
(Aronoff, Meir, Padden & Sandler [Aronoff et al.];
Behme; Brooks & Ragir; Corballis; de Ruiter &
Levinson; Dessalles; Enfield; Fauconnier & Turner;
Goldberg; Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch; Landauer;
Lieberman; Namy & Nygaard; Tallerman; Toscano,
Perry, Mueller, Bean, Galle, & Samuelson [Toscano
et al.]; Wallentin & Frith). These proposals can also
be viewed as providing a range of potentially complemen-
tary perspectives concerning what crucial neural or cogni-
tive structures differentiate humans from nonhuman
primates.
4. When can genes and language co-evolve? The target
article makes a narrow argument: that a co-evolutionary,
adaptationist account of the origin of a genetic basis for
arbitrary linguistic constraints (as postulated in UG) is
not viable. A range of commentators consider whether
the assumptions of this argument apply, especially in
relation to the presumed speed of language change (Black-
more; Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch; Pagel & Atkin-
son) and level of selectional pressure (Behme); while
others suggest that the argument cannot go through more
generally (Barrett et al.; Blackmore; Fitch; Hurford),
or that our arguments can be expanded to argue even
against the possibility of the co-evolution of functionally
relevant linguistic regularities (Smith et al.).
In the following sections, we discuss these themes in
turn, and close by outlining open questions and challenges
for future research that are raised by the commentaries.
We conclude that the balance of the discussion suggests
that a new synthesis concerning the relationship between
brains, genes, and language may be emerging.
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R2. Rethinking classical UG
The centerpiece of our argument was that there is no cred-
ible evolutionary account for a genetically based UG, throw-
ing the classical conception of UG into difficulties. Many
commentators are, largely on independent grounds, happy
to accept that UG, as classically conceived, is not viable.
For example, Goldberg argues that the traditional con-
ception of UG should be replaced by an attempt to specify
the cognitive and neural prerequisites for language, noting
that recent advances in, among other things, the compu-
tational and psychological study of learning, require revisit-
ing arguments for UG. Indeed, Goldberg and several other
commentators (e.g., Hurford; Wallentin & Frith) note
that Chomsky’s own position can be read as rethinking the
classical UG viewpoint. Thus, Hauser et al. (2002) have, as
Goldberg notes, emphasized the importance of domain-
general mechanisms, raising the possibility that recursion
might be the only element of the “narrow faculty of lan-
guage” – that is, a genetically based process, which is
specific to language.
We agree with these commentators that, taken at face
value, this theoretical position does seem to require
letting go of core theoretical claims previously associated
with UG. Thismove has substantial theoretical implications:
It signals the need for a complete revision of the perspective
that the goal of linguistics is the characterization of UG; a
withdrawal of the claim that linguistics is a branch of
biology; and a departure from viewing language acquisition
as the “growth” of a language organ, whose blueprint is
specified by the genetic constraints that encode UG. It
seems, then, that Hauser et al.’s (2002) position is strongly
in tension with those contemporary theorists who are com-
mitted to the view that language acquisition must be
explained in terms of innate language-specific constraints,
both in meta-theoretic discussions in linguistics (Harnad;
Reuland; see also, e.g., Boeckx 2006) and accounts of
language acquisition (e.g., Crain & Pietroski 2006).
Even if the conventional UG picture is set aside, some
commentators suggest that there is, nonetheless, a role for
language-specific innate constraints of some kind, especially
in explaining how children can learn the enormously subtle
and intricate patterns in natural language. Thus, Satterfield
raises the point that a naive empiricist perspective on lan-
guage acquisition might be expected to mirror the adult
linguistic environment. But how, then, are systematic errors
in children’s speech to be explained? For example, how,
she asks, is it possible to explain that children brought up in
English-speaking linguistic environments frequently drop
subject pronouns in tensed clauses (Hyams 1986), even
though this is not observed in their linguistic environment?
Satterfield suggests that we must look to innate language-
specific biases to explain how this can occur. We agree
with Satterfield that biases may be needed to explain this
and other acquisition phenomena. However, whether such
biases are specific to language is, of course, an empirical
question. Indeed, recent analyses of children’s spontaneous
productions and computational modeling by Freudenthal
et al. (2007) suggest that the omission of subject pronouns
in English may be explained without recourse to language-
specific information, by a simple developmental model
incorporating cognitive processing constraints and which
gradually acquires grammatical knowledge from distribu-
tional information in child-directed speech.
Also focusing on the role of innate constraints, Reuland
provides a shortlist of requirements for an innately speci-
fied language acquisition system, going beyond theminimal
conception of UG as containing only recursion (Hauser
et al. 2002). These constraints appear highly language-
specific in nature, such as a checking operation to compare
linguistic features and a locality condition to restrict move-
ment, depending on linguistic domains. Moreover, even if,
in linewith theMinimalist Program,much of the priorwork
of classical UG is pushed into a parameterized lexicon, non-
lexical parameters are still needed in current versions
of minimalist theory (Baker 2001; Boeckx 2006). Thus,
despite the arguments put forward by Hauser et al.
(2002), current generative accounts of language in linguis-
tics appear to require UG to encompass considerably more
abstract, language-specific properties than just recursion
(at least given the current state of the Minimalist
Program). As a consequence, such accounts are therefore
vulnerable to the logical problem of language evolution
described in the target article.
One potential way of rethinking UG is to reconceptualize
it in more functional terms, which are outside the immedi-
ate scope of the arguments in the target article. Satterfield
suggests that UG be construed as a collection of domain-
general mechanisms that interact with language-specific
components to help resolve the purported POS problem
(see also Bever, in press). However, this perspective cannot
escape the logical problem of language evolution, because
of the arbitrary (i.e., nonfunctional) nature of the latter,
language-specific, part of this hybrid UG. Barrett et al.
push the reconceptualization of UG still further, proposing
to conceive it simply as whatever mechanisms have evolved
specifically for language – even if these should turn out to
be entirely functional in nature and thus diametrically
opposed to the claims of classical UG. As noted in the
target article, we agree that evolution may have led to adap-
tations for certain functional features of language – though,
as discussed further below, the extent of this is not clear
(Smith et al.).
In contrast to these adaptationist reconceptualizations of
UG, Harnad endorses our analyses of the problems facing
adaptationist explanations of UG and instead backs a non-
adaptationist account. However, as mentioned above and
in the target article, this type of explanation faces a difficult
dilemma. On the one hand, if UG is really so simple that
it can come about through “chance” (e.g., via a single
mutation), then it is not clear how it can resolve the pur-
ported POS problem, or other acquisition phenomena (as,
e.g., highlighted by Satterfield), which are typically viewed
as requiring rich language-specific innate constraints. On
the other hand, if UG is permitted to have the complexity
necessary to deal adequately with such acquisition issues
(as hypothesized by many generative approaches), then
the probability of such an intricate biological structure
emerging de novo through a single macro-mutation is
vanishingly small.
Also advocating a non-adaptationist perspective,Piattelli-
Palmarini et al. suggest that we have underplayed the
impact of the “evo-devo” revolution in biology for under-
standing how UG might have evolved by non-adaptationist
means. The evo-devo approach has shown that biological
evolution frequently exhibits the repetition and variation
of basic “modular” structures, typically underpinned by
common genetic machinery (Kirschner & Gerhart 2005).
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Could this be true for UG? Chomsky (e.g., 1980) repeat-
edly stressed how the structure of language differs funda-
mentally from that observed in other cognitive domains.
If this is right, it is very difficult to see how a unique,
complex, and fully functioning system might spring into
being as a minor variation of some existing cognitive struc-
ture. Similarly, if, as Piattelli-Palmarini et al.’s title appears
to suggest, the design of language arises from optimality
constraints, which might perhaps, as Chomsky (2005b)
has recently suggested, be analogous to the minimum prin-
ciples that give rise to soap bubbles and snowflakes, then it
is unclear why special-purpose biological machinery for
UG is theoretically necessary at all. In the target article,
we therefore argued that the emergence by non-adapta-
tionist means of a complex, functioning neural system
embodying UG is astronomically unlikely. Indeed, as we
read the literature, biological structures built de novo
appear invariably to be shaped by long periods of adap-
tation (Finlay 2007). Thus, while antennae may be a modi-
fication of the insect leg (Carroll 2005), it is not an insect
leg, or anything like one. It is exquisitely crafted to play
its new role – and such apparent design is universally
explainedwithin biology as an outcome ofDarwinian selec-
tion. The impact of evo-devo is to help us understand the
intricate structure and constraints of the space of organ-
isms over which the processes of variation and natural
selection unfold; it is not an alternative to the operation
of natural selection (Carroll 2001).
R3. Too much emphasis on the brain?
The title of our target article, “Language as shaped by the
brain,” embodies the claim that the brain, and the thought-
based, perceptuo-motor, cognitive, and socio-pragmatic
processes that it supports, plays a crucial role in determin-
ing the structure of natural language. Yet, as we pointed
out, the influence of these processes can take a wide
range of routes. Many of our commentators explore the
possibility that our emphasis on the brain may be excessive
(Catania); or that it should at minimum be supplemented
with an analysis of the selective forces on language gener-
ated by its communicative function, and its transmission
across networks of individuals (Brooks & Ragir; Smith
et al.; Wallentin & Frith). According to this latter view-
point, there may be regularities in language that can be
understood independently from the details of brain mech-
anisms. In general, a natural challenge to our perspective
on the evolution of language structure is to ask, from an
explanatory point of view: How much can be explained
by cultural transmission alone?
Catania suspects that, in using the brain to explain lin-
guistic behavior, we have the cart squarely before the
horse. Instead, he sees behavior as primary and argues
that human learning mechanisms may be flexible enough
to capture and reflect whatever patterns of behavior may
be required. He uses the analogy of categorical perception
(Liberman et al. 1957). While many theorists suggest that
categorical perception between phoneme boundaries may
arise from boundaries in the sensory input or the mechan-
isms of speech perception and/or production, Catania
contends that it may be more productive to propose that
such boundaries are not so constrained. Instead, the
specific boundaries observed in categorical perception in
different languages may be determined purely by the lin-
guistic environment (i.e., English vs. Arabic) – according
to this viewpoint, the brain is not shaping language, but
responding to the linguistic environment.
We suggest that this viewpoint is not adequate to explain
linguistic regularities in general, however, precisely because
it does not place constraints on the patterns of language that
are viable. The challenge of understanding language struc-
ture is to explain the structural regularities that the world’s
languages do, and do not, exhibit; and some of the key
sources of constraints are, we suggest, that languages must
be easy to learn (from limited amounts of data that are avail-
able to the child), that theymust be easy to process (e.g., lin-
guistic relations will typically be local, rather than involving
arbitrarily long and complex dependences between linguis-
tic items), and that theymust fit naturallywith the perceptual
and motor apparatus (language must be easy to decode, and
easy to produce).
A lack of focus on such constraints is, we suggest, also
evident in many meme-based accounts of cultural and
linguistic evolution, as exemplified in the commentary by
Blackmore. She suggests that language should be viewed
as a complex of memes; and that these memes propagate
in a selfishway – that is, the crucial factor in language evol-
ution is the replicative power ofmemes, independent of any
functional value that the memes may or may not have for
their “hosts,” that is, language users.We arewary of this per-
spective if taken to an extreme.We would agree that under-
standing which aspects of language structure will readily
be transferred from one generation of language users to
another is critical in understanding the selectional pressures
on languages. But we see the question of the learning and
processing biases of learners to be crucial in determining
what is, or is not, readily transferred. That is, which struc-
tures “replicate” depends critically on the nature of the
brains that propagate those structures via learning. Thus,
we see the selection pressures on language as arising, to a
large degree, from the properties of the brain.
Piattelli-Palmarini et al. appear to have mistaken
our approach for a meme-based account (such as Black-
more’s) and are concerned that viewing language as a
cultural productmeans that linguistic evolution is no differ-
ent, in principle, from the design of a Boeing 707. But,
of course, aircraft are typically products of directed
and determined efforts of design, typically by vast teams
of scientists and engineers. The process of the cultural con-
struction of language is, we suggest, a much more piece-
meal, distributed, and incidental matter. In specific
circumstances, with particular purposes in mind, people
attempt to communicate; and the layering of such attempts,
and their selective winnowing and replication, inadver-
tently creates a language, shaped by the brain. The putati-
vely worrying analogy with aircraft design therefore seems
remote at best.
More generally, a tendency to see processes of cultural
transmission as an alternative to, rather than as grounded
in, theories of brain and cognition occurs elsewhere in the
literature. For example, many properties of language are
viewed as arising from historical processes of language
change (such as grammaticalization); and such processes are
viewed as fairly independent of underlying brainmechanisms
(Bybee, in press). But we argue that processes of historical
language change depend crucially on the cognitive and
neural machinery of the speakers involved. Even if language
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is a cultural product, created by processes of cultural trans-
mission, it is nonetheless shaped by the brains that create
and transmit linguistic structure. The brain, and the cogni-
tive and learning constraints that it embodies, is centrally
important, after all. Brooks & Ragir generalize this line of
thought to cultural products more broadly, suggesting that
tool manufacture, music, and play are all likely to be
shaped by an interplay of factors governing cultural trans-
mission and the cognitive constraints of individual agents.
We shall discuss later on how far the arguments of our
target article, particularly concerning the non-viability of
nativism with respect to apparent universals, might apply
beyond language to other aspects of culture.
One way to study the interplay of constraints on learners
and the structure of the cultural transmission of language is
through the combination of computer simulations – where
both the “cognitivemachinery” of the learners and the struc-
ture of communicative interactions, including the structure
of the “social network” across which information is diffused,
can be directly manipulated. Smith et al. mention their
important work in this tradition, which we shall discuss in
detail later. A complementary approach is to study the diffu-
sion of information across human agents, as outlined by
Caldwell. She finds intriguing cases of “convergent evol-
ution” in problem-solving tasks, when solutions are passed
from “generation to generation” by gradual replacements
of group members. Here, the selectional pressure (the pre-
ference for one solution over others) results from explicit
reflection and discussion within the group, rather than the
presumably nonconscious biases that shape many aspects
of language evolution. Nonetheless, this work provides an
intriguing illustration of how the properties of learners
(here, their problem-solving abilities and biases) can lead
to systematic regularities, which may converge across
groups. Perhaps similarly, convergent evolution at the level
of language change might explain some common properties
across theworld’s languages. Thus, the interplay of computer
simulations and empirical research promises to be parti-
cularly fruitful for the investigation of such convergent
evolution.
R4. The biological and cognitive basis
of language
In the previous section (R3), we considered commentaries
that emphasize the importance of learning, communica-
tion, and properties of cultural transmission – but we
have stressed that these processes are grounded in the
properties of our cognitive and neural mechanisms. Here,
we consider commentaries for which those mechanisms
are the main focus. That is, we consider questions such
as: What are the cognitive pre-adaptations that make the
cultural construction of language possible?What is distinc-
tive about human cognition? And, more broadly, how is
language rooted in biology?
Before addressing these questions, it is important to dis-
tinguish themain points at issue, which concern the general
biological machinery that makes language possible (which,
it is typically assumed, is shared by all normally developing
humans), from the question of individual variation in lin-
guistic ability. Pagel & Atkinson rightly point out that
human linguistic abilities, like most human cognitive differ-
ences, are quite strongly heritable, implying that these
differences have a genetic basis. Such differences need
not, of course, be language-specific, but might reflect gene-
ral processing differences, such as variations in memory
(Landauer; see also, e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch 1995; Mac-
Donald & Christiansen 2002; Wynne & Coolidge 2008).
Moreover, “generalist” genes may explain a broad range of
learning abilities and disabilities (Kovas et al. 2007). In
the target article, however, the focus is not on genes that
vary between language users, but on the common genetic
basis, shared across the normally developing population,
that supports language acquisition and processing. The
range of suggestions concerning the key biological and cog-
nitive bases for language mentioned in the commentaries is
impressively broad.
De Ruiter & Levinson argue that the key driving force
behind language is communicative intelligence: a power-
ful pragmatic system for relating signals to communica-
tive intentions. They argue that this system arose prior to
language, and that this adaptation crucially distinguishes
the human brain from that of other primates (for a related
perspective, see Tomasello 2008). This approach provides
an elegant inversion of the assumptions common in nativist
perspectives on language acquisition. According to that
tradition, the distinctive features of the language organ
concern the abstract, structural properties of syntax and
phonology; pragmatic inference is typically assumed to be
continuous with general inference abilities (e.g., Fodor
1983), and hence not properly part of the language system
at all, let alone part of UG. Yet, de Ruiter & Levinson take
pragmatics to be the cognitively decisive mechanism for
the emergence of language; and Levinson (2000) suggests,
as we briefly described in the target article, that highly
specific and intricate structural patterns in language,
such as the binding constraints, emerge as a consequence.
This concrete example of how general communicative
factors can generate apparently highly arbitrary and com-
plex syntactic phenomena illustrates the potential value
of viewing language as adapted to the brain, rather than
the reverse. This case is perhaps particularly interesting,
given that binding constraints are often highlighted as par-
ticularly strong evidence for innate linguistic constraints
(Reuland).
Enfield makes a related argument, focusing instead on
theprimacy of the speech act, a pragmatic notion concerning
the unit over which communicative intentions are conveyed.
He argues that the structure of communication as a series of
conversational “moves and countermoves” may have strong
implications for the structure of grammar. Fauconnier &
Turner, by contrast, argue that human evolution may have
undergone a qualitative and decisive cognitive transition
involving the ability to engage in “double-scope blending.”
This ability permits the integrationof twodifferent represen-
tational frames, whichFauconnier&Turner take to underlie
the creation of not merely language but many aspects of
culture, from mathematics to religion. We suggest that the
complexity and variety of cognitive machinery that presum-
ably underlies the full range of cultural products, including
language, makes the existence of a single key transition
prima facie unlikely; but this bold possibility is certainly
worthy of consideration in principle.
Tallerman takes up a complementary line of reasoning,
in considering cross-linguistic regularities in case-marking
systems. She notes that case-marking tends to be highly “eco-
nomical” – that is, while a variety of possible linguistic cues
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may be used to signal case, cues are used only where necess-
ary to avoid ambiguity. Typically, overt case-marking only
applies to one member of an “opposition” (e.g., between
agent and patient); the identity of the non-marked case
may, presumably, be “filled in” by the listener using the
type of pragmatic inferences considered by de Ruiter &
Levinson. Tallerman’s account explains some of the
variety of case systems observed cross-linguistically, from a
purely functional standpoint (e.g., in terms of economy and
avoiding ambiguity). Her arguments thus provide a counter-
weight to Satterfield’s claim that innate knowledge of case
systems may have to be built into the learner. Clearly, chil-
dren are able to acquire case systems for natural language –
but thismay be explained because case systems have evolved
to be functionally effective, and, we suggest along with Tal-
lerman, readily learned and processed. Thus, case systems,
along with other linguistic regularities, will reflect whatever
learning and processing biases the cognitive system embo-
dies. But this match arises not because the learner has a
language-specific innate knowledge of the case system, but
instead because the case system has been selected to fit
language learners and users.
Wallentin & Frith take a different tack, developing an
intriguing argument. They first point out that perceptuo-
motor constraints are likely to be important in constraining
language, noting that imaging studies suggest that neural
representations of different classes of words are located
in corresponding brain areas (e.g., action words are often
associated with prefrontal cortex [Hauk et al. 2004], where-
as words representing spatial relations are associated with
posterior parietal cortex [Wallentin et al. 2006]). Nonethe-
less, they note that, in many areas of classification (e.g.,
color names), there is considerable variation across langua-
ges, even though color names appear to be driven, to some
extent at least, by considerations of perceptual optimality
(Regier et al. 2007). Wallentin & Frith suggest that this
may arise because the drive to align with other group
members may outweigh the drive to find an optimal classi-
fication. They suggest that the goodness of a classification
may partially be defined in terms of agreement with other
group members, which may potentially lead to a radical
and rapid runaway process. We suggest that such proces-
ses may be particularly likely where there is a large range
of alternative solutions, which are roughly equally “good”
from the point of view of the individual agent; and
especially when it is difficult to shift from one type of sol-
ution to another. Many of the arbitrary aspects of the
world’s languages, ranging from the inventory of phone-
mes, the variety of syntactic categories, to the functioning
of pronouns, seem to exhibit considerable variation. These
variants are, perhaps, roughly equally good solutions; and
moving between solutions is slow and difficult (although
historical linguistics does sometimes indicate that change
does occur between such forms; McMahon 1994). In
such cases, the selection pressure on language from the
brain imposes only a relatively weak constraint on the sol-
ution that is reached. Conversely, the functional pressure
for the emergence of other aspects of language, such as
double articulation (i.e., separate combinatorial layers of
phonological and syntactic structure) or large vocabulary
(Hurford) or compositionality (Smith et al.), may be so
strong that these factors are not disturbed by social forces.
Greenfield&Gillespie-Lynch also consider perceptual-
motor factors to be an important, but insufficient, starting
point for understanding language. They argue that the struc-
ture of actions may provide an infrastructure for linguistic
behavior (see, e.g., Byrne & Byrne [1993] on the complex
action sequences involved in field observations of gorilla
leaf-gathering). This infrastructure might be co-opted in
gestural communication. Yet, like Wallentin & Frith,
Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch argue that social factors are
likely to play a key additional role. They suggest that
mirror neurons, which are phylogenetically broad, may be
indicative of “intersubjectivity” (i.e., the sharing of mental
states by two or more people), and that this may be crucial
to language (as is indicated by, for example, work on joint
attention in developmental psychology; Eilan et al. 2005).
Mirror neurons appear to represent actions, whether per-
formed by the agent or merely observed; and, suggestively,
mirror neurons are located in what is arguably the homol-
ogue of Broca’s area, which is important for language in
humans. Differential expansion of language-related areas
in the human brain may, Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch
suggest, indicate co-evolution of brain and language.
We suspect that such arguments may currently be prema-
ture. Although a number of experiments have been con-
ducted to investigate mirror neurons in humans, the
results remain unclear (for discussion, see Turella et al. in
press). Another caveat is that mirror neurons were originally
found in a nonhuman primate, and may even be present
across a wide range of species (Hurford 2004), indicating
thatmirror neuronsmay not be a key factor in language evol-
ution. Moreover, there are elegant statistical models that
accurately show the relationship between the differential
expansion of brain areas across a wide range of mammals.
These models reveal no notable expansion of Broca’s or
Wernicke’s area, as might be expected from selectional
pressure for language (Finlay et al. 2001). Although these
considerations caution against the specific scenario for
language evolution outlined by Greenfield & Gillespie-
Lynch, the argument of our target article does not deny
the possibility of brain-language co-evolution. Rather, the
logical problem of language evolution arises for arbitrary
properties of language – because, having no “functional”
anchors, these will tend to vary freely and rapidly, both
across time and across populations. This would lead to a
highly unstable linguistic environment, to which slow-chan-
ging language genes cannot readily adapt. But this specific
argument does not eliminate all possibility of co-evolution
between genes and behavior. For example, it is entirely com-
patible with our argument that better memory (Landauer)
or better pragmatic skills (de Ruiter & Levinson;Enfield;
Wallentin & Frith), might co-evolve with a language sys-
tem that draws upon these skills. We shall discuss these
issues inmore detail, as they arise throughout the commen-
taries, in section R5.
Lieberman has a different proposal concerning the key
neural circuitry underpinning language and a range of
other human-specific behaviors, such as dance and music.
He focuses on neural circuits creating bidirectional links
between the cortex and basal ganglia. As also noted in
the target article, the corticostriatal system is important
for the learning and processing of sequential information
(Packard & Knowlton 2002). Lieberman further argues
that “hard” data from molecular genetics and neuroima-
ging suggest that these neural circuits underpin our pro-
ductive syntactic capacity. For example, mutations in the
FOXP2 gene, which has been shown to be crucial to the
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development and function of the corticostriatal system (Lai
et al. 2003), give rise to severe speech and orofacial motor
problems (Lai et al. 2001; MacDermot et al. 2005). This
genetic link between sequential learning and language is
further underscored by recent results showing that
common allelic variation in FOXP2 is associated with indi-
vidual differences in performance on a sequence-learning
task, which, in turn, is related to language ability (Tomblin
et al. 2007). Thus, genetic research relating to brain devel-
opment can readily be incorporated into the new synthesis
proposed here, providing insights into the nature of the
neural constraints that shape language evolution.
Emphasizing the importance of constraints arising from
the human body, Aronoff et al. andCorballis explore the
contribution of gesture to language evolution. Indeed,
Corballis sees gesture as the origin of language, arguing
that early languages may have been signed, rather than
spoken. He argues that the scenario for language evolution
outlined in the target article is compatible with a gestural
origin of language. We see this as an important possibility.
It is certainly conceivable that early language – as a cul-
tural product – might equally well have been shaped by
the mechanisms involved in the production and interpret-
ation of gestures as those used for vocalizations. Research
on modern apes suggests that vocal and manual gestures
might initially have proceeded in parallel, perhaps with a
more flexible use of gestures (Pollick & de Waal 2007).
Subsequent changes to the human vocal tract might then
have tipped the scales toward speech as the default
modality for language (irrespective of whether these ana-
tomical changes were adaptations specifically for speech
[Lieberman 1984] or something else [Hauser & Fitch
2003]). We remain agnostic with regard to these questions
of language origin, but we note that – perceptuo-motor
differences notwithstanding – there is considerable over-
lap in mechanisms between spoken and signed languages
that would allow for much similarity in the thought-
based, cognitive, and pragmatic constraints imposed on
their evolution (as outlined in the target article).2
Further highlighting the importance of gesture, Aronoff
et al. point to newly emerging sign languages as a source
of evidence of language evolution in vivo. Specifically, they
argue that a key discontinuity between humans and other
primates is iconicity: While nonhuman primates in the wild
spontaneously gesture, they appear never to use gesture to
represent external objects or events. It is interesting to ask
how this difference may relate to cognitive distinctions dis-
cussed by other commentators, including de Ruiter &
Levinson’s communicative intelligence. Perhaps the key to
being able to interpret a gesture as a representation is under-
standing that the gesture is a signal that is intended to convey
a message; and producing a gesture as a representation
requires understanding that the other agent will understand
this intention; and so on. A complementary suggestion is
Corballiss’ proposal that “mental time travel” – the ability
to mentally replay past events, or imagine future events –
may underpin symbolic representation, which allows refer-
ence to items that are not perceptually present.
While Aronoff et al. see iconicity as a starting point for
(signed) language,Dessalles views it as a crucial limitation.
He argues that if language has been shaped by the brain,
then we should expect that iconicity should be maximized,
because this would make learning as easy as possible. Yet,
as de Saussure (1916/1959) observed, relations between
linguistic signs and their meanings are typically close to
arbitrary. We believe this concern can be readily allayed
by noticing that language is selected not just to be learnable,
but also to be communicatively effective (that is, forms
which do not successfully convey their message will be
eliminated). As Namy & Nygaard point out, communica-
tive pressures favor arbitrariness. An iconic representational
system will preserve the similarity relations of the represen-
ted domain in the signs themselves. Although communi-
cation often requires distinguishing between signs for
closely related things, context typically can tell us what a
sign is referring to (e.g., a species of fish, a brand of car,
or a TV show). An iconic system of representation will be
communicatively inefficient if the signs for each type of
object are highly similar, and hence contextually redundant
and difficult to distinguish, both in production and per-
ception. Developing this idea, Monaghan and Christiansen
(2006) illustrate the advantages of an arbitrary, rather than a
systematic, phonology-semantics mapping, in simulations
with a feed-forward connectionist network. Nonetheless,
the model also indicates that systematic mappings may
arise in the service of learning about other aspects of
language (e.g., in the formof phonological cues to lexical cat-
egory;Monaghan et al. 2007). As noted byNamy&Nygaard,
this illustrates the idea of language as adapting to multiple
competing constraints.
Stressing the importance of communication, as well as
learning, in shaping the evolution of language also resolves
another of Dessalles’s concerns. He suggests that if lan-
guages are selected to be learnable, then linguistic complex-
ity will gradually be stripped away, leading ultimately to a
“null” language. But such a language will not evolve, preci-
sely because it would have no expressive power, and hence
would be communicatively useless. The complexity and
diversity of language arise because the primary purpose of
language is rich and flexible communication.
Goldberg raises amore subtle version of the same issue.
Should we expect that, through successive generations,
languages will become increasingly easy to learn? Might
this imply, perhaps implausibly, that Creoles would be
especially difficult to learn? Goldberg notes, though, that
such predictions do not immediately follow, precisely
because language has to simultaneously satisfy constraints
concerning expressive power, and ease of learning and pro-
cessing. The drive for expressive power will typically lead to
greater complexity, balanced by a drive for ease of learning
and processing, which pushes toward greater simplicity.
Note that the constraints from learning and processing
may also be in opposition – and some aspects of language
change may crucially arise from this opposition. For exam-
ple, historical language change involves both processes
of erosion (i.e., reducing morphemes, creating irregular
forms, and thus reducing the load on language production)
and regularization (making learning easier) (McMahon
1994).
But how much of language change is due to child
language acquisition (Bickerton 1984), or is linguistic vari-
ation primarily created and propagated through adult
populations (e.g., Bybee, in press)? To the extent that
child language acquisition is the major driver of change,
the processes of cognitive development are likely to be
important in understanding language change (Toscano
et al.). We are sympathetic to this general perspective
(cf. Karmiloff-Smith 1992), although the current state of
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understanding of the learning and processing mechanisms
across development may currently be insufficient to
constrain closely the theory of language evolution.
Brooks & Ragir also stress the importance of develop-
ment – and in particular the prolonged neural plasticity
that seems especially characteristic of humans. We see
prolonged development as a consequence of the need to
construct highly complex, yet flexible, cognitive functions.
Indeed, to the degree that cognitive development must be
responsive to the particular culture (including the particu-
lar language) to which the child must adapt, a prolonged
period of learning from the environment (whether phys-
ical, social, or linguistic) is surely necessary.
Brooks & Ragir argue that our target article is insuffi-
ciently radical, however. They wish to go beyond our claim
that language does not presuppose a genetically specified
UG, to argue against the existence of genetically encoded
cognitive pre-adaptations for language. To the extent that a
pre-adaptation for language is a mechanism or process that
has adapted through natural selection, but not to support
language, the claim that such pre-adaptations exist seems
relatively mild. Indeed, the various claims concerning cog-
nitive and biological prerequisites for language reviewed
above all seem plausibly to fall into the category of pre-
adaptations. Yet we suspect that Brooks & Ragir’s aim is
not to deny the existence of pre-adaptations. Rather, it is
to deny that the development of any specific pre-adaptation
was the trigger for the creation and evolution of language.
Instead, they suggest that changes in habitat, diet, and social
organization might be more important. To the degree that
language is viewed as a cultural phenomenon, this perspec-
tive seems plausible. Scholars do not seek to identify a
crucial biological change in the hominid lineage supporting
the development of agriculture, fire, or arithmetic – it may
be that this is equally futile in the case of language. None-
theless, language does appear to be uniquely human. Even
if there is no single critical difference between humans and
other animals, it still seems to be an important scientific
project to sketch out the dimensions on which humans
are biologically and cognitively special.
More broadly, the commentators on this target article
have provided a rich set of hypotheses that deserve further
exploration, illustrating the potential pay-off that may be
obtained by attempting to understand language as shaped
by the brain, and thereby countering Piattelli-Palmarini
et al.’s concern that our approach has no explanatory bite.
R5. When can genes and language co-evolve?
Our target articlemakes a narrowly focused argument against
the hypothesis that genes for arbitrary features of language
(as in UG) could have co-evolved with the language itself.
In a nutshell, the concern is that, lacking any functional
pressure to stabilize them, and prior to the existence of puta-
tive language genes, such arbitrary features of the language
will vary. Indeed,we suggest that language change is typically
very much faster than genetic change, and, hence, that the
linguistic environment will provide a moving target, against
which biological adaptation will not be possible. We noted
also that the spatial diffusion of human populations would
be expected to lead to a wide diversity of languages (and,
indeed, human languages appear to diverge very rapidly –
Papua New Guinea was probably settled less than 50,000
years ago, and yet it contains perhaps one quarter of the
world’s languages, exhibiting an extraordinary diversity in
phonology and syntax; Diamond 1992). Co-evolutionary pro-
cesses can, of course, only adapt to the current linguistic
environment – and hence the variety of languages would,
through co-evolution, generate different selective pressures
on “language genes.” Yet modern human populations do
not seem to be selectively adapted to learn languages from
their own language groups – instead, every human appears,
to a first approximation, equally ready to learn any of the
world’s languages (but see Dediu & Ladd 2007).
Although the target article is clear about the narrow
scope of this argument, and, indeed, explicitly notes that
it does not necessarily apply to functional aspects of
language, several commentators take our argument to be
rather broader: to amount to the claim that no aspect of
cognition can be positively selected for language, or even
that co-evolution between any pair of processes is not
possible. In the light of this misreading of our argument,
several points of concern from the commentators can be
set aside.
In particular,Blackmore raises the concern that possible
(although controversial, see Hauser & Fitch 2003) evidence
that the larynx has been adapted to improve speech articula-
tionwould cast doubt on the viability of our argument against
the co-evolution of language and language genes. Note,
though, that improvements in the speech apparatus would
have a positive and general functional impact on language
behavior, whereas genes for UG are expressly for arbitrary
features of language – and it is the latter that is the subject
of our argument. Barrett et al., similarly, develop an argu-
ment that language-gene co-evolution is possible, in prin-
ciple. We entirely agree (see Christiansen et al. 2006, for
simulations of the biological adaptation for functional fea-
tures of language). Our arguments apply only to the viability
of co-evolution of genes for arbitrary features of language,
and Barrett et al.’s counterarguments do not address this.
Fitch puts forward what appears to be a more direct
attack on our position: “If this ‘logical problem of language
evolution’ is indeed as severe as C&C claim, it is not just
linguists who should be worried: any biologist interested
in adaptation to a rapidly changing environment (e.g., indi-
vidual learning) or culturally transmitted system (e.g., bird
or whale song) should be alarmed.” The first case does
not seem directly relevant. Fitch notes that adaptation to a
rapidly changing environment typically leads to “generalist”
species (e.g., rats) whose behavior is highly responsive to
the environment; the natural parallel would be to assume
that language learners would be generalists, able to deal
with a broad range of linguistic environments. But, before
the putative UG is established, early languages will not
exhibit any specific set of arbitrary constraints – and hence,
to deal with this range of languages, the generalists will not
embody such constraints either. So this line of reasoning
seems to lead directly to the conclusion for which we are
arguing.
The case of learned bird- and whalesong appears more
directly analogous to language (see alsoPagel&Atkinson).
Fitch points out that biologists agree that the songs of some
species of birds are culturally transmitted, but within
sharply defined limits. Moreover, he notes, biologists agree
that birds have an innate propensity (“instinct”) to acquire
the song type specific to their species (Marler 1991). This
seems analogous to the case of human language: Language
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is culturally transmitted, and people may have an inherent
disposition to acquire human languages. Fitch may perhaps
suspect that we do not accept that people have any such
innate propensity for language – but, in the weak sense of
the term “relevant” here, our position entails that there is
indeed a genetic basis for language, in the form of a range
of pre-adaptations (perceptuo-motor, communicative, cog-
nitive, and so on). We deny, though, that there is a geneti-
cally encoded language-specific UG; and we explain the
viability of acquisition, and the structure of the world’s
languages, in the light of the adaptation of language to this
genetic basis. Goldberg’s quote from Liz Bates puts the
point well: “It’s not a question of Nature vs. Nurture; the
question is about the Nature of Nature” (Bates 1993).
Fitch goes on to develop an argument that comes danger-
ously close to undercutting his position. He agrees that rapid
cultural changes imply that genetic changes (whether in the
bird or human case) will only be positively selected for prop-
erties that are stable across that cultural environment – this
is the “generalist” strategy, mentioned earlier. But prior to
the existence of language-specific genetic constraints, arbi-
trary properties of language, such as those in a putative
UG, will precisely not be stable: they have (by assumption)
as yet no genetic basis; and (also by their presumed arbitrari-
ness) they have no functional role to ensure they dominate
the cultural environment. Hence, the arbitrary constraints
of UG will be just the kinds of features that will not be
genetically internalized.
Barrett et al. also observe, rightly, that co-evolution
between language and genes is possible, noting that even a
fast-changing environment will have statistical properties
which may, to some degree, provide selectional pressure on
learners. As they point out, co-evolution appears widespread
in biology (e.g., Futuyma & Slatkin 1983). There are, more-
over, some well-attested cases of co-evolution between
culture and genes. For example, the development of arable
agriculture and dairying appear to have co-evolved with
genes for the digestion of starch (Perry et al. 2007) and
lactose (Holden & Mace 1997). Note that these cases are
examples of stable shifts in the cultural environment – for
instance, once milk becomes a stable part of the diet, there
is a consistent positive selection pressure in favor of genes
that allow for the digestion of lactose. These cases are entirely
consistent with our position: Co-evolution can and does
occur where culture provides a stable target. But this could
not be the case for the putative arbitrary regularities pre-
sumed to be encoded in UG. We concur with Barrett et al.
that the broader project of understanding what cognitive
mechanisms may have been positively selected for because
of their role in language acquisition and use (e.g., de Ruiter
& Levinson’s communicative intelligence; increased memory
capacity allowing a large vocabulary [Landauer]; or the
structure of the vocal apparatus, mentioned by Black-
more, and so on) is an important direction for future work.
Several commentators note that our arguments rest
on the assumption that language changes more rapidly
than genes and that this assumption is open to question
(Behme; Blackmore). Pagel & Atkinson report some
important recent analyses which suggest that some aspects
of language may change surprisingly slowly. The Indo-
European language group shows common aspects of voca-
bulary over many thousands of years, as shown both by
traditional linguistic analysis and modern statistical
methods (Pagel et al. 2007). Nonetheless, these languages
have gone through spectacular divergences and reorganiz-
ations, which scarcely count as a stable linguistic environ-
ment over either time or space. Moreover, while, as Pagel
& Atkinson point out, the lactose gene may have become
established over a period of thousands of years, it is un-
likely that a single gene would be responsible for establish-
ing an arbitrary linguistic regularity, such as some aspect of
the binding constraints. This would suggest that an even
longer period of stability in the target language would be
required for the relevant genes to become established.
Overall, we suggest that our assumption that languages
change faster than genes is a good first-order approxi-
mation – and this creates substantial difficulties for co-
evolutionary accounts of the origin of UG. Nonetheless,
Pagel & Atkinson’s arguments raise the possibility that
this assumption is not always correct, and suggest that
further analysis may be required to see if there are
limited circumstances where language-specific arbitrary
constraints might become established.
A number of commentators point to specific evolution-
ary mechanisms that, they suggest, might extend or com-
plicate our argument somewhat. Behme notes that our
argument may be strengthened by the observation that
language users need to coordinate with each other – a dra-
matic grammatical “advance” for a single agent might not
confer selectional advantage. It would, one might say, be
comparable to being the only person to own a telephone,
which is useless unless there is someone with whom to
communicate.
Behme further suggests that powerful forces of sexual
selection may change the argument in favor of biological
adaptations for language by analogy with the male peacock’s
impressive tail feathers (see also Dessalles). Indeed, the
males of many species of songbirds use their vocal prowess
to attract females and defend their territory, and have
clearly been subject to sexual selection (e.g., Catchpole &
Slater 1995). Crucially, however, such sexual selection has
resulted in considerable sexual dimorphisms in the neural
systems for song, with males having substantially larger brain
areas for song control (e.g., MacDougall-Shackleton & Ball
1999). Similarly, sexual selection for language ability in
humanswould also be expected to lead to sexual dimorphisms
in the brain areas involved in language, but there is no evi-
dence for such neural differences favoring male linguistic
ability. If anything, human females tend to acquire language
earlier than males (e.g., Dionne et al. 2003) and to become
more proficient language users (e.g., Lynn 1992). Thus, it
would seem that sexual selection is unlikely to be a major
determinant of any biological adaptations for language.
Hurford argues that the mechanism of “Baldwinian
niche construction”may provide a route for the co-evolution
of genes for some, albeit limited, language-specific knowl-
edge or mechanisms. Perhaps some change in the structure
of hominid social groups (e.g., group size)may have changed
the “niche” in which communication occurs; and this might
itself have altered the dynamics of language change and the
selectional pressures on cognitive machinery co-opted for
language processing. If this is right, then the triggers for
the initial creation of language may have been social,
rather than biological, change (as Brooks & Ragir also
argue). Hurford suggests, in line with our target article,
that it is possible that functional (rather than arbitrary) featu-
res of languagemight subsequently co-evolve with language,
and he highlights large vocabulary, double articulation, and
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long-distance dependencies as possible language-specific
structures. We welcome these specific proposals, and see
them as valuable pointers to guide future empirical work.
Smith et al. suggest that our argument that arbitrary
aspects of language cannot become genetically fixed by
co-evolution applies equally well to functional aspects of
language. They cite important recent formal analyses by
Kirby et al. (2007), which indicate that, if learners choose
the most probable language, given the linguistic data to
which they have been exposed, then the ordering, but
not the strength, of their prior biases, determines the
distribution of languages that arise from cultural transmis-
sion. Smith et al. raise the concern that, in this type of case,
there may be no pressure of natural selection on the more
“desirable” priors – and hence that genes that influence
such priors may be “shielded” from processes of natural
selection. We suggest that this conclusion need not follow,
however. The space of possible grammars (or, more broadly,
hypotheses concerning linguistic structures) is vast; and
hence the number of possible orderings of prior probabil-
ities across this space is enormous. If genes influence this
ordering, rather than the precise numerical values of the
priors for each element in the ordering, this gives plenty
of scope for enormous genetic influences on the speed of
learning, and hence provides scope for strong selectional
pressure on genes. Thus, if functional features of language
provide stable constraints on the linguistic environment,
then there could, we suggest, be strong pressures of
natural selection on genes determining the ordering of
priors over different grammars. Hence, we currently see
in principle no reason to rule out the co-evolution of lan-
guage and language genes for functional (though not arbi-
trary) constraints on language. Nonetheless, we suggest
that additional experimental, computational, and theoretical
work is required to clarify the circumstances under which
such co-evolution is possible.
R6. Where next?
A decade ago, Lewontin (1998) painted a bleak picture
of evolutionary accounts of language and cognition as
being “nothing more than a mixture of pure speculation
and inventive stories” (p. 111). In the target article, we out-
lined the beginnings of a new synthesis for theorizing
about the relationship between brains, genes, and lan-
guage, emphasizing the role of cultural evolution. This
perspective views language evolution as primarily a matter
of cultural, rather thanbiological, evolution; and suchevolu-
tion is seen as continuous with processes of historical
language change, such that selection among linguistic
forms is driven by constraints concerning cognition, com-
munication, learning and processing, and the structure of
the perceptuo-motor system. These selectional pressures
can be studied directly by analyzing the neural, cognitive,
and social basis of language in modern humans, by explor-
ing the impacts of different patterns of social transmission
of linguistic patterns, and by analyzing contemporary and
historical language change. The positive and constructive
spirit of the commentaries gives us grounds for optimism
that a synthesis drawing together these, and related, per-
spectives, is not merely attainable in principle, but is also
likely to be of considerable scientific potential. Thus, the
commentaries have highlighted a range of key areas for
future work, and some important theoretical challenges.
In this concluding section, we draw together these issues
and identify central remaining open questions.
R6.1. Reconnecting synchronic and diachronic
linguistics
We argued, in the target article, that grammaticalization and
other processes of linguistic change are likely to provide
much insight into language evolution. In a similar vein, we
find that some of the key observationsmade by the commen-
tators based on synchronic language data could be strength-
ened and emphasized by embedding them in a diachronic
perspective. For example, Tallerman’s discussion of the
typological patterns of case-marking as an example of lin-
guistic adaptation could be further corroborated by incor-
porating diachronic data to explore the patterns of change
over time, perhaps revealing more about the specific cogni-
tive constraints involved. This point is underscored by
Aronoff et al., who describe how their study of in vivo
changes in Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language and Israeli
Sign Language has highlighted the importance of body-
based perceptuo-motor constraints on diachronic change.
More generally, as noted in the target article, the combi-
nation of diachronic and synchronic analyses in past work
has tended to show how apparently “arbitrary,” language-
specific linguistic universals might derive from general, cog-
nitive constraints. The implication of this line of argumenta-
tion goes beyond theories of language evolution to the theory
of language itself. For example, it seems that construction
grammar may provide a much more suitable formal
approach to capturing the properties of language than gen-
erative grammar in its various guises.
R6.2. Dynamics of linguistic and cultural change
Several commentators stress the importance of cultural
dynamics in shaping language, some arguing that the social
structures underpinning language transmissions fromgener-
ation to generation may be as important as the cognitive and
biological machinery of the language learner in determining
the emergence and evolution of language. Smith et al.
report computational models of language evolution, which
illustrate the interdependence of assumptions about learners
and mechanisms of transmission (Smith & Kirby 2008);
Caldwell illustrates how cultural transmission can be
studied in the laboratory. We suggest that there is much
foundational theoretical work to be done in understanding
the co-evolution of genes-for-learning and the structure of
the to-be-learned domain, whether this domain is language
or some other aspect of human culture. Only with such
work in place will it be possible to assess the scope of the
arguments presented here (e.g., whether functional aspects
of language canbecomegenetically embedded) and todeter-
mine how far our negative conclusions concerningUGmight
extend to putatively innate “grammars” in other cultural
domains (e.g., morality; Hauser 2006). This work is required
in order to extend existing theories of co-evolution (without
learning or cultural change; Thompson 1994) and cultural
evolution (without genetic change; Boyd&Richerson 2005).
R6.3. Relevance to language acquisition
The target article notes that language change, and conse-
quently language evolution, may be importantly shaped
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by language development, although language change in
adults is also likely to be important (Bybee, in press).
Toscano et al. and Brooks & Ragir elaborate on the
importance of developmental processes embedded in a
social context. Moreover, the target article noted that if
language is shaped by the brain, the problem of language
acquisition may be far less daunting than is typically assu-
med: Language has been shaped to be learnable from the
noisy and partial input that children receive. Therefore,
language will embody the (typically non-language-specific)
biases or constraints the child brings to the problem of
language acquisition. This dramatically reduces the impact
of the POS argument, which is still used as a key motiv-
ation for UG (Harnad). These issues are explored in
more detail in Chater and Christiansen (submitted).
R6.4. Revisiting the multiple constraints on language
evolution and acquisition
The commentators elaborate and expand upon the four
types of constraints (thought, perceptuo-motor, cognition,
and social-pragmatic) on language evolution discussed in
the target article, indicating that this framework is pro-
ductive. Somehighlight specific aspects of thoughtprocesses
which may underpin language, such as mental time travel
(Corballis) and double-scope blending (Fauconnier &
Turner); some focus on perceptuo-motor constraints,
including the importance of embodiment (Aronoff et al.)
and the structure of actions (Greenfield & Gillespie-
Lynch). Lieberman sees language as built upon a neural
system for complex and flexible action sequences, underpin-
ning the cognitive aspects of language processing and learn-
ing (Namy & Nygaard). Finally, several commentators
stress the social-pragmatic forces that shape language, focus-
ing on social interaction (Wallentin & Frith), communica-
tive intelligence (de Ruiter & Levinson), and speech acts
(Enfield). As noted in the target article, one of the major
challenges for future research is to understand the many
facets of each type of constraint, and how these constraints
interact to shape the evolution of language.
R6.5. What makes humans special?
If the mechanisms shaping language evolution are to a
large extent not specific to language, then what differen-
tiates human cognition and communication from that of
other primates? That is, why do humans have languages
whereas other primates do not? Across the commentaries,
there is a continuum of views, from the reiteration of the
conventional viewpoint that grammatical information is
innate and species-specific (Harnad; Reuland), across
the suggestion that some such information may be a rela-
tively small part of the story (Barrett et al.; Satterfield),
to the idea that cultural and/or developmental processes
are of central importance (Brooks & Ragir; Smith
et al.; Toscano et al.). In considering human/primate
differences, however, it is important to keep in mind
that the absence of language-specific constraints on
language does not necessarily entail the lack of species-
specific constraints. Along these lines, Hurford and
Landauer propose some specific cognitive features that
may be uniquely human, including memory capacity suffi-
cient to store a large vocabulary, double articulation, and
combinatorial operations. Other commentators suggest
that pragmatic machinery for interpreting others’ behavior
may be more fundamental (de Ruiter & Levinson).
Comparative work on primate versus human neural and
cognitive mechanisms, as well as archaeological analysis
and language-reconstruction to clarify the relationship
between biological changes and the emergence of lan-
guage, will be crucial in addressing these issues (e.g.,
Tomasello et al. 2005).
To conclude, we thank the commentators for providing a
stimulating range of perspectives on the target article, and
for their numerous constructive suggestions for directions
for future research. We are optimistic that pursuing these
and related lines of work, across disciplines as diverse as
linguistics, primatology, developmental psychology, and
neurobiology,mayhelp construct anewsynthesis forunder-
standing the complex relationship between brains, genes,
and language.
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NOTES
1. Although others have used the term “the logical problem of
language evolution” to point to evolutionary issues relating to UG
(Botha 1999; Roberts et al. 2005), we are – to the best of our
knowledge – the first to use it as an overarching label for the
combined theoretical issues facing both adaptationist and non-
adaptationist explanations of UG.
2. Of course, differences do exist between signed and spoken
languages relating to the differences in the modality and mode
of transfer of information. This raises the intriguing possibility
that subtle differences in language structure and use may exist
due to differences in the constraints imposed on the mechanisms
subserving signed and spoken languages. For example, Conway
and Christiansen (2005; 2006; in press) have shown that visual
and auditory sequential learning may involve separate modality-
specific, but computationally similar, mechanisms, giving rise to
both qualitative and quantitative differences in the processing of
auditory and visual sequences. Such differences may shape
signed and spoken languages in slightly different ways so as to
better fit modality-specific constraints on sequential learning.
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